

TAB 8

CITATION: Smith v Sino-Forest Corporation, 2012 ONSC24
 COURT FILE NO.: 11-CV-428238CP
 COURT FILE NO.: 11-CV-431153CP
 COURT FILE NO.: 11-CV-435826CP
 DATE: January 6, 2012

ONTARIO
 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Douglas Smith and Zhongjun Goa

Plaintiffs

- and -

Sino-Forest Corporation, Allen T.Y. Chan, James M.E. Hyde, Edmund Mak, W. Judson Martin, Simon Murray, Peter D.H. Wang, David J. Horsley, Ernst & Young LLP, BDO Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd., and Maison Placements Canada Inc.

Defendants

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

AND BETWEEN:

The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada and the Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario

Plaintiffs

- and -

Sino-Forest Corporation, Ernst & Young LLP, Allen T.Y. Chan, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon, David J. Horsley, William E. Ardell, Kai Kit Poon, David J. Horsley, James P Bowland, James M.E. Hyde, Edmund Mak, Simon Murray, Peter Wang, Garry J. West, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc. Canaccord Financial Ltd., and Maison Placements Canada Inc.

Defendants

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

AND BETWEEN:

**Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P., Comité Syndical National de Retraite
Bâtirente Inc.**

Plaintiffs

- and -

**Sino-Forest Corporation, Allen T.Y. Chan, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon,
David J. Horsley, Hua Chen, Wei Mao Zhao, Alfred C.T. Hung, Albert Ip, George
Ho, Thomas M. Maradin, William E. Ardell, James M.E. Hyde, Simon Murray,
Garry J. West, James P. Boyland, Edmund Mak, Peter Wang, Kee Y. Wong, The
Estate of John Lawrence, Simon Yeung, Ernst & Young LLP, BDO Limited,
Pöyry Forest Industry PTE Limited, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company
Limited, JP Management Consulting (Asia Pacific) PTE Ltd., Dundee Securities
Corporation, UBS Securities Canada Inc., Haywood Securities Inc., Credit Suisse
Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia
Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc. Canaccord
Financial Ltd., Maison Placements Canada Inc., Morgan Stanley & Co.
Incorporated, Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.**

Defendants

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

COUNSEL:

- J.P. Rochon, J. Archibald, and S. Tambakos for the Plaintiffs in 11-CV-428238CP
- K.M. Baert, J. Bida, and C.M. Wright for the Plaintiffs in 11-CV-431153CP
- J.C. Orr, V. Paris, N. Mizobuchi, and A. Erfan for the Plaintiffs in 11-CV-435826CP
- M. Eizonga for the defendant Sino-Forest Corporation
- P. Osborne and S. Roy for the defendant Ernst & Young LLP
- E. Cole for the defendant Allen T.Y. Chan
- J. Fabello for the defendant underwriters

HEARING DATES: December 20 and 21, 2011

PERELL, J.

REASONS FOR DECISION

A. INTRODUCTION

[1] This is a carriage motion under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, S.O. 1992, c. 6. In this particular carriage motion, four law firms are rivals for the carriage of a class action against Sino-Forest Corporation. There are currently four proposed Ontario class

actions against Sino-Forest to recover losses alleged to be in the billions of dollars arising from the spectacular crash in value of its shares and notes.

[2] Practically speaking, carriage motions involve two steps. First, the rival law firms that are seeking carriage of a class action extoll their own merits as class counsel and the merits of their client as the representative plaintiff. During this step, the law firms explain their tactical and strategic plans for the class action, and, thus, a carriage motion has aspects of being a casting call or rehearsal for the certification motion.

[3] Second, the rival law firms submit that with their talent and their litigation plan, their class action is the better way to serve the best interests of the class members, and, thus, the court should choose their action as the one to go forward. No doubt to the delight of the defendants and the defendants' lawyers, which have a watching brief, the second step also involves the rivals hardheartedly and toughly reviewing and criticizing each other's work and pointing out flaws, disadvantages, and weaknesses in their rivals' plans for suing the defendants.

[4] The law firms seeking carriage are: Rochon Genova LLP; Koskie Minsky LLP; Siskinds LLP; and Kim Orr Barristers P.C., all competent, experienced, and veteran class action law firms.

[5] For the purposes of deciding the carriage motions, I will assume that all of the rivals have delivered their Statements of Claim as they propose to amend them.

[6] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds propose to act as co-counsel and to consolidate two of the actions. Thus, the competition for carriage is between three proposed class actions; namely:

- *Smith v. Sino-Forest Corp.* (11-CV-428238CP) ("*Smith v. Sino-Forest*") with Rochon Genova as Class Counsel
- *The Trustees of Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. Sino-Forest Corp.* (11-CV-431153CP) ("*Labourers v. Sino-Forest*") with Koskie Minsky and Siskinds as Class Counsel (This action would be consolidated with "*Grant v. Sino-Forest*" (CV-11-439400-00CP))
- *Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P. v. Sino-Forest Corp.* (11-CV-435826CP) ("*Northwest v. Sino-Forest*") with Kim Orr as Class Counsel.

[7] It has been a very difficult decision to reach, but for the reasons that follow, I stay *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, and I grant carriage to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[8] I also grant leave to the plaintiffs in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, which may include the joinder of the plaintiffs and the causes of action set out in *Grant v. Sino-Forest*, *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, as the plaintiffs may be advised.

[9] This order is without prejudice to the rights of the Defendants to challenge the Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim as they may be advised. In any event, nothing in

these reasons is intended to make findings of fact or law binding on the Defendants or to be a pre-determination of the certification motion.

B. METHODOLOGY

[10] To explain my reasons, first, I will describe the jurisprudence about carriage motions. Second, I will describe the evidentiary record for the carriage motions. Third, I will describe the factual background to the claims against Sino-Forest, which is the principal but not the only target of the various class actions. Fourth, deferring my ultimate conclusions, I will analyze the rival actions that are competing for carriage under twelve headings and describe the positions and competing arguments of the law firms competing for carriage. Fifth, I will culminate the analysis of the competing actions by explaining the carriage order decision. Sixth and finally, I will finish with a concluding section.

[11] Thus, the organization of these Reasons for Decision is as follows:

- Introduction
- Methodology
- Carriage Orders Jurisprudence
- Evidentiary Background
- Factual Background to the Claims against Sino-Forest
- Analysis of the Competing Class Actions
 - The Attributes of Class Counsel
 - Retainer, Legal and Forensic Resources, and Investigations
 - Proposed Representative Plaintiffs
 - Funding
 - Conflicts of Interest
 - Definition of Class Membership
 - Definition of Class Period
 - Theory of the Case against the Defendants
 - Joinder of Defendants
 - Causes of Action
 - The Plaintiff and the Defendant Correlation
 - Prospects of Certification
- Carriage Order
 - Introduction
 - Neutral or Non-Determinative Factors
 - Determinative Factors
- Conclusion

C. CARRIAGE ORDERS JURISPRUDENCE

[12] There should not be two or more class actions that proceed in respect of the same putative class asserting the same cause(s) of action, and one action must be selected: *Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd.*, [2000] O.J. No. 4594

(S.C.J.) at para. 14. See also *Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3682 (S.C.J.), aff'd [2002] O.J. No. 2010 (C.A.). When counsel have not agreed to consolidate and coordinate their actions, the court will usually select one and stay all other actions: *Lau v. Bayview Landmark*, [2004] O.J. No. 2788 (S.C.J.) at para. 19.

[13] Where two or more class proceedings are brought with respect to the same subject matter, a proposed representative plaintiff in one action may bring a carriage motion to stay all other present or future class proceedings relating to the same subject matter: *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, [2006] O.J. No. 376 (S.C.J.) at paras. 9-11; *Ricardo v. Air Transat A.T. Inc.*, [2002] O.J. No. 1090 (S.C.J.), leave to appeal dismissed [2002] O.J. No. 2122 (S.C.J.).

[14] The *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, confers upon the court a broad discretion to manage the proceedings. Section 13 of the Act authorizes the court to "stay any proceeding related to the class proceeding," and s. 12 authorizes the court to "make any order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination." Section 138 of the *Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 43* directs that "as far as possible, multiplicity of legal proceedings shall be avoided." See: *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*, at paras. 9-11.

[15] The court also has its normal jurisdiction under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. Section 35 of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, provides that the rules of court apply to class proceedings. Among the rules that are available is Rule 6, the rule that empowers the court to consolidate two or more proceedings or to order that they be heard together.

[16] In determining carriage of a class proceeding, the court's objective is to make the selection that is in the best interests of class members, while at the same time being fair to the defendants and being consistent with the objectives of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*: *Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd.*, [2000] O.J. No. 4594 (S.C.J.) at para. 48; *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*, at para. 13 (S.C.J.); *Sharma v. Timminco Ltd.* (2009), 99 O.R. (3d) 260 (S.C.J.) at para. 14. The objectives of a class proceeding are access to justice, behaviour modification, and judicial economy for the parties and for the administration of justice.

[17] Courts generally consider seven non-exhaustive factors in determining which action should proceed: (1) the nature and scope of the causes of action advanced; (2) the theories advanced by counsel as being supportive of the claims advanced; (3) the state of each class action, including preparation; (4) the number, size and extent of involvement of the proposed representative plaintiffs; (5) the relative priority of the commencement of the class actions; (6) the resources and experience of counsel; and (7) the presence of any conflicts of interest: *Sharma v. Timminco Ltd.*, *supra* at para. 17.

[18] In these reasons, I will examine the above factors under somewhat differently-named headings and in a different order and combination. And, I will add several more factors that the parties made relevant to the circumstances of the competing actions in the cases at bar, including: (a) funding; (b) definition of class membership; (c) definition of class period; (d) joinder of defendants; (e) the plaintiff and defendant correlation; and, (f) prospects of certification.

[19] In addition to identifying relevant factors, the carriage motion jurisprudence provides guidance about how the court should determine carriage. Although the determination of a carriage motion will decide which counsel will represent the plaintiff, the task of the court is not to choose between different counsel according to their relative resources and expertise; rather, it is to determine which of the competing actions is more, or most, likely to advance the interests of the class: *Tiboni v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, [2008] O.J. No. 2996 (S.C.J.), sub. nom *Mignacca v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, leave to appeal granted [2008] O.J. No. 4731 (S.C.J.), aff'd [2009] O.J. No. 821 (Div. Ct.), application for leave to appeal to C.A. ref'd May 15, 2009, application for leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref'd [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 261.

[20] On a carriage motion, it is inappropriate for the court to embark upon an analysis as to which claim is most likely to succeed unless one is "fanciful or frivolous": *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*, at para. 19.

[21] In analysing whether the prohibition against a multiplicity of proceedings would be offended, it is not necessary that the multiple proceedings be identical or mirror each other in every respect; rather, the court will look at the essence of the proceedings and their similarities: *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*, at para. 11.

[22] Where there is a competition for carriage of a class proceeding, the circumstance that one competitor joins more defendants is not determinative; rather, what is important is the rationale for the joinder and whether or not it is advantageous for the class to join the additional defendants: *Joel v. Menu Foods Gen-Par Limited*, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2159 (B.C.S.C.); *Genier v. CCI Capital Canada Ltd.*, [2005] O.J. No. 1135 (S.C.J.); *Settingington v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.*, *supra*.

[23] In determining which firm should be granted carriage of a class action, the court may consider whether there is any potential conflict of interest if carriage is given to one counsel as opposed to others: *Joel v. Menu Foods Gen-Par Limited*, *supra* at para. 16; *Vitapharm Canada Ltd. v. F. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd.*, [2000] O.J. No. 4594 (S.C.J.) and [2001] O.J. No. 3673 (S.C.J.).

D. EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND

Smith v. Sino-Forest

[24] In support of its carriage motion in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, Rochon Genova delivered affidavits from:

- Ken Froese, who is Senior Managing Director of Froese Forensic Partners Ltd., a forensic accounting firm
- Vincent Genova, who is the managing partner of Rochon Genova
- Douglas Smith, the proposed representative plaintiff

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[25] In support of their carriage motion in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds delivered affidavits from:

- Dimitri Lascaris, who is a partner at Siskinds and the leader of its class action team
- Michael Gallagher, who is the Chair of the Board of Trustees of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario ("Operating Engineers Fund"), a proposed representative plaintiff
- David Grant, a proposed representative plaintiff
- Richard Grottheim, who is the Chief Executive Officer of Sjuñde AP-Fonden, a proposed representative plaintiff
- Joseph Mancinelli, who is the Chair of the Board of Trustees of The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada ("Labourers' Fund"), a proposed representative plaintiff. He also holds senior positions with the Labourers International Union of North America, which has more than 80,000 members in Canada
- Ronald Queck, who is Director of Investments of the Healthcare Employee Benefits Plans of Manitoba ("Healthcare Manitoba"), which would be a prominent class member in the proposed class action
- Frank Torchio, who is a chartered financial analyst and an expert in finance and economics who was retained to opine, among other things, about the damages suffered under various proposed class periods by Sino-Forest shareholders and noteholders under s. 138.5 of the *Ontario Securities Act*
- Robert Wong, who is a proposed representative plaintiff
- Mark Zigler, who is the managing partner of Koskie Minsky

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[26] In support of its carriage motion in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, Kim Orr delivered affidavits from:

- Megan B. McPhee, a principal of the firm
- John Mountain, who is the Senior Vice President, Legal and Human Resources, the Chief Compliance Officer and Corporate Secretary of Northwest Ethical Investments L.P. ("Northwest"), a proposed representative plaintiff
- Zachary Nye, a financial economist who was retained to respond to Mr. Torchio's opinion
- Daniel Simard, who is General Co-Ordinator and a non-voting ex-officio member of the Board of Directors and Committees of Comité syndical national de retraite Bâtirente inc. ("Bâtirente"), a proposed representative plaintiff
- Michael C. Spencer, a lawyer qualified to practice in New York, California, and Ontario, who is counsel to Kim Orr and a partner and member of the executive committee at the American law firm of Milberg LLP

- Brian Thomson, who is Vice-President, Equity Investments for British Columbia Investment Management Corporation ("BC Investment"), a proposed representative plaintiff

E. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE CLAIMS AGAINST SINO-FOREST

[27] The following factual background is largely an amalgam made from the unproven allegations in the Statements of Claim in the three proposed class actions and unproven allegations in the motion material delivered by the parties.

[28] The Defendant, Sino-Forest is a Canadian public company incorporated under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44 with its registered office in Mississauga, Ontario, and its head office in Hong Kong. Its shares have traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange ("TSX") since 1995. It is a forestry plantation company with operations centered in the People's Republic of China. Its trading of securities is subject to the regulation of the *Ontario Securities Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, under which it is a "reporting issuer" subject to the continuous disclosure provisions of Part XVIII of the Act and a "responsible issuer" subject to civil liability for secondary market misrepresentation under Part XXIII.1 of the Act.

[29] The Defendant, Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y") has been Sino-Forest's auditor from 1994 to date, except for 1999, when the now-defunct Arthur Andersen LLP did the audit, and 2005 and 2006, when the predecessor of what is now the Defendant, BDO Limited ("BDO") was Sino-Forest's auditor. BDO is the Hong Kong member of BDO International Ltd., a global accounting and audit firm.

[30] E&Y and BDO are "experts" within the meaning of s. 138.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[31] From 1996 to 2010, in its financial statements, Sino-Forest reported only profits, and it appeared to be an enormously successful enterprise that substantially outperformed its competitors in the forestry industry. Sino-Forest's 2010 Annual Report issued in May 2011 reported that Sino-Forest had net income of \$395 million and assets of \$5.7 billion. Its year-end market capitalization was \$5.7 billion with approximately 246 million common shares outstanding.

[32] It is alleged that Sino-Forest and its auditors E&Y and BDO repeatedly misrepresented that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAAP ("generally accepted accounting principles").

[33] It is alleged that Sino-Forest and its officers and directors made other misrepresentations about the assets, liabilities, and performance of Sino-Forest in various filings required under the *Ontario Securities Act*. It is alleged that these misrepresentations appeared in the documents used for the offerings of shares and bonds in the primary market and again in what are known as Core Documents under securities legislation, which documents are available to provide information to purchasers of shares and bonds in the secondary market. It is also alleged that misrepresentations were made in oral statements and in Non-Core Documents.

[34] The Defendant, Allen T.Y. Chan was Sino-Forest's co-founder, its CEO, and a director until August 2011. He resides in Hong Kong.

[35] The Defendant, Kai Kit Poon, was Sino-Forest's co-founder, a director from 1994 until 2009, and Sino-Forest's President. He resides in Hong Kong.

[36] The Defendant, David J. Horsley was a Sino-Forest director (from 2004 to 2006) and was its CFO. He resides in Ontario.

[37] The Defendants, William E. Ardell (resident of Ontario, director since 2010), James P. Bowland (resident of Ontario, director since 2011), James M.E. Hyde (resident of Ontario, director since 2004), John Lawrence (resident of Ontario, deceased, director 1997 to 2006), Edmund Mak (resident of British Columbia, director since 1994), W. Judson Martin (resident of Hong Kong, director since 2006, CEO since August 2011), Simon Murray (resident of Hong Kong, director since 1999), Peter Wang (resident of Hong Kong, director since 2007) and Gary J. West (resident of Ontario, director since 2011) were members of Sino-Forest's Board of Directors.

[38] The Defendants, Hua Chen (resident of Ontario), George Ho (resident of China), Alfred C.T. Hung (resident of China), Alfred Ip (resident of China), Thomas M. Maradin (resident of Ontario), Simon Yeung (resident of China) and Wei Mao Zhao (resident of Ontario) are vice presidents of Sino-Forest. The defendant Kee Y. Wong was CFO from 1999 to 2005.

[39] Sino-Forest's forestry assets were valued by the Defendant, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited, ("Pöyry"), a consulting firm based in Shanghai, China. Associated with Pöyry are the Defendants, Pöyry Forest Industry PTE Limited ("Pöyry-Forest") and JP Management Consulting (Asia-Pacific) PTE Ltd. ("JP Management"). Each Pöyry Defendant is an expert as defined by s. 138.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[40] Pöyry prepared technical reports dated March 8, 2006, March 15, 2007, March 14, 2008, April 1, 2009, and April 23, 2010 that were filed with SEDAR (the System of Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval) and made available on Sino-Forest's website. The reports contained a disclaimer and a limited liability exculpatory provision purporting to protect Pöyry from liability.

[41] In China, the state owns the forests, but the Chinese government grants forestry rights to local farmers, who may sell their lumber rights to forestry companies, like Sino-Forest. Under Chinese law, Sino-Forest was obliged to maintain a 1:1 ratio between lands for forest harvesting and lands for forest replantation.

[42] Sino-Forest's business model involved numerous subsidiaries and the use of authorized intermediaries or "AIs" to assemble forestry rights from local farmers. Sino-Forest also used authorized intermediaries to purchase forestry products. There were numerous AIs, and by 2010, Sino-Forest had over 150 subsidiaries, 58 of which were formed in the British Virgin Islands and at least 40 of which were incorporated in China.

[43] It is alleged that from at least March 2003, Sino-Forest used its business model and non-arm's length AIs to falsify revenues and to facilitate the misappropriation of Sino-Forest's assets.

[44] It is alleged that from at least March 2004, Sino-Forest made false statements about the nature of its business, assets, revenue, profitability, future prospects, and compliance with the laws of Canada and China. It is alleged that Sino-Forest and other Defendants misrepresented that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAPP ("generally accepted accounting principles"). It is alleged that Sino-Forest misrepresented that it was an honest and reputable corporate citizen. It is alleged that Sino-Forest misrepresented and greatly exaggerated the nature and extent of its forestry rights and its compliance with Chinese forestry regulations. It is alleged that Sino-Forest inflated its revenue, had questionable accounting practices, and failed to pay a substantial VAT liability. It is alleged that Sino-Forest and other Defendants misrepresented the role of the AIs and greatly understated the risks of Sino-Forest utilizing them. It is alleged that Sino-Forest materially understated the tax-related risks from the use of AIs in China, where tax evasion penalties are severe and potentially devastating.

[45] Starting in 2004, Sino-Forest began a program of debt and equity financing. It amassed over \$2.1 billion from note offerings and over \$906 million from share issues.

[46] On May 17, 2004, Sino-Forest filed its Annual Information Form for the 2003 year. It is alleged in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* that the 2003 AIF contains the first misrepresentation in respect of the nature and role of the authorized intermediaries, which allegedly played a foundational role in the misappropriation of Sino-Forest's assets.

[47] In August 2004, Sino-Forest issued an offering memorandum for the distribution of 9.125% guaranteed senior notes (\$300 million (U.S.)). The Defendant, Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated ("Morgan") was a note distributor that managed the note offering in 2004 and purchased and resold notes.

[48] Under the Sino-Forest note instruments, in the event of default, the trustee may sue to collect payment of the notes. A noteholder, however, may not pursue any remedy with respect to the notes unless, among other things, written notice is given to the trustee by holders of 25% of the outstanding principal asking the trustee to pursue the remedy and the trustee does not comply with the request. The notes provide that no noteholder shall obtain a preference or priority over another noteholder. The notes contain a waiver and release of Sino-Forest's directors, officers, and shareholders from all liability "for the payment of the principal of, or interest on, or other amounts in respect of the notes or for any claim based thereon or otherwise in respect thereof." The notes are all governed by New York law and include non-exclusive attornment clauses to the jurisdiction of New York State and United States federal courts.

[49] On March 19, 2007, Sino-Forest announced its 2006 financial results. The appearance of positive results caused a substantial increase in its share price which moved from \$10.10 per share to \$13.42 per share ten days later, a 33% increase.

[50] In May 2007, Sino-Forest filed a Management Information Circular that represented that it maintained a high standard of corporate governance. It indicated that its Board of Directors made compliance with high governance standards a top priority.

[51] In June 2007, Sino-Forest made a share prospectus offering of 15.9 million common shares at \$12.65 per share (\$201 million offering). Chan, Horsley, Martin, and Hyde signed the prospectus. The underwriters (as defined by s. 1. (1) of the *Ontario Securities Act*) were the Defendants, CIBC World Markets Inc. ("CIBC"), Credit Suisse Securities Canada (Inc.) ("Credit Suisse"), Dundee Securities Corporation ("Dundee"), Haywood Securities Inc. ("Haywood"), Merrill Lynch Canada, Inc. ("Merrill") and UBS Securities Canada Inc. ("UBS").

[52] In July 2008, Sino-Forest issued a final offering memorandum for the distribution of 5% convertible notes (\$345 million (U.S.) due 2013. The Defendants, Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC ("Credit Suisse (USA)"), and Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith Inc. ("Merrill-Fenner") were note distributors.

[53] In June 2009, Sino-Forest made a share prospectus offering of 34.5 million common shares at \$11.00 per share (\$380 million offering). Chan, Horsley, Martin, and Hyde signed the prospectus. The underwriters (as defined by s. 1. (1) of the *Ontario Securities Act*) were Credit Suisse, Dundee, Merrill, the Defendant, Scotia Capital Inc. ("Scotia"), and the Defendant, TD Securities Inc. ("TD").

[54] In June 2009, Sino-Forest issued a final offering memorandum for the exchange of senior notes for new guaranteed senior 10.25% notes (\$212 million (U.S.) offering) due 2014. Credit Suisse (USA) was the note distributor.

[55] In December 2009, Sino-Forest made a share prospectus offering of 22 million common shares at \$16.80 per share (\$367 million offering). Chan, Horsley, Martin, and Hyde signed the prospectus. The underwriters (as defined by s. 1. (1) of the *Ontario Securities Act*) were Credit Suisse, the Defendant, Canaccord Financial Ltd. ("Canaccord"), CIBC, Dundee, the Defendant, Maison Placements Canada Inc. ("Maison"), Merrill, the Defendant, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. ("RBC"), Scotia, and TD.

[56] In December 2009, Sino-Forest issued an offering memorandum for 4.25% convertible senior notes (\$460 million (U.S.) offering) due 2016. The note distributors were Credit Suisse (USA), Merrill-Fenner, and TD.

[57] In October 2010, Sino-Forest issued an offering memorandum for 6.25% guaranteed senior notes (\$600 million (U.S.) offering) due 2017. The note distributors were Banc of America Securities LLC ("Banc of America") and Credit Suisse USA.

[58] Sino-Forest's per-share market price reached a high of \$25.30 on March 31, 2011.

[59] It is alleged that all the financial statements, prospectuses, offering memoranda, MD&As (Management Discussion and Analysis), AIFs (Annual Information Forms) contained misrepresentations and failures to fully, fairly, and plainly disclose all

material facts relating to the securities of Sino-Forest, including misrepresentations about Sino-Forest's assets, its revenues, its business activities, and its liabilities.

[60] On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters Research, a Hong Kong investment firm that researches Chinese businesses, released a research report about Sino-Forest. Muddy Waters is operated by Carson Block, its sole full-time employee. Mr. Block was a short-seller of Sino-Forest stock. His Report alleged that Sino-Forest massively exaggerates its assets and that it had engaged in extensive related-party transactions since the company's TSX listing in 1995. The Report asserted, among other allegations, that a company-reported sale of \$231 million in timber in Yunnan Province was largely fabricated. It asserted that Sino-Forest had overstated its standing timber purchases in Yunnan Province by over \$800 million.

[61] The revelations in the Muddy Waters Report had a catastrophic effect on Sino-Forest's share price. Within two days, \$3 billion of market capitalization was gone and the market value of Sino-Forest's notes plummeted.

[62] Following the release of the Muddy Waters Report, Sino-Forest and certain of its officers and directors released documents and press releases and made public oral statements in an effort to refute the allegations in the Report. Sino-Forest promised to produce documentation to counter the allegations of misrepresentations. It appointed an Independent Committee of Messrs. Ardell, Bowland and Hyde to investigate the allegations contained in the Muddy Waters Report. After these assurances, Sino-Forest's share price rebounded, trading as high as 60% of its previous day's close, eventually closing on June 6, 2011 at \$6.16, approximately 18% higher from its previous close.

[63] On June 7, the Independent Committee announced that it had appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PWC") to assist with the investigation. Several law firms were also hired to assist in the investigation.

[64] However, bad news followed. Reporters from the *Globe and Mail* travelled to China, and on June 18 and 20, 2011, the newspaper published articles that reported that Yunnan Province forestry officials had stated that their records contradicted Sino-Forest's claim that it controlled almost 200,000 hectares in Yunnan Province.

[65] On August 26, 2011, the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC") issued an order suspending trading in Sino-Forest's securities and stated that: (a) Sino-Forest appears to have engaged in significant non-arm's length transactions that may have been contrary to Ontario securities laws and the public interest; (b) Sino-Forest and certain of its officers and directors appear to have misrepresented in a material respect, some of its revenue and/or exaggerated some of its timber holdings in public filings under the securities laws; and (c) Sino-Forest and certain of its officers and directors, including its CEO, appear to be engaging or participating in acts, practices or a course of conduct related to its securities which it and/or they know or reasonably ought to know perpetuate a fraud.

[66] The OSC named Chan, Ho, Hung, Ip, and Young as respondents in the proceedings before the Commission. Sino-Forest placed Messrs. Hung, Ho and Young on administrative leave. Mr. Ip may only act on the instructions of the CEO.

[67] Having already downgraded its credit rating for Sino-Forest's securities, Standard & Poor withdrew its rating entirely, and Moody's reduced its rating to "junk" indicating a very high credit risk.

[68] On September 8, 2011, after a hearing, the OSC continued its cease-trading order until January 25, 2012, and the OSC noted the presence of evidence of conduct that may be harmful to investors and the public interest.

[69] On November 10, 2011, articles in the *Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* reported that the RCMP had commenced a criminal investigation into whether executives of Sino-Forest had defrauded Canadian investors.

[70] On November 13, 2011, at a cost of \$35 million, Sino-Forest's Independent Committee released its Second Interim Report, which included the work of the committee members, PWC, and three law firms. The Report refuted some of the allegations made in the Muddy Waters Report but indicated that evidence could not be obtained to refute other allegations. The Committee reported that it did not detect widespread fraud, and noted that due to challenges it faced, including resistance from some company insiders, it was not able to reach firm conclusions on many issues.

[71] On December 12, 2011, Sino-Forest announced that it would not file its third-quarter earnings' figures and would default on an upcoming interest payment on outstanding notes. This default may lead to the bankruptcy of Sino-Forest.

[72] The chart attached as Schedule "A" to this judgment shows Sino-Forest's stock price on the TSX from January 1, 2004, to the date that its shares were cease-traded on August 26, 2011.

F. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING CLASS ACTIONS

1. The Attributes of Class Counsel

Smith v. Sino-Forest

[73] Rochon Genova is a boutique litigation firm in Toronto focusing primarily on class action litigation, including securities class actions. It is currently class counsel in the CIBC subprime litigation, which seeks billions in damages on behalf of CIBC shareholders for the bank's alleged non-disclosure of its exposure to the U.S. subprime residential mortgage market. It is currently the lawyer of record in *Fischer v. IG Investment Management Ltd* and *Frank v. Martie Turner*, both securities cases, and it is acting for aggrieved investors in litigation involving two multi-million dollar Ponzi schemes. It acted on behalf of Canadian shareholders in relation to the Nortel securities litigation, as well as, large scale products liability class actions involving Baycol, Proculsid, and Maple Leaf Foods, among many other cases.

[74] Rochon Genova has a working arrangement with Loeff Cabrasser Holmann & Bernstein, one of the United States' leading class action firms.

[75] Lead lawyers for *Smith v. Sino-Forest* are Joel Rochon and Peter Jervis, both senior lawyers with considerable experience and proficiency in class actions and securities litigation.

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[76] Koskie Minsky is a Toronto law firm of 43 lawyers with a diverse practice including bankruptcy and insolvency, commercial litigation, corporate and securities, taxation, employment, labour, pension and benefits, professional negligence and insurance litigation.

[77] Koskie Minsky has a well-established and prominent class actions practice, having been counsel in every sort of class proceeding, several of them being landmark cases, including *Hollick v Toronto (City)*, *Cloud v The Attorney General of Canada*, and *Caputo v Imperial Tobacco*. It is currently representative counsel on behalf of all former Canadian employees in the multi-billion dollar Nortel insolvency.

[78] Siskinds is a London and Toronto law firm of 70 lawyers with a diverse practice including bankruptcy and insolvency, business law, and commercial litigation. It has an association with the Québec law firm Siskinds, Desmeules, avocats.

[79] At its London office, Siskinds has a team of 14 lawyers that focus their practice on class actions, in some instances exclusively. The firm has a long and distinguished history at the class actions bar, being class counsel in the first action certified as a class action, *Bendall v. McGhan Medical Corp.* (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 734, and it has almost a monopoly on securities class actions, having filed approximately 40 of this species of class actions, including 24 that advance claims under Part XXX.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[80] As mentioned again later, for the purposes of *Labourers' Fund v. Sino-Forest*, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds have a co-operative arrangement with the U.S. law firm, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP ("Kessler Topaz"), which is a 113-lawyer law firm specializing in complex litigation with a very high profile and excellent reputation as counsel in securities class action lawsuits in the United States.

[81] Lead lawyers for *Labourers' v. Sino-Forest* are Kirk M. Baert, Jonathan Ptak, Mark Ziegler, and Michael Mazzuca of Koskie Minsky and A. Dimitri Lascaris of Siskinds, all senior lawyers with considerable experience and proficiency in class actions and securities litigation.

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[82] Kim Orr is a boutique litigation firm in Toronto focusing primarily on class action litigation, including securities class actions. It also has considerable experience on the defence side of defending securities cases.

[83] As I described in *Sharma v. Timminco Ltd.*, *supra*, where I choose Kim Orr in a carriage competition with Siskinds in a securities class action, Kim Orr has a fine pedigree as a class action firm and its senior lawyers have considerable experience and proficiency in all types of class actions. It was comparatively modest in its self-promotional material for the carriage motion, but I am aware that it is currently class

counsel in substantial class actions involving claims of a similar nature to those in the case at bar.

[84] Kim Orr has an association with Milberg, LLP, a prominent class action law firm in the United States. It has 75 attorneys, most of whom devote their practice to representing plaintiffs in complex litigations, including class and derivative actions. It has a large support staff, including investigators, a forensic accountant, financial analysts, legal assistants, litigation support analysts, shareholder services personnel, and information technology specialists.

[85] Michael Spencer, who is a partner at Milberg and called to the bar in Ontario, offers counsel to Kim Orr.

[86] Lead lawyers for *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* are James Orr, Won Kim, and Mr. Spencer.

2. Retainer, Legal and Forensic Resources, and Investigations

Smith v. Sino-Forest

[87] Following the release of the Muddy Waters Report, on June 6, 2011, Mr. Smith contacted Rochon Genova. Mr. Smith, who lost much of his investment fortune, was one of the victims of the wrongs allegedly committed by Sino-Forest. Rochon Genova accepted the retainer, and two days later, a notice of action was issued. The Statement of Claim in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* followed on July 8, 2011.

[88] Following their retainer by Mr. Smith, Rochon Genova hired Mr. X (his name was not disclosed), as a consultant. Mr. X, who has an accounting background, can fluently read, write, and speak English, Cantonese, and Mandarin. He travelled to China from June 19 to July 3, 2011 and again from October 31 to November 18, 2011. The purpose of the trips was to gather information about Sino-Forest's subsidiaries, its customers, and its suppliers. While in China, Mr. X secured approximately 20,000 pages of filings by Sino-Forest with the provincial branches of China's State Administration for Industry and Commerce (the "SAIC Files").

[89] In August 2011, Rochon Genova retained Froese Forensic Partners Ltd., a Toronto-based forensic accounting firm, to analyze the SAIC files.

[90] Rochon Genova also retained HAIBU Attorneys at Law, a full service law firm based in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, China, to provide a preliminary opinion about Sino-Forest's alleged violations of Chinese accounting and taxation laws.

[91] Exclusive of the carriage motion, Rochon Genova has already incurred approximately \$350,000 in time and disbursements for the proposed class action.

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[92] On June 3, 2011, the day after the release of the Muddy Waters Report, Siskinds retained the Dacheng Law Firm in China to begin an investigation of the allegations contained in the report. Dacheng is the largest law firm in China with offices throughout China and Hong Kong and also offices in Los Angeles, New York, Paris, Singapore, and Taiwan.

[93] On June 9, 2011, Guining Liu, a Sino-Forest shareholder, commenced an action in the Québec Superior Court on behalf of persons or entities domiciled in Québec who purchased shares and notes. Siskinds' Québec affiliate office, Siskinds, Desmeules, avocats, is acting as class counsel in that action.

[94] On June 20, 2011, Koskie Minsky, which had a long standing lawyer-client relationship with the Labourers' Fund, was retained by it to recover its losses associated with the plummet in value of its holdings in Sino-Forest shares. Koskie Minsky issued a notice of action in a proposed class action with Labourers' Fund as the proposed representative plaintiffs.

[95] The June action, however, is not being pursued, and in July 2011, Labourers' Fund was advised that Operating Engineers Fund, another pension fund, also had very significant losses, and the two funds decided to retain Koskie Minsky and Siskinds to commence a new action, which followed on July 20, 2011, by notice of action. The Statement of Claim in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* was served in August, 2011.

[96] Before commencing the new action, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds retained private investigators in Southeast Asia and received reports from them, along with information received from the Daoheng Law Firm. Koskie Minsky and Siskinds also received information from an unnamed expert in Suriname about the operations of Sino-Forest in Suriname and the role of Greenheart Group Ltd., which is a significant aspect of its Statement of Claim in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[97] On November 4, 2011, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds served the Defendants in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* with the notice of motion for an order granting leave to assert the causes of action under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[98] On October 26, 2011, Robert Wong, who had lost a very large personal investment in Sino-Forest shares, retained Koskie Minsky and Siskinds to sue Sino-Forest for his losses, and the firms decided that he would become another representative plaintiff.

[99] On November 14, 2011, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds commenced *Grant v. Sino-Forest Corp.*, which, as already noted above, they intend to consolidate with *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[100] *Grant v. Sino-Forest* names the same defendants as in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, except for the additional joinder of Messrs. Bowland, Poon, and West, and it also joins as defendants, BDO, and two additional underwriters, Banc of America and Credit Suisse Securities (USA).

[101] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds state that *Grant v. Sino-Forest* was commenced out of an abundance of caution to ensure that certain prospectus and offering memorandum claims under the *Ontario Securities Act*, and under the equivalent legislation of the other Provinces, will not expire as being statute-barred.

[102] Exclusive of the carriage motion, Koskie Minsky has already incurred approximately \$350,000 in time and disbursements for the proposed class action, and

exclusive of the carriage motion, Siskinds has already incurred approximately \$440,000 in time and disbursements for the proposed class action.

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[103] Immediately following the release of the Muddy Waters Report, Kim Orr and Milberg together began an investigation to determine whether an investor class action would be warranted. A joint press release on June 7, 2011, announced the investigation.

[104] For the purposes of the carriage motion, apart from saying that their investigation included reviewing all the documents on SEDAR and the System for Electronic Disclosure for Insiders (SEDI), communicating with contacts in the financial industry, and looking into Sino-Forest's officers, directors, auditors, underwriters and valuation experts, Kim Orr did not disclose the details of its investigation. It did indicate that it had hired a Chinese forensic investigator and financial analyst, a market and damage consulting firm, Canadian forensic accountants, and an investment and market analyst and that its investigations discovered valuable information.

[105] Meanwhile, lawyers at Milberg contacted Bâtirente, which was one of its clients and also a Sino-Forest shareholder, and Won Kim of Kim Orr contacted Northwest, another Sino-Forest shareholder. Bâtirente already had a retainer with Milberg to monitor its investment portfolio on an ongoing basis to detect losses due to possible securities violations.

[106] Northwest and Bâtirente agreed to retain Kim Orr to commence a class action, and on September 26, 2011, Kim Orr commenced *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

[107] In October 2011, BC Investments contacted Kim Orr about the possibility of it becoming a plaintiff in the class proceeding commenced by Northwest and Bâtirente, and BC Investments decided to retain the firm and the plan is that BC Investments is to become another representative plaintiff.

[108] Exclusive of the carriage motion, Kim Orr and Milberg have already incurred approximately \$1,070,000 in time and disbursement for the proposed class action.

3. Proposed Representative Plaintiffs

Smith v. Sino-Forest

[109] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed representative plaintiffs are Douglas Smith and Frederick Collins.

[110] Douglas Smith is a resident of Ontario, who acquired approximately 9,000 shares of Sino-Forest during the proposed class period. He is married, 48 years of age, and employed as a director of sales. He describes himself as a moderately sophisticated investor that invested in Sino-Forest based on his review of the publicly available information, including public reports and filings, press releases, and statements released by or on behalf of Sino-Forest. He lost \$75,345, which was half of his investment fortune.

[111] Frederick Collins is a resident of Nanaimo, British Columbia. He purchased shares in the primary market. His willingness to act as a representative plaintiff was

announced during the reply argument of the second day of the carriage motion, and nothing was discussed about his background other than he is similar to Mr. Smith in being an individual investor. He was introduced to address a possible *Ragoonanan* problem in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*; namely, the absence of a plaintiff who purchased in the primary market, of which alleged problem I will have more to say about below.

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[112] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed representative plaintiffs are: David Grant, Robert Wong, The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada ("Labourers' Fund"), the Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating Engineers in Ontario ("Operating Engineers Fund"), and Sjuude AP-Fonden.

[113] David Grant is a resident of Alberta. On October 21, 2010, he purchased 100 Guaranteed Senior Notes of Sino-Forest at a price of \$101.50 (\$U.S.), which he continues to hold.

[114] Robert Wong, a resident of Ontario, is an electrical engineer. He was born in China, and in addition to speaking English, he speaks fluent Cantonese. He was a substantial shareholder of Sino-Forest from July 2002 to June 2011. Before making his investment, he reviewed Sino-Forest's Core Documents, and he also made his own investigations, including visiting Sino-Forest's plantations in China in 2005, where he met a Sino-Forest vice-president.

[115] Mr. Wong's investment in Sino-Forest comprised much of his net worth. In September 2008, he owned 1.4 million Sino-Forest shares with a value of approximately \$26.1 million. He purchased more shares in the December 2009 prospectus offering. Around the end of May 2011, he owned 518,700 shares, which, after the publication of the Muddy Waters Report, he sold on June 3, 2011 and June 10, 2011, for \$2.8 million.

[116] The Labourers' Fund is a multi-employer pension fund for employees in the construction industry. It is registered with the Financial Services Commission in Ontario and has 52,100 members in Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador. It is a long-time client of Koskie Minsky.

[117] Labourers' Fund manages more than \$2.5 billion in assets. It has a fiduciary and statutory responsibility to invest pension monies on behalf of thousands of employees and pensioners in Ontario and in other provinces.

[118] Labourer's Fund acted as representative plaintiff in a U.S. class actions against Fortis, Pitney Bowes Inc., Synovus Financial Corp., and Medea Health Solutions, Inc. Those actions involved allegations of misrepresentation in the statements and filings of public issuers.

[119] The Labourers' Fund purchased Sino-Forest shares on the TSX during the class period, including 32,300 shares in a trade placed by Credit Suisse under a prospectus. Most of its purchases of Sino-Forest shares were made in the secondary market.

[120] On June 1, 2011, the Labourers' Fund held a total of 128,700 Sino-Forest shares with a market value of \$2.3 million, and it also had an interest in pooled funds that had \$1.4 million invested in Sino-Forest shares. On June 2 and 3, 2011, the Labourers' Fund sold its holdings in Sino-Forest for a net recovery of \$695,993.96. By June 30, 2011, the value of the Sino-Forest shares in the pooled funds was \$291,811.

[121] The Operating Engineers Fund is a multi-employer pension fund for employed operating engineers and apprentices in the construction industry. It is registered with the Financial Services Commission in Ontario, and it has 20,867 members. It is a long-time client of Koskie Minsky.

[122] The Operating Engineers Fund manages \$1.5 billion in assets. It has a fiduciary and statutory responsibility to invest pension monies on behalf of thousands of employees and pensions in Ontario and in other provinces.

[123] The Operating Engineers Fund acquired shares of Sino-Forest on the TSX during the class period. The Operating Engineers Fund invested in Sino-Forest shares through four asset managers of a segregated fund. One of the managers purchased 42,000 Sino-Forest shares between February 1, 2011, and May 24, 2011, which had a market value of \$764,820 at the close of trading on June 1, 2011. These shares were sold on June 21, 2011 for net \$77,170.80. Another manager purchased 181,700 Sino-Forest shares between January 20, 2011 and June 1, 2011, which had a market value of \$3.3 million at the close of trading on June 1, 2011. These shares were sold and the Operating Engineers Fund recovered \$1.5 million. Another asset manager purchased 100,400 Sino-Forest shares between July 5, 2007 and May 26, 2011, which had a market value of \$1.8 million at the close of trading on June 1, 2011. Many of these shares were sold in July and August, 2011, but the Operating Engineers Fund continues to hold approximately 37,350 shares. Between June 15, 2007 and June 9, 2011, the Operating Engineers Fund also purchased units of a pooled fund managed by TD that held Sino-Forest shares, and it continues to hold these units. The Operating Engineers Fund has incurred losses in excess of \$5 million with respect to its investment in Sino-Forest shares.

[124] Sjunde AP-Fonden is the Swedish Nation Pension Fund, and part of Sweden's national pension system. It manages \$15.3 billion in assets. It has acted as lead plaintiff in a large securities class action and a large stockholder class action in the United States.

[125] In addition to retaining Koskie Minsky and Siskinds, Sjunde AP-Fonden also retained the American law firm Kessler Topaz to provide assistance, if necessary, to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds.

[126] Sjunde AP-Fonden purchased Sino-Forest shares on the TSX from outside Canada between April 2010 and January 2011. It was holding 139,398 shares with a value of \$2.5 million at the close of trading on June 1, 2011. It sold 43,095 shares for \$188,829.36 in August 2011 and holds 93,303 shares.

[127] Sjunde AP-Fonden is prepared to be representative plaintiff for a sub-class of non-Canadian purchasers of Sino-Forest shares who purchased shares in Canada from outside of Canada.

[128] Messrs. Mancinelli, Gallagher, and Grottheim each deposed that Labourers' Fund, the Operating Engineers Fund, and Sjunde AP-Fonden respectively sued because of their losses and because of their concerns that public markets remain healthy and transparent.

[129] Although it does not seek to be a representative plaintiff, the Healthcare Employee Benefits Plans of Manitoba ("Healthcare Manitoba") is a major class member that supports carriage being granted to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds, and its presence should also be mentioned here because it actively supports the appointment of the proposed representative plaintiffs in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[130] Healthcare Manitoba provides pensions and other benefits to eligible healthcare employees and their families throughout Manitoba. It has 65,000 members. It is a long-time client of Koskie Minsky. It manages more than \$3.9 billion in assets.

[131] Healthcare Manitoba, invested in Sino-Forest shares that were purchased by one of its asset managers in the TSX secondary market. Between February and May, 2011, it purchased 305,200 shares with a book value of \$6.7 million. On June 24, 2011, the shares were sold for net proceeds of \$560,775.48.

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[132] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed representative plaintiffs are: British Columbia Investment Management Corporation ("BC Investment"); Comité syndical national de retraite Bâtirente inc. ("Bâtirente") and Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P. ("Northwest").

[133] BC Investment, which is incorporated under the British Columbia *Public Sector Pension Plans Act*, is owned by and is an agent of the Government of British Columbia. It manages \$86.9 billion in assets. Its investment activities help to finance the retirement benefits of more than 475,000 residents of British Columbia, including public service employees, healthcare workers, university teachers, and staff. Its investment activities also help to finance the WorkSafeBC insurance fund that covers approximately 2.3 million workers and over 200,000 employers in B.C., as well as, insurance funds for public service long term disability and credit union deposits.

[134] BC Investment, through the funds it managed, owned 334,900 shares of Sino-Forest at the start of the Class Period, purchased 6.6 million shares during the Class Period, including 50,200 shares in the June 2009 offering and 54,800 shares in the December 2009 offering; sold 5 million shares during the Class Period; disposed of 371,628 shares after the end of the Class Period; and presently holds 1.5 million shares.

[135] Bâtirente is a non-profit financial services firm initiated by the Confederation of National Trade Unions to establish and promote a workplace retirement system for affiliated unions and other organizations. It is registered as a financial services firm regulated in Quebec by the Autorité des marchés financiers under the *Act Respecting the Distribution of Financial Products and Services*, R.S.Q., chapter D-9.2. It has assets of about \$850 million.

[136] Bâtirente, through the funds it managed, did not own any shares of Sino-Forest before the class period, purchased 69,500 shares during the class period, sold 57,625 shares during the class period, and disposed of the rest of its shares after the end of the class period.

[137] Northwest is an Ontario limited partnership, owned 50% by the Provincial Credit Unions Central and 50% by Federation des caisses Desjardin du Québec. It is registered with the British Columbia Securities Commission as a portfolio manager, and it is registered with the OSC as a portfolio manager and as an investment funds manager. It manages about \$5 billion in assets.

[138] Northwest, through the funds it managed, did not own any shares of Sino-Forest before the class period, purchased 714,075 shares during the class period, including 245,400 shares in the December 2009 offering, sold 207,600 shares during the class period, and disposed of the rest of its shares after the end of the class period.

[139] Kim Orr touts BC Investment, Bâtirente, and Northwest as candidates for representative plaintiff because they are sophisticated "activist shareholders" that are committed to ethical investing. There is evidence that they have all raised governance issues with Sino-Forest as well as other companies. Mr. Mountain of Northwest and Mr. Simard of Bâtirente are eager to be actively involved in the litigation against Sino-Forest.

4. Funding

[140] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds have approached Claims Funding International, and subject to court approval, Claims Funding International has agreed to indemnify the plaintiffs for an adverse costs award in return for a percentage of any recovery from the class action.

[141] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds state that if the funding arrangement with Claims Funding International is refused, they will, in any event, proceed with the litigation and will indemnify the plaintiffs for any adverse costs award.

[142] Similarly, Kim Orr has approached Bridgepoint Financial Services, which subject to court approval, has agreed to indemnify the plaintiffs for an adverse costs award in return for a percentage of any recovery in the class action. If this arrangement is not approved, Kim Orr intends to apply to the Class Proceedings Fund, which would be a more expensive approach to financing the class action.

[143] Kim Orr states that if these funding arrangements are refused, it will, in any event, proceed with the litigation and it will indemnify the plaintiffs for any adverse costs award.

[144] Rochon Genova did not mention in its factum whether it intends to apply to the Class Proceedings Fund on behalf of Messrs. Smith and Collins, but for the purposes of the discussion later about the carriage order, I will assume that this may be the case. I will also assume that Rochon Genova has agreed to indemnify Messrs. Smith and Collins for any adverse costs award should funding not be granted by the Fund.

members of the immediate families of the Individual Defendants, or the directors, officers, subsidiaries and affiliates of the corporate Defendants.

[156] Both Koskie Minsky and Siskinds and Kim Orr challenge this class membership as inadequate for failing to include the bondholders who were allegedly harmed by the same misconduct that harmed the shareholders.

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[157] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed class action is on behalf of all persons and entities wherever they may reside who acquired securities of Sino-Forest during the period from and including March 19, 2007 to and including June 2, 2011 either by primary distribution in Canada or an acquisition on the TSX or other secondary markets in Canada, other than the defendants, their past and present subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, senior employees, partners, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors and assigns, and any individual who is an immediate member of the family of an individual defendant.

[158] The class membership definition in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* includes non-Canadians who purchased shares or notes in Canada but excludes non-Canadians who purchased in a foreign marketplace.

[159] Challenging this definition, Kim Orr submits that it is wrong in principle to exclude persons whose claims will involve the same facts as other class members and for whom it is arguable that Canadian courts may exercise jurisdiction and provide access to justice.

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[160] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the proposed class action is on behalf of purchasers of shares or notes of Sino-Forest during the period from August 17, 2004 through June 2, 2011, except: Sino-Forest's past and present subsidiaries and affiliates; the past and present officers and directors of Sino-Forest and its subsidiaries and affiliates; members of the immediate family of any excluded person; the legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns of any excluded person or entity; and any entity in which any excluded person or entity has or had a controlling interest.

[161] Challenging this definition, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that the proposed class in *Northwest* has no geographical limits and, therefore, will face jurisdictional and choice of law challenges that do not withstand a cost-benefit analysis. It submits that Sino-Forest predominantly raised capital in Canadian capital markets and the vast majority of its securities were either acquired in Canada or on a Canadian market, and, in this context, including in the class non-residents who purchased securities outside of Canada risks undermining and delaying the claims of the great majority of proposed class members whose claims do not face such jurisdictional obstacles.

7. Definition of Class Period

Smith v. Sino-Forest

[162] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the class period is May 17, 2004 to August 26, 2011. This class period starts with the release of Sino-Forest's release of its 2003 Annual Information Form, which indicated the use of authorized intermediaries, and it ends on the day of the OSC's cease-trade order.

[163] For comparison purposes, it should be noted that this class period has the earliest start date and the latest finish date. *Labourers v. Sino-Smith* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* both use the end date of the release of the Muddy Waters Report.

[164] In making comparisons, it is helpful to look at the chart found at Schedule A of this judgment.

[165] Rochon Genova justifies its extended end date based on the argument that the Muddy Waters Report was a revelation of Sino-Forest's misrepresentation but not a corrective statement that would end the causation of injuries because Sino-Forest and its officers denied the truth of the Muddy Waters Report.

[166] Kim Orr's criticizes the class definition in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and submits that purchasers of shares or notes after the Muddy Waters Report was published do not have viable claims and ought not be included as class members.

[167] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' submission is similar, and they regard the extended end date as problematic in raising the issues of whether there were corrective disclosures and of how Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* should be interpreted.

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[168] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the class period is March 19, 2007 to June 2, 2011.

[169] This class period starts with the date Sino-Forest's 2006 financial results were announced, and it ends on the date of the publication of the Muddy Waters Report.

[170] The March 19, 2007, commencement date was determined using a complex mathematical formula known as the "multi-trader trading model." Using this model, Mr. Torchio estimates that 99.5% of Sino-Forest's shares retained after June 2, 2011, had been purchased after the March 19, 2007 commencement date. Thus, practically speaking, there is almost nothing to be gained by an earlier start date for the class period.

[171] The proposed class period covers two share offerings (June 2009 and December 2009). This class period does not include time before the coming into force of Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* (December 31, 2005), and, thus, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that this aspect of their definition avoids problems about the retroactive application, if any, of Part XXIII.1 of the Act.

[172] For comparison purposes, the *Labourers* class period has the latest start date and shares the finish date used in the *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* action, which is sooner than the later date used in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. It is the most compressed of the three definitions of a class period.

[173] Based on Mr. Torchio's opinion, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that there are likely no damages arising from purchases made during a substantial portion of the class periods in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*. Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that given that the average price of Sino's shares was approximately \$4.49 in the ten trading days after the Muddy Waters report, it is likely that any shareholder that acquired Sino-Forest shares for less than \$4.49 suffered no damages, particularly under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

[174] In part as a matter of principle, Kim Orr submits that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' approach to defining the class period is unsound because it excludes class members who, despite the mathematical modelling, may have genuine claims and are being denied any opportunity for access to justice. Kim Orr submits it is wrong in principle to abandon these potential class members.

[175] Rochon Genova also submits that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' approach to defining the class period is wrong. It argues that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' reliance on a complex mathematical model to define class membership is arbitrary and unfair to share purchasers with similar claims to those claimants to be included as class members. Rochon Genova criticizes Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' approach as being the condemned merits based approach to class definitions and for being the sin of excluding class members because they may ultimately not succeed after a successful common issues trial.

[176] Relying on what I wrote in *Fischer v. IG Investment Management Ltd.*, 2010 ONSC 296 at para. 157, Rochon Genova submits that the possible failure of an individual class member to establish an individual element of his or her claim such as causation or damages is not a reason to initially exclude him or her as a class member. Rochon Genova submits that the end date employed in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is wrong.

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[177] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the class period is August 17, 2004 to June 2, 2011.

[178] This class period starts from the day Sino-Forest closed its public offering of long-term notes that were still outstanding at the end of the class period and ends on the date of the Muddy Waters Research Report. This period covers three share offerings (June 2007, June 2009, and December 2009) and six note offerings (August 2004, July 2008, July 2009, December 2009, February 2010, and October 2010).

[179] For comparison purposes, the *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* class period begins 3 months later and ends three months sooner than the class period in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. The *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* class period begins approximately two-and-a-half years earlier and ends at the same time as the class period in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[180] Kim Orr submits that its start date of August 17, 2004 is satisfactory, because on that date, Sino-Forest shares were trading at \$2.85, which is below the closing price of Sino-Forest shares on the TSX for the ten days after June 3, 2011 (\$4.49), which indicates that share purchasers before August 2004 would not likely be able to claim loss or damages based on the public disclosures on June 2, 2011.

[181] However, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds point out that Kim Orr's submission actually provides partial support for the theory for a later start date (March 19, 2007) because, there is no logical reason to include in the class persons who purchased Sino-Forest shares between May 17, 2004, the start date of the *Smith Action* and December 1, 2005, because with the exception of one trading day (January 24, 2005), Sino-Forest's shares never traded above \$4.49 during that period.

8. Theory of the Case against the Defendants

Smith v. Sino-Forest

[182] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the theory of the case rests on the alleged non-arms length transfers between Sino-Forest and its subsidiaries and authorized intermediaries, that purported to be suppliers and customers. Rochon Geneva's investigations and analysis suggest that there are numerous non-arms length inter-company transfers by which Sino-Forest misappropriated investors' funds, exaggerated Sino-Forest's assets and revenues, and engaged in improper tax and accounting practices.

[183] Mr. Smith alleges that Sino-Forest's quarterly interim financial statements, audited annual financial statements, and management's discussion and analysis reports, which are Core Documents as defined under the *Ontario Securities Act*, misrepresented its revenues, the nature and scope of its business and operations, and the value and composition of its forestry holdings. He alleges that the Core Documents failed to disclose an unlawful scheme of fabricated sales transactions and the avoidance of tax and an unlawful scheme through which hundreds of millions of dollars in investors' funds were misappropriated or vanished.

[184] Mr. Smith submits that these misrepresentations and failures to disclose were also made in press releases and in public oral statements. He submits that Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, and Wang authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the release of Core Documents and that Chan, Horsley, Martin, and Murray made the misrepresentations in public oral statements.

[185] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, Mr. Smith (and Mr. Collins) brings different claims against different combinations of Defendants; visualize:

- misrepresentation in a prospectus under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act*, against all the Defendants
- subject to leave being granted, misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* as against the defendants: Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, BDO and E&Y
- negligent, reckless, or fraudulent misrepresentation against Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, and Wang. This claim would appear to cover sales of shares in both the primary and secondary markets.

[186] It is to be noted that *Smith v. Sino-Forest* does not make a claim on behalf of noteholders, and, as described and explained below, it joins the fewest number of defendants.

[187] *Smith* also does not advance a claim on behalf of purchasers of shares through Sino-Forest's prospectus offering of June 5, 2007, because of limitation period concerns associated with the absolute limitation period found in 138.14 of the *Ontario Securities Act*. See: *Coulson v. Citigroup Global Markets Canada Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 1596 at paras. 98-100.

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[188] The theory of *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* is that Sino-Forest, along with its officers, directors, and certain of its professional advisors, falsely represented that its financial statements complied with GAAP, materially overstated the size and value of its forestry assets, and made false and incomplete representations regarding its tax liabilities, revenue recognition, and related party transactions.

[189] The claims in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* are largely limited to alleged misrepresentations in Core Documents as defined in the *Ontario Securities Act* and other Canadian securities legislation. Core Documents include prospectuses, annual information forms, information circulars, financial statements, management discussion & analysis, and material change reports.

[190] The representative plaintiffs advance statutory claims and also common law claims that certain defendants breached a duty of care and committed the torts of negligent misrepresentation and negligence. There are unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and oppression remedy claims advanced against certain defendants.

[191] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, different combinations of representative plaintiffs advance different claims against different combinations of defendants; visualize:

- Labourers' Fund and Mr. Wong, purchasers of shares in a primary market distribution, advance a statutory claim under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act* against Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, CIBC, Canaccord, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD and Pöyry
- Labourers' Fund and Mr. Wong, purchasers of shares in a primary market distribution, advance a common law negligent misrepresentation claim against Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, CIBC, Canaccord, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, and TD based on the common misrepresentation that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAPP
- Labourers' Fund and Mr. Wong, purchasers of shares in a primary market distribution, advance a common law negligence claim against Sino-Forest, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, CIBC, Canaccord, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD and Pöyry
- Grant, who purchased bonds in a primary market distribution, advances a statutory claim under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act* against Sino-Forest

- Grant, who purchased bonds in a primary market distribution, advances a common law negligent misrepresentation claim against Sino-Forest, E&Y and BDO based on the common misrepresentation that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAPP
- Grant, who purchased bonds in a primary market distribution, advances a common law negligence claim against Sino-Forest, E&Y, BDO, Banc of America, Credit Suisse USA, and TD
- All the representative plaintiffs, subject to leave being granted, advance claims of misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and, if necessary, equivalent provincial legislation. This claim is against Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, E & Y, BDO, and Pöyry
- All of the representative plaintiffs, who purchased Sino-Forest securities in the secondary market, advance a common law negligent misrepresentation claim against all of the Defendants except the underwriters based on the common misrepresentation contained in the Core Documents that Sino-Forest's financial statements complied with GAAP
- All the representative plaintiffs sue Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, and Poon for conspiracy. It is alleged that Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, and Poon conspired to inflate the price of Sino-Forest's shares and bonds and to profit by their wrongful acts to enrich themselves by, among other things, issuing stock options in which the price was impermissibly low
- While it is not entirely clear from the Statement of Claim, it seems that all the representative plaintiffs sue Chan, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, and Poon for unjust enrichment in selling shares to class members at artificially inflated prices
- While it is not entirely clear from the Statement of Claim, it seems that all the representative plaintiffs sue Sino-Forest for unjust enrichment for selling shares at artificially inflated prices
- While it is not entirely clear from the Statement of Claim, it seems that all the representative plaintiffs sue Banc of America, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse USA, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, and TD for unjustly enriching themselves from their underwriters fees
- All the representative plaintiffs sue Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, and Wang for an oppression remedy under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*

[192] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* is more focused than *Smith* and *Northwest* because: (a) its class definition covers a shorter time period and is limited to securities acquired by Canadian residents or in Canadian markets; (b) the material documents are limited to Core Documents under securities legislation; (c) the named individual defendants are limited to directors and officers with statutory obligations to certify the accuracy of Sino-Forest's public filings; and (d) the

causes of action are tailored to distinguish between the claims of primary market purchasers and secondary market purchasers and so are less susceptible to motions to strike.

[193] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that save for background and context, little is gained in the rival actions by including claims based on non-Core Documents, which confront a higher threshold to establish liability under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*.

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[194] The *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* Statement of Claim focuses on an "Integrity Representation," which is defined as: "the representation in substance that Sino-Forest's overall reporting of its business operations and financial statements was fair, complete, accurate, and in conformity with international standards and the requirements of the *Ontario Securities Act* and National Instrument 51-102, and that its accounts of its growth and success could be trusted."

[195] The *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* Statement of Claim alleges that all Defendants made the Integrity Representation and that it was a false, misleading, or deceptive statement or omission. It is alleged that the false Integrity Representation caused the market decline following the June 2, 2011, disclosures, regardless of the truth or falsity of the particular allegations contained in the Muddy Waters Report.

[196] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the representative plaintiffs advance statutory claims under Parts XXIII and XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and a collection of common law tort claims. Kim Orr submits that to the extent, if any, that the statutory claims do not provide complete remedies to class members, whether due to limitation periods, liability caps, or other limitations, the common law claims may provide coverage.

[197] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the plaintiffs advance different claims against different combinations of defendants; visualize:

- With respect to the June 2009 and December 2009 prospectus, a cause of action for violation of Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act* against Sino-Forest, the underwriter Defendants, the director Defendants, the Defendants who consented to disclosure in the prospectus and the Defendants who signed the prospectus
- Negligent misrepresentation against all of the Defendants for disseminating material misrepresentations about Sino-Forest in breach of a duty to exercise appropriate care and diligence to ensure that the documents and statements disseminated to the public about Sino-Forest were complete, truthful, and accurate.
- Fraudulent misrepresentation against all of the Defendants for acting knowingly and deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth making misrepresentations in documents, statements, financial statements, prospectus,

offering memoranda, and filings issued and disseminated to the investing public including Class Members.

- Negligence against all the Defendants for a breach of a duty of care to ensure that Sino-Forest implemented and maintained adequate internal controls, procedures and policies to ensure that the company's assets were protected and its activities conformed to all legal developments.
- Negligence against the underwriter Defendants, the note distributor Defendants, the auditor Defendants, and the Pöyry Defendants for breach of a duty to the purchasers of Sino-Forest securities to perform their professional responsibilities in connection with Sino-Forest with appropriate care and diligence.
- Subject to leave being granted, a cause of action for violation of Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* against Sino-Forest, the auditor Defendants, the individual Defendants who were directors and officers of Sino-Forest at the time one or more of the pleaded material misrepresentations was made, and the Pöyry Defendants.

[198] Kim Orr submits that *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is more comprehensive than its rivals and does not avoid asserting claims on the grounds that they may take time to litigate, may not be assured of success, or may involve a small portion of the total potential class. It submits that its conception of Sino-Forest's wrongdoing better accords with the factual reality and makes for a more viable claim than does Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' focus on GAAP violations and Rochon Genova's focus on the misrepresentations associated with the use of authorized intermediaries. It denies Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' argument that it has pleaded overbroad tort claims.

[199] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that its conspiracy claim against a few defendants is focused and narrow, and it criticizes the broad fraud claim advanced in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* against all the defendants as speculative, provocative, and unproductive.

[200] Relying on *McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 1591 at para. 49; *Corfax Benefits Systems Ltd. v. Fiducie Desjardins Inc.*, [1997] O.J. No. 5005 (Gen. Div.) at paras. 28-36; *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada)*, [2000] O.J. No. 4595 (S.C.J.) at paras. 25 and 38; and *Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of)*, [1998] O.J. No. 2637 (Gen. Div.) at para. 477, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that the speculative fraud action in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is improper and would not advance the interests of class members. Further, the task of proving that each of some twenty defendants had a fraudulent intent, which will be vehemently denied by the defendants, and the costs sanction imposed for pleading and not providing fraud make the fraud claim a negative and not a positive feature of *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

9. Joinder of Defendants

Smith v. Sino-Forest

[201] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the Defendants are: Sino-Forest; seven of its directors and officers; namely: Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, and Wang; nine underwriters; namely, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, and TD; and Sino-Forest's two auditors during the Class Period, E & Y and BDO.

[202] The *Smith v. Sino-Forest* Statement of Claim does not join Pöyry because Rochon Genova is of the view that the disclaimer clause in Pöyry's reports likely insulates it from liability, and Rochon Genova believes that its joinder would be of marginal utility and an unnecessary complication. It submits that joining Pöyry would add unnecessary expense and delay to the litigation with little corresponding benefit because of its jurisdiction and its potential defences.

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[203] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the Defendants are the same as in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* with the additional joinder of Ardell, Bowland, Poon, West, Banc of America, Credit Suisse (USA), and Pöyry.

[204] The *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* action does not join Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Credit Suisse (USA), Haywood, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan and UBS, which are parties to *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

[205] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' explanation for these non-joinders is that the activities of the underwriters added to *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* occurred outside of the class period in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and neither Lawrence nor Wong held a position with Sino-Forest during the proposed class period and the action against Lawrence's Estate is probably statute-barred. (See *Waschkowski v. Hopkinson Estate*, [2000] O.J. No. 470 (C.A.).)

[206] Wong left Sino-Forest before Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* came into force, and Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that proving causation against Wong will be difficult in light of the numerous alleged misrepresentations since his departure. Moreover, the claim against him is likely statute-barred.

[207] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that Chen, Maradin, and Zhao did not have statutory duties and allegations that they owed common law duties will just lead to motions to strike that hinder the progress of an action.

[208] Further, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that it is not advisable to assert claims of fraud against all defendants, which pleading may raise issues for insurers that potentially put available coverage and thus collection for plaintiffs at risk.

[209] Kim Orr submits that it is a mistake in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, which is connected to the late start date for the class period, which Kim Orr also regards as a mistake, that those underwriters that may be liable and who may have insurance to indemnify them for their liability, have been left out of *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[210] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, with one exception, the defendants are the same as in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* with the additional joinder of various officers of Sino-Forest; namely: Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, The Estate of John Lawrence, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, and Zhao; the joinder of Pöyry Forest and JP Management; and the joinder of more underwriters; namely: Haywood, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, and UBS.

[211] The one exception where *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* does not join a defendant found in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* is Banc of America.

[212] Kim Orr's submits that its joinder of all defendants who might arguably bear some responsibility for the loss is a positive feature of its proposed class action because the precarious financial situation of Sino-Forest makes it in the best interests of the class members that they be provided access to all appropriate routes to compensation. It strongly denies Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' allegation that *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* takes a "shot-gun" and injudicious approach by joining defendants that will just complicate matters and increase costs and delay.

[213] Kim Orr submits that Rochon Genova has no good reason for not adding Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, and JP Management as defendants to *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds have no good reason in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* for suing Pöyry but not also suing its associated companies, all of whom are exposed to liability and may be sources of compensation for class members.

[214] While not putting it in my blunt terms, Kim Orr submits, in effect, that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds' omission of the additional defendants is just laziness under the guise of feigning a concern for avoiding delay and unnecessarily complicating an already complex proceeding.

10. Causes of Action

Smith v. Sino-Forest

[215] In *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, the causes of action advanced by Mr. Smith on behalf of the class members are:

- misrepresentation in a prospectus under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act*
- negligent, reckless, or fraudulent misrepresentation
- subject to leave being granted, misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and, if necessary, equivalent provincial legislation

Labourers v. Sino-Forest

[216] In *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the causes of action advanced by various combinations of plaintiffs against various combinations of defendants are:

- misrepresentation in a prospectus under Part XXIII of the *Ontario Securities Act*
- negligent misrepresentation

- negligence
- subject to leave being granted misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and, if necessary, equivalent provincial legislation
- conspiracy
- unjust enrichment
- oppression remedy.

[217] Kim Orr submits that the unjust enrichment claims and oppression remedy claims seemed to be based on and add little to the misrepresentation causes of action. It concedes that the conspiracy action may be a tenable claim but submits that its connection to the disclosure issues that comprise the nucleus of the litigation is unclear.

Northwest v. Sino-Forest

[218] In *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, the causes of action are:

- misrepresentation in a prospectus in violation of Part XXIII the *Ontario Securities Act*
- misrepresentation in an offering memorandum in violation of Part XXIII the *Ontario Securities Act*
- negligent misrepresentation
- fraudulent misrepresentation
- negligence
- subject to leave being granted misrepresentation in secondary market disclosure under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act* and, if necessary, equivalent provincial legislation

[219] The following chart is helpful in comparing and contrasting the joinder of various causes of action and the joinder of defendants in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*, *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

Cause of Action	<i>Smith v. Sino-Forest</i> ,	<i>Labourers v. Sino-Forest</i> ,	<i>Northwest v. Sino-Forest</i> ,
Part XXIII of the <i>Ontario Securities Act</i> – primary market shares	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, E&Y, BDO	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Canaccord, CIBC Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management [for June 2009 and Dec. 2009 prospectus]
Part XXIII of the <i>Ontario Securities Act</i> – primary		Sino-Forest [two bond issues]	Sino-Forest [six bond issues]

market bonds			
Negligent misrepresentation - primary market shares	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, E&Y, BDO	Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management.
Negligent misrepresentation - primary market bonds		Sino-Forest, E&Y, BDO	Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management.
Negligence - primary market shares		Sino-Forest, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E & Y, BDO, CIBC, Canaccord, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, Pöyry.	[see negligence, professional negligence]
Negligence - primary market bonds		Sino-Forest, E&Y, BDO, Banc of America, Credit Suisse USA, TD	[See negligence, professional negligence]
Negligence			Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management.
Professional Negligence			Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management.

<p>Part XXIII.1 of the <i>Ontario Securities Act</i> - secondary market shares</p>	<p>Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, E&Y, BDO</p>	<p>Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry</p>	<p>Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management</p>
<p>Part XXIII.1 of the <i>Ontario Securities Act</i> - secondary market bonds</p>		<p>Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Hyde, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry</p>	<p>Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management</p>
<p>Negligent misrepresentation - secondary market shares</p>	<p>Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Wang, E&Y, BDO</p>	<p>Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry</p>	<p>Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management</p>
<p>Negligent misrepresentation - secondary market bonds</p>		<p>Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry</p>	<p>Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management</p>
<p>Negligence - secondary market shares</p>		<p>Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, Canaccord, CIBC</p>	<p>[see negligence, professional negligence]</p>

		Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry	
Conspiracy		Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Poon,	
Fraudulent Misrepresentation - Bonds, shares			Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Penner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management
Unjust Enrichment		Chan, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon,	
Unjust Enrichment		Sino-Forest,	
Unjust Enrichment		Banc of America, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse USA, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, TD	
Oppression Remedy		Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang,	

11. The Plaintiff and Defendant Correlation

[220] In class actions in Ontario, for every named defendant there must be a named plaintiff with a cause of action against that defendant: *Ragoonanan v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, [2000] O.J. No. 4597 (S.C.J.) at para. 55 (S.C.J.); *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada)* (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (C.A.) at para. 18.

[221] As an application of the *Ragoonanan* rule, a purchaser in the secondary market cannot be the representative plaintiff for a class member who purchased in the primary market: *Menegon v. Philip Services Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 5547 (S.C.J.) at paras. 28-30 aff'd [2003] O.J. No. 8 (C.A.).

[222] Where the class includes non-resident class members, they must be represented by a representative plaintiff that is a non-resident: *McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 1591 at paras. 109, 117 and 184; *Currie v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd.* (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 321 at para. 30 (C.A.).

[223] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* has no *Ragoonanan* problems. However, they submit that the other actions have problems. For example, until Mr. Collins volunteered, there was no representative plaintiff in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* who had purchased shares in the primary market, and at this juncture, it is not clear that Mr. Collins purchased in all of the primary market distributions. Mr. Smith and Mr. Collins may have timing-of-purchase issues. Mr. Smith made purchases

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during periods when some of the Defendants were not involved; viz. BDO, Canaccord CIBC, Credit Suisse, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia, and TD.

[224] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that none of the representative plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* purchased notes in the primary market for the 2007 prospectus offering and that the plaintiffs in *Northwest* may have timing issues with respect to their claims against Wong, Lawrence, JP Management, UBS, Haywood and Morgan.

[225] Rochon Genova's and Kim Orr's response is that there are no *Ragoonanan* problems or no irremediable *Ragoonanan* problems.

12. Prospects of Certification

[226] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds framed part of their argument in favour of their being selected for carriage in terms of the comparative prospects of certification of the rival actions. They submitted that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* was carefully designed to avoid the typical road blocks placed by defendants on the route to certification and to avoid inefficiencies and unproductive claims or claims that on a cost-benefit analysis would not be in the interests of the class to pursue. One of the typical roadblocks that they referred to was challenges to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Court over foreign class members and foreign defendants who have not attorned to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice's territorial jurisdiction.

[227] Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submitted that their representative plaintiffs focus their claims on a single misrepresentation to avoid the pitfalls of seeking to certify a negligent misrepresentation claim with multiple misrepresentations over a long period of time. Such a claim apparently falls into a pit because it is often not certified. Koskie Minsky and Siskinds say it is better to craft a claim that has higher prospects of certification and leave some claims behind. They submit that the Supreme Court of Canada accepted that a representative plaintiff is entitled to restrict their causes of action to make their claims more amenable to class proceedings: *Rumley v. British Columbia*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184 at para. 30.

[228] Although *Smith v. Sino-Forest* is even more focused than *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds still submit that their approach is better because *Smith v. Sino-Forest* goes too far in cutting out the bondholders' claims and then loses focus by extending its claims beyond the release of the Muddy Waters Report.

[229] In any event, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* is better because the named plaintiffs are able to advance statutory and common law claims against all of the named defendants, which arguably is not the case for the plaintiffs in the other actions, who may have *Ragoonanan* problems or no tenable claims against some of the named defendants. Further, *Labourers* arguably is better because of a more focussed approach to maximize class recovery while avoiding the costs and delays inevitably linked with motions to strike.

[230] Kim Orr submits that its more comprehensive approach, where there are more defendant parties and expansive tort claims, is preferable to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. Kim Orr submits that it does not shirk asserting claims

because they may be difficult to litigate and it does not abandon class members who may not be assured of success or who comprise a small portion of the class.

[231] Kim Orr submits that *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is comprehensive and also cohesive and corresponds to the factual reality. It submits that the theories of the competing actions do not capture the wrongdoing at Sino-Forest for which many are culpable and who should be held responsible. It submits that its approach will meet the challenges of certification and yield an optimum recovery for the class.

[232] Rochon Genova submits that *Smith v. Sino-Forest* is much more cohesive than the other actions. It submits that the more expansive class definitions and causes of action in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* will present serious difficulties relating to manageability, preferability, and potential conflicts of interest amongst class members that are not present in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. Rochon Genova submits that it has developed a solid, straightforward theory of the case and made a great deal of progress in unearthing proof of Sino-Forest's wrongdoing.

G. CARRIAGE ORDER

1. Introduction

[233] With the explanation that follows, I stay *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, and I award carriage to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*. In the race for carriage of an action against *Sino-Forest*, I would have ranked Rochon Genova second and Kim Orr third.

[234] This is not an easy decision to make because class members would probably be well served by any of the rival law firms. Success in a carriage motion does not determine which is the best law firm, it determines that having regard to the interests of the plaintiffs and class members, to what is fair to the defendants, and to the policies that underlie the class actions regime, there is a constellation of factors that favours selecting one firm or group of firms as the best choice for a particular class action.

[235] Having regard to the constellation of factors, in the circumstances of this case, several factors are neutral or non-determinative of the choice for carriage. In this group are: (a) attributes of class counsel; (b) retainer, legal, and forensic resources; (c) funding; (d) conflicts of interest; and (e) the plaintiff and defendant correlation.

[236] In the case at bar, the determinative factors are: definition of class membership, definition of class period, theory of the case, causes of action, joinder of defendants, and prospects of certification.

[237] Of the determinative factors, the attributes of the representative plaintiffs is a standalone factor. The other determinative factors are interrelated and concern the rival conceptualizations of what kind of class action would best serve the class members' need for access to justice and the policies of fairness to defendants, behaviour modification, and judicial economy.

[238] Below, I will first discuss the neutral or non-determinative factors. Then, I will discuss the determinative factors. After discussing the attributes of the representative plaintiffs, I will discuss the related factors in two groups. One group of related factors is about class membership, and the second group of factors is about the claims against the defendants.

2. Neutral or Non-Determinative Factors

(a) Attributes of Class Counsel

[239] In the circumstances of the cases at bar, the attributes of the competing law firms along with their associations with prestigious and prominent American class action firms is not determinative of carriage, since there is little difference among the rivals about their suitability for bringing a proposed class action against Sino-Forest.

[240] With respect to the attributes of the law firms, although one might have thought that Mr. Spencer's call to the bar would diminish the risk, Koskie and Minsky and Siskinds, particularly Siskinds, raised a question about whether Milberg might cross the line of what legal services a foreign law firm may provide to the Ontario lawyers who are the lawyers of record, and Siskinds alluded to the spectre of violations of the rules of professional conduct and perhaps the evil of champerty and maintenance. It suggested that it was unfair to class members to have to bear this risk associated with the involvement of Milberg.

[241] However, at this juncture, I have no reason to believe that any of the competing law firms, all of which have associations with notable American class action firms, will shirk their responsibilities to control the litigation and not to condone breaches of the rules of professional conduct or tortious conduct.

(b) Retainer, Legal, and Forensic Resources

[242] The circumstances of the retainers and the initiative shown by the law firms and their efforts and resources expended by them are also not determinative factors in deciding the carriage motions in the case at bar, although it is an enormous shame that it may not be possible to share the fruits of these efforts once carriage is granted to one action and not the others.

[243] As I have already noted above, the aggregate expenditure to develop the tactical and strategic plans for litigation not including the costs of preparing for the carriage motion are approximately \$2 million. It seems that this effort by the respective law firms has been fruitful and productive. All of the law firms claim that their respective efforts have yielded valuable information to advance a claim against Sino-Forest and others.

[244] All of the law firms were quickly out of the starting blocks to initiate investigations about the prospects and merits of a class action against Sino-Forest. For different reasonable reasons, the statements of claim were filed at different times.

[245] In the case at bar, I do not regard the priority of the commencement of the actions as a meaningful factor, given that from the publication of the Muddy Waters Report, all the firms responded immediately to explore the merits of a class action and given that all the firms plan to amend their original pleadings that commenced the actions. In any event, I do not think that a carriage motion should be regarded as some sort of take home exam where the competing law firms have a deadline for delivering a statement of claim, else marks be deducted.

(c) Funding

[246] In my opinion, another non-determinative factor is the circumstances that: (a) the representative plaintiffs in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* may apply for court approval for third-party funding; (b) the plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* may apply for court approval for third-party funding or they may apply to the Class Proceedings Fund to be protected from an adverse costs award; (c) Messrs. Smith and Collins in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* may apply to the Class Proceedings Fund to be protected from an adverse costs award; and (d) each of the law firms have respectively undertaken with their respective clients to indemnify them from an adverse costs award.

[247] In the future, the court or the Ontario Law Foundation may have to deal with the funding requests, but for present purposes, I do not see how these prospects should make a difference to deciding carriage, although I will have something more to say below about the significance of the state of affairs that clients with the resources of Labourers' Fund, Operating Engineers Fund, Sjunde AP-Fonden, BC Investment, Bâtirente, and Northwest would seek an indemnity from their respective class counsel.

[248] In any event, in my opinion, standing alone, the funding situation is not a determinative factor to carriage, although it may be relevant to other factors that are discussed below.

(d) Conflicts of Interest

[249] In the circumstances of the case at bar, I also do not regard conflicts of interest as a determinative factor.

[250] I do not see how the fact that Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments made their investments on behalf of others and allegedly suffered no losses themselves creates a conflict of interest. It appears to me that they have the same fiduciary responsibilities to their members as do Labourers' Fund, Operating Engineers Fund, Sjunde AP-Fonden, and Healthcare Manitoba.

[251] Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments were the investors in the securities of Sino-Forest and although there may be equitable or beneficial owners, under the common law, they suffered the losses, just like the other investors in Sino-Forest securities suffered losses. The fact that Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments held the investments in trust for their members does not change the reality that they suffered the losses.

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[252] It is alleged that Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments, who were involved in corporate governance matters associated with Sino-Forest, failed to properly evaluate the risks of investing in Sino-Forest. Based on these allegations, it is submitted that they have a conflict of interest. I disagree.

[253] Having regard to the main allegation being that Sino-Forest was engaged in a corporate shell game that deceived everyone, it strikes me that it is almost a spuriously speculative allegation to blame another victim as being at fault. However, even if the allegation is true, the other class members have no claim against Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments. If there were a claim, it would be by the members of Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments, who are not members of the class suing Sino-Forest. The actual class members have no claim against Northwest, Bâtirente, and BC Investments but have a common interest in pursuing Sino-Forest and the other defendants.

[254] Further, it is arguable that Koskie Minsky and Siskinds are incorrect in suggesting that in *Comité syndical national de retraite Bâtirente inc. c. Société financière Manulife*, 2011 QCCS 3446, the Superior Court of Québec disqualified Bâtirente as a representative plaintiff because there might be an issue about Bâtirente's investment decisions.

[255] It appears to me that Justice Soldevida did not appoint Bâtirente as a representative plaintiff for a different reason. The action in Québec was a class action. There were some similarities to the case at bar, insofar as it was an action against a corporation, Manulife, and its officers and directors for misrepresentations and failure to fulfill disclosure obligations under securities law. In that action, the personal knowledge of the investors was a factor in their claims against Manulife, and Justice Soldevida felt that sophisticated investors, like Bâtirente, could not be treated on the same footing as the average investor. It was in that context that she concluded that there was an appearance of a conflict of interest between Bâtirente and the class members.

[256] In the case at bar, however, particularly for the statutory claims where reliance is presumed, there is no reason to differentiate the average investors from the sophisticated ones. I also do not see how the difference between sophisticated and average investors would matter except perhaps at individual issues trials, where reasonable reliance might be an issue, if the matter ever gets that far.

[257] Another alleged conflict concerns the facts that BDO Canada, which is not a defendant, is the auditor of Labourers' Fund, and Koskie Minsky and BDO Canada have worked together on several matters. Those circumstances are not conflicts of interest. There is no reason to think that Labourers' Fund and Koskie Minsky are going to pull their punches against BDO or would have any reason to do so.

[258] Finally, turning to the major alleged conflict between the bondholders and the shareholders, speaking generally, the alleged conflicts of interest between the bondholders that invested in Sino-Forest and the shareholders that invested in Sino-Forest arise because the bondholders have a cause of action in debt in addition to their causes of action based in tort or statutory misrepresentation claims, while, in contrast,

the shareholders have only statutory and common law claims based in misrepresentation.

[259] There is, however, within the context of the class action, no conflict of interest. In the class action, only the misrepresentation claims are being advanced, and there is no conflict between the bondholders and the shareholders in advancing these claims. Both the bondholders and the shareholders seek to prove that they were deceived in purchasing or holding on to their Sino-Forest securities. That the Defendants may have defences associated with the terms of the bonds is a problem for the bondholders but it does not place them in a conflict with shareholders not confronted with those special defences.

[260] Assuming that the bondholders and shareholders succeed or are offered a settlement, there might be a disagreement between them about how the judgment or settlement proceeds should be distributed, but that conflict, which at this juncture is speculative, can be addressed now or later by constituting the bondholders as a subclass and by the court's supervisory role in approving settlements under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*.

[261] If there are bondholders that wish only to pursue their debt claims or who wish not to pursue any claim against Sino-Forest or who wish to have the bond trustee pursue only the debt claims, these bondholders may opt out of the class proceeding assuming it is certified.

[262] If there is a bankruptcy of Sino-Forest, then in the bankruptcy, the position of the shareholders as owners of equity is different than the position of the bondholders as secured creditors, but that is a natural course of a bankruptcy. That there are creditors' priorities, outside of the class action, does not mean that, within the class action, where the bondholders and the shareholders both claim damages, i.e., unsecured claims, there is a conflict of interest.

[263] The alleged conflict in the case at bar is different from the genuine conflict of interest that was identified in *Settlington v. Merck Frost Canada Ltd.*, [2006] O.J. No. 379 (S.C.J.), where, for several reasons, the Merchant Law Firm was not granted carriage or permitted to be part of the consortium granted carriage in a pharmaceutical products liability class action against Merck.

[264] In *Settlington*, one ground for disqualification was that the Merchant Law firm was counsel in a securities class action for different plaintiffs suing Merck for an unsecured claim. If the securities class action claim was successful, then the prospects of an unsecured recovery in the products liability class action might be imperiled. In the case at bar, however, within the class action, the bondholders are not pursuing a different cause of action from the shareholders; both are unsecured creditors for the purposes of their damages' claims arising from misrepresentation. If, in other proceedings, the bondholders or their trustee successfully pursue recovery in debt, then the threat to the prospects of recovery by the shareholders arises in the normal way that debt instruments have priority over equity instruments, which is a normal risk for shareholders.

[265] Put shortly, although the analysis may not be easy, there are no conflicts of interest between the bondholders and the shareholders within the class action that cannot be handled by establishing a subclass for bondholders at the time of certification or at the time a settlement is contemplated.

(e) The Plaintiff and Defendant Correlation

[266] In *Ragoonanan v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.*, (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 603 (S.C.J.), in a proposed products liability class action, Mr. Ragoonanan sued Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans, and JTI-MacDonald, all cigarette manufacturers. He alleged that the manufacturers had negligently designed their cigarettes by failing to make them "fire safe." Mr. Ragoonanan's particular claim was against Imperial Tobacco, which was the manufacturer of the cigarette that allegedly caused harm to him when it was the cause of a fire at Mr. Ragoonanan's home. Mr. Ragoonanan did not have a claim against Rothmans or JTI-MacDonald.

[267] In *Ragoonanan*, Justice Cumming established the principle in Ontario class action law that there cannot be a cause of action against a defendant without a plaintiff who has that cause of action. Rather, there must be for every named defendant, a named plaintiff with a cause of action against that defendant. The *Ragoonanan* principle was expressly endorsed by the Court of Appeal in *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd.* (2002), 61 O.R. (3de) 433 (C.A.) at paras. 13-18, leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref'd (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4th) vii.

[268] It should be noted, however, that in *Ragoonanan*, Justice Cumming did not say that there must be for every separate cause of action against a named defendant, a named plaintiff. In other words, he did not say that if some class members had cause of action A against defendant X and other class members had cause of action B against defendant X that it was necessary that there be a named representative plaintiff for both the cause of action A v. X and for the cause of action B v. X. It was arguable that if the representative plaintiff had a claim against X, then he or she could represent others with the same or different claims against X.

[269] Thus, there is room for a debate about the scope of the *Ragoonanan* principle, and, indeed, it has been applied in the narrow way, just suggested. Provided that the representative plaintiff has his or her own cause of action, the representative plaintiff can assert a cause of action against a defendant on behalf of other class members that he or she does not assert personally, provided that the causes of action all share a common issue of law or of fact: *Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp.*, [2002] O.J. No. 1075 (S.C.J.) at para. 22, leave to appeal granted, [2002] O.J. No. 2135 (S.C.J.), varied (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 208 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 41, 48, varied [2003] O.J. No. 2218 (C.A.); *Healey v. Lakeridge Health Corp.*, [2006] O.J. No. 4277 (S.C.J.); *Matoni v. C.B.S. Interactive Multimedia Inc.*, [2008] O.J. No. 197 (S.C.J.) at paras. 71-77; *Voutour v. Pfizer Canada Inc.*, [2008] O.J. No. 3070 (S.C.J.); *Dobbie v. Arctic Glacier Income Fund*, 2011 ONSC 25 at para. 37. Thus, a representative plaintiff with damages for personal injury can claim in respect of dependents with derivative claims provided that

the statutes that create the derivative causes of action are properly pleaded: *Voutour v. Pfizer Canada Inc.*, *supra*; *Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp.*, *supra*.

[270] As noted above, in the case at bar, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submit that *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* has no problem with the *Ragoonanan* principle and that *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and especially the more elaborate *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* confront *Ragoonanan* problems.

[271] For the purposes of this carriage motion, I do not feel it is necessary to do an analysis about the extent to which any of the rival actions are compliant with *Ragoonanan*.

[272] The *Ragoonanan* problem is often easy to fix. The emergence of Mr. Collins in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* to sue for the primary market shareholders is an example, assuming that Mr. Smith's own claims against the defendants do not satisfy the *Ragoonanan* principle. Therefore, I do not regard the plaintiff and defendant correlation as a determinative factor in determining carriage.

[273] It is also convenient here to add that I do not see the spectre of challenges to the Superior Court's jurisdiction over foreign class members or over the foreign defendants are a determinative factor to picking one action over another. It may be that *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* has the potential to attract more jurisdictional challenges but standing alone that potential is not a reason for disqualifying *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

3. Determinative Factors

(a) Attributes of the Proposed Representative Plaintiffs

[274] I turn now to the determinative factors that lead me to the conclusion that carriage should be granted to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[275] The one determinative factor that stands alone is the characteristics of the candidates for representative plaintiff. In the case at bar, this is a troublesome and maybe a profound determinative factor.

[276] Kim Orr extolled the virtues of having its clients, Northwest, Bâtirente and BC Investments, which collectively manage \$92 billion in assets, as candidates to be representative plaintiffs.

[277] Similarly, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds extolled the virtues of having Labourers' Fund, Operating Engineers Fund, and Sjunde AP-Fonden as candidates for representative plaintiff, along with the support of major class member Healthcare Manitoba. Together, these parties to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* collectively manage \$23.2 billion in assets. As noted above, Koskie Minsky and Siskinds submitted that their clients were not tainted by involving themselves in the governance oversight of Sino-Forest, which had been lauded as a positive factor by Kim Orr.

[278] As I have already discussed above in the context of the discussion about conflicts of interest, I do not regard Bâtirente's, and Northwest's interest in corporate governance generally or its particular efforts to oversee Sino-Forest as a negative factor.

[279] However, what may be a negative factor and what is the signature attribute of all of these candidates for representative plaintiff is that it is hard to believe that given their financial heft, they need the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* for access to justice or to level the litigation playing field or that they need an indemnity to protect them from exposure to an adverse costs award.

[280] Although these candidates for representative plaintiff would seem to have adequate resources to litigate, they seem to be seeking to use a class action as a means to secure an indemnity from class counsel or a third-party funder for any exposure to costs. If they are genuinely serious about pursuing the defendants to obtain compensation for their respective members, they would also seem to be prime candidates to opt out of the class proceeding if they are not selected as a representative plaintiff.

[281] Mr. Rochon neatly argued that the class proceedings regime was designed for litigants like Mr. Smith not litigants like Labourers Trust or Northwest. He referred to the *Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995*, legislation in the United States that was designed to encourage large institutions to participate in securities class actions by awarding them leadership of securities actions under what is known as a "leadership order". He told me that the policy behind this legislation was to discourage what are known as "strike suits," namely, meritless securities class actions brought by opportunistic entrepreneurial attorneys to obtain very remunerative nuisance value payments from the defendants to settle non-meritorious claims.

[282] I was told that the American legislators thought that appointing a lead plaintiff on the basis of financial interest would ensure that institutional plaintiffs with expertise in the securities market and real financial interests in the integrity of the market would control the litigation, not lawyers. See: *LaSala v. Bordier et CIE*, 519 F.3d 121 (U.S. Ct App (3rd Cir)) (2008) at p. 128; *Taft v. Ackermans*, (2003), F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 402789 at 1,2, D.H. Webber, "The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions" (2010) NYU Law and Economics Working Papers, para. 216 at p. 7.

[283] Mr. Rochon pointed out that the litigation environment is different in Canada and Ontario and that the provinces have taken a different approach to controlling strike suits. Control is established generally by requiring that a proposed class action go through a certification process and by requiring a fairness hearing for any settlements, and in the securities field, control is established by requiring leave for claims under Part XXIII.1 of the *Ontario Securities Act*. See *Atsile v. CV Technologies Inc.* (2008) 93 O.R. (3d) 200 (S.C.J.) at paras. 7, 10-13.

[284] In his factum, Mr. Rochon eloquently argued that individual investors victimized by securities fraud should have a voice in directing class actions. Mr. Smith lost approximately half of his investment fortune; and according to Mr. Rochon, Mr. Smith is an individual investor who is highly motivated, wants an active role, and wants to have a voice in the proceeding.

[285] While I was impressed by Mr. Rochon's argument, it did not take me to the conclusions that the attributes of the institutional candidates for representative plaintiff in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* when compared to the

attributes of Mr. Smith should disqualify the institutional candidates from being representative plaintiffs or be a determinative factor to grant carriage to a more typical representative plaintiff like Mr. Smith or Mr. Collins.

[286] I think that it would be a mistake to have a categorical rule that an institutional plaintiff with the resources to bring individual proceedings or the means to opt-out of class proceedings and go it alone should be disqualified or discouraged from being a representative plaintiff. In the case at bar, the expertise and participation of the institutional investors in the securities marketplace could contribute to the successful prosecution of the lawsuit on behalf of the class members.

[287] Although Mr. Smith and Mr. Collins might lose their voice, they might in the circumstances of this case not be best voice for their fellow class members, who at the end of the day want results not empathy from their representative plaintiff and class counsel.

[288] Access to justice is one of the policy goals of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* and although it may be the case that the institutional representative plaintiffs want but do not need the access to justice provided by the Act, they are pursuing access to justice in a way that ultimately benefits Mr. Smith and other class members should their actions be certified as a class proceeding.

[289] On these matters, I agree with what Justice Rady said in *McCann v. CP Ships Ltd.*, [2009] O.J. No. 5182 (S.C.J.) at paras. 104-105:

104. I recognize that access to justice concerns may not be engaged when a class is comprised of large institutions with large claims. Authority for this proposition is found in *Abdool v. Anaheim Management Ltd.* (1995), 21 O.R. (3d) 453 (Div. Ct.). Moldaver J. made the following observation at p. 473:

As a rule, certification should have as its root a number of individual claims which would otherwise be economically unfeasible to pursue. While not necessarily fatal to an order for certification, the absence of this important underpinning will certainly weigh in the balance against certification.

105. Nevertheless, I am satisfied on the basis of the record before me that the individual claims and those of small corporations would likely be economically unfeasible to pursue. Further, there is no good principled reason that a large corporation should not be able to avail itself of the class proceeding mechanism where the other objectives are met.

[290] Another goal of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* is judicial economy, and the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions. However, the Act envisions a multiplicity of actions by permitting class members to opt-out and bring their own action against the defendants. However, there is an exception. The only class member that cannot opt out is the representative plaintiff, and in the circumstances of the case at bar, one advantage of granting carriage to one of the institutional plaintiffs is that they cannot opt out, and this, in and of itself, advances judicial economy.

[291] Another advantage of keeping the institutional plaintiffs in the case at bar in a class action is that the institutional plaintiffs are already to a large extent representative plaintiffs. They are already, practically speaking, suing on behalf of their own members, who number in the hundreds of thousands. Their members suffered losses by the

investments made on their behalf by BC Investments, Bâtirente, Northwest, Labourers' Fund, Operating Engineers Fund, Sjunde AP-Fonden, and Healthcare Manitoba. These pseudo-class members are probably better served by the court case managing the class action, assuming it is certified and by the judicial oversight of the approval process for any settlements.

[292] These thoughts lead me to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case at bar, a determinative factor that favours *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* is the attributes of their candidates for representative plaintiff. In this regard, *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* has the further advantage that it also has Mr. Grant and Mr. Wong, who are individual investors and who can give voice to the interests of similarly situated class members.

(b) Definition of Class Membership and Definition of Class Period

[293] The first group of interrelated determinative factors is: definition of class membership and definition of class period. These factors concern who, among the investors in Sino-Forest shares and bonds, is to be given a ticket to a class action litigation train that is designed to take them to the court of justice.

[294] *Smith v. Sino-Forest* offers no tickets to bondholders because it is submitted that (a) the bondholders will fight with the shareholders about sharing the spoils of the litigation, especially because the bondholders have priority over the shareholders and secured and protected claims in a bankruptcy; (b) the bondholders will fight among themselves about a variety of matters including whether it would be preferable to leave it to their bond trustee to sue on their collective behalf to collect the debt rather than prosecute a class action for an unsecured claim for damages for misrepresentation; and (c) a misrepresentation action by the bondholders against some or all of the defendants may be precluded by the terms of the bonds.

[295] In my opinion, the bondholders should be included as class members, if necessary, with their own subclass, and, thus, *Smith v. Sino-Forest* does not fare well under this group of interrelated factors. As I explained above, I do not regard the membership of both shareholders and bondholders in the class as raising insurmountable conflicts of interest. The bondholders have essentially the same misrepresentation claims as do the shareholders, and it makes sense, particularly as a matter of judicial economy, to have their claims litigated in the same proceeding as the shareholders' claims.

[296] Pragmatically, if the bondholders are denied a ticket to one of the class actions now at the Osgoode Hall station because of a conflict of interest, then they could bring another class action in which they would be the only class members. That class action by the bondholders would raise the same issues of fact and law about the affairs of Sino-Forest. Thus, denying the bondholders a ticket on one of the two class actions that has made room for them would just encourage a multiplicity of litigation. It is preferable to keep the bondholders on board sharing the train with any conflicts being managed by the appointment of separate class counsel for the bondholders, who can form a subclass at certification or later assuming that certification is granted.

[297] As already noted above, for those bondholders who do not want to get on the litigation train, they can opt-out of the class action assuming it is certified. That the defendants may have defences to the misrepresentation claims of the bondholders is just a problem that the bondholders will have to confront, and it is not a reason to deny them a ticket to try to obtain access to justice.

[298] In *Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.*, [2004] O.J. No. 299 (S.C.J.), Justice Winkler, as he then was, noted at para. 39 that there is a difference between restricting the joinder of causes of action in order to make an action more amenable to certification and restricting the number of class members in an action for which certification is being sought. He stated:

Although *Rumley v. British Columbia*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184 holds that the plaintiffs can arbitrarily restrict the causes of action asserted in order to make a proceeding more amenable to certification (at 201), the same does not hold true with respect to the proposed class. Here the plaintiffs have not chosen to restrict the causes of action asserted but rather attempt to make the action more amenable to certification by suggesting arbitrary exclusions from the proposed class. This is diametrically opposite to the approach taken by the plaintiffs in *Rumley*, and one which has been expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court in *Hollick v. Toronto (City)*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158. There, McLachlin C.J. made it clear that the onus falls on the putative representative to show that the "class is defined sufficiently narrowly" but without resort to arbitrary exclusion to achieve that result.....

[299] For shareholders, *Smith v. Sino-Forest* is more accommodating; indeed, it is the most accommodating, in offering tickets to shareholders to board the class action train. Without prejudice to the arguments of the defendants, who may impugn any of the class period or class membership definitions, and assuming that the bondholders are also included, the best of the class periods for shareholders is that found in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*.

[300] To be blunt, I found the rationales for shorter class periods in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* somewhat paranoid, as if the plaintiffs were afraid that the defendants will attack their definitions for over-inclusiveness or for making the class proceeding unmanageable. Those attacks may come, but I see no reason for the plaintiffs in *Labourers* and *Sino-Forest* to leave at the station without tickets some shareholders who may have arguable claims.

[301] If Mr. Torchio is correct that almost all of the shareholders would be covered by the shortest class period that is found in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, then the defendants may think the fight to shorten the class period may not be worth it. If they are inclined to challenge the class definition on grounds of unmanageability or the class action as not being the preferable procedure, the longer class period definition will likely be peripheral to the main contest.

[302] I do not see the extension of the class period beyond June 2, 2011, when the Muddy Waters Report became public, as a problem. Put shortly, at this juncture, and subject to what the defendants may later have to say, I agree with Rochon Genova's arguments about the appropriate class period end date for the shareholders.

[303] If I am correct in this analysis so far, where it takes me is only to the conclusion that the best class period definition for shareholders is found in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. It,

however, does not take me to the conclusion that carriage should be granted to *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. Subject to what the defendants may have to say, the class definitions and class period in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* appear to be adequate, reasonable, certifiable, and likely consistent with the common issues that will be forthcoming.

[304] Since for other reasons, I would grant carriage to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, the question I ask myself is whether the class definition in *Labourers*, which favourably includes bondholders, but which is not as good a definition as found in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* or in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* should be a reason not to grant carriage to *Labourers*. My answer to my own question is no, especially since it is still possible to amend the class definition so that it is not under-inclusive.

(c) Theory of the Case, Causes of Action, Joinder of Defendants, and Prospects of Certification

[305] The second group of interrelated determinative factors is: theory of the case, causes of action, joinder of defendants, and prospects of certification. Taken together, it is my opinion, that these factors, which are about what is in the best interests of the putative class members, favour staying *Smith v. Sino-Forest* and *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* and granting carriage to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[306] In applying the above factors, I begin here with the obvious point that it would not be in the interests of the putative class members, let alone not in their best interests to grant carriage to an action that is unlikely to be certified or that, if certified, is unlikely to succeed. It also seems obvious that it would be in the best interests of class members to grant carriage to the action that is most likely to be certified and ultimately successful at obtaining access to justice for the injured or, in this case, financially harmed class members. And it also seems obvious that all other things being equal, it would be in the best interests of class members and fair to the defendants and most consistent with the policies of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* to grant carriage to the action that, to borrow from rule 1.04 or the *Rules of Civil Procedure* secures the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of the dispute on its merits.

[307] While these points seem obvious, there is, however, a major problem in applying them, because the court should not and cannot go very far in determining the matters that would be most determinative of carriage. A carriage motion is not the time to determine whether an action will satisfy the criteria for certification or whether it will ultimately provide redress to the class members or whether it would be the preferable procedure or the most expeditious and least expensive procedure to resolve the dispute.

[308] Keeping this caution in mind, in my opinion, certain aspects of *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* make the other actions preferable. In this regard, I find the joinder of some defendants to *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* mildly troublesome.

[309] More serious, in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*, I find the employment and reliance on the tort action of fraudulent misrepresentation less desirable than the causes of action utilized to provide procedural and substantive justice to the class members in *Smith v.*

Sino-Forest and *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*. In my opinion, the fraudulent misrepresentation action adds needless complexity and costs.

[310] While the finger-pointing of the OSC at Ho, Hung, Ip, and Yeung supports their joinder, the joinder of Chen, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, and Zhao is mildly troublesome. The joinder of defendants should be based on something more substantive than their opportunity to be a wrongdoer, and at this juncture it is not clear why Chen, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, and Zhao have been joined to *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* and not to the other proposed class actions. Their joinder, however, is only mildly troublesome, because the plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* may have particulars of wrongdoing and have simply failed to plead them.

[311] Turning to the pleading of fraudulent misrepresentation, when it is far easier to prove a claim in negligent misrepresentation or negligence, the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation seems a needless provocation that will just fuel the defendants' fervour to defend and to not settle the class action. Fraud is a very serious allegation because of the moral and not just legal turpitude of it, and the allegation of fraud also imperils insurance coverage that might be the source of a recovery for class members.

[312] Kim Orr has understated the difficulties the plaintiffs in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* will confront in impugning the integrity of Sino-Forest, Ardell, Bowland, Chan, Horsley, Hyde, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Wang, West, Chen, Ho, Hung, Ip, Lawrence Estate, Maradin, Wong, Yeung, Zhao, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse (USA), Dundee, Haywood, Maison, Merrill, Merrill-Fenner, Morgan, RBC, Scotia, TD, UBS, E&Y, BDO, Pöyry, Pöyry Forest, JP Management.

[313] Fraud must be proved individually. In order to establish that a corporate defendant committed fraud, it must be proven that a natural person for whose conduct the corporation is responsible acted with a fraudulent intent. See: *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada)*, [2000] O.J. No. 4595 (S.C.J.) at para. 26; *Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of)*, [1998] O.J. No. 2637 (Gen. Div.) at paras. 477-479.

[314] A claim for deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation typically breaks down into five elements: (1) a false statement; (2) the defendant knowing that the statement is false or being indifferent to its truth or falsity; (3) the defendant having an intent to deceive the plaintiff; (4) the false statement being material and the plaintiff being induced to act; and (5) the defendant suffering damages: *Derry v. Peek* (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.); *Graham v. Saville*, [1945] O.R. 301 (C.A.); *Francis v. Dingman* (1983), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 244 (Ont. C.A.). The fraud elements are the second and third in this list.

[315] In the famous case of *Derry v. Peek*, the general issue was what counts as a fraudulent misrepresentation. More particularly, the issue was whether a careless or negligent misrepresentation without more could count as a fraudulent misrepresentation. In the case, the defendants were responsible for a false statement in a prospectus. The prospectus, which was for the sale of shares in a tramway company, stated that the company was permitted to use steam power to work a tram line. The statement was false because the directors had omitted the qualification that the use of steam power required the consent of the Board of Trade. As it happened, the consent was not given, the tram line would have to be driven by horses, and the company was wound-up. The Law

Lords reviewed the evidence of the defendants individually and concluded that although the defendants had all been careless in their use of language, they had honestly believed what they had said in the prospectus.

[316] In the lead judgment, Lord Herschell reviewed the case law, and at p. 374, he stated in the most famous passage from the case:

I think the authorities establish the following propositions. First, in order to sustain an action for deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless, whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think be an honest belief in its truth. And this probably covers the whole ground, for one who knowingly alleges that which is false has obviously no such honest belief. Thirdly, if fraud is proved, the motive of the person guilty is immaterial. It matters not that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the statement was made.

[317] Lord Herschell's third situation is the one that was at the heart of *Derry v. Peek*, and the Law Lords struggled to articulate that relationship between belief and carelessness in speaking. Before the above passage, Lord Herschell stated at p. 361:

To make a statement careless whether it be true or false, and therefore without any real belief in its truth, appears to me to be an essentially different thing from making, through want of care, a false statement, which is nevertheless honestly believed to be true. And it is surely conceivable that a man may believe that what he states is the fact, though he has been so wanting in care that the Court may think that there were no sufficient grounds to warrant his belief.

[318] Lord Herschell is saying that carelessness in making a statement does not necessarily entail that a person does not believe what he or she is saying. However, later in his judgment, he emphasizes that carelessness is relevant and could be sufficient to show that a person did not believe what he or she was saying. Thus, carelessness may prove fraud, but it is not itself fraud. Lord Herschell's famous quotation, where he states that fraud is proven when it is shown that a false statement was made recklessly, careless whether it be true or false, states only awkwardly the role of carelessness and must be read in the context of the whole judgment.

[319] In *Angus v. Clifford*, [1891] 2 Ch. 449 (C.A.) at p. 471, Bowen, L.J. discussed the role of carelessness or recklessness in establishing fraud; he stated:

Not caring, in that context [i.e., in the context of an allegation of fraud], did not mean taking care, it meant indifference to the truth, the moral obliquity which consists of wilful disregard of the importance of truth, and unless you keep it clear that that is the true meaning of the term, you are constantly in danger of confusing the evidence from which the inference of dishonesty in the mind may be drawn - evidence which consists in a great many cases of gross want of caution - with the inference of fraud, or of dishonesty itself, which has to be drawn after you have weighed all the evidence.

[320] Bowen, L.J.'s statement alludes to the second element of what makes a statement fraudulent. Deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation requires that the defendant

have "a wicked mind." *Le Lievre v. Gould*, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491 at p. 498. Fraud involves intentional dishonesty, the intent being to deceive. If the plaintiff fails to prove this mental element, then, as was the case in *Derry v. Peek*, the claim is dismissed. To succeed in an action for deceit or for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must show not only that the defendant spoke falsely and contrary to belief but that the defendant had the intent to deceive, which is to say he or she had the aim of inducing the plaintiff to act mistakenly: *BG Checo International Ltd. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority* (1993), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).

[321] The defendant's reason for deceiving the plaintiff, however, need not be evil. In the passage above from *Derry v. Peek*, Lord Herschell notes that the person's motive for saying something that he or she does not believe is irrelevant. A person may have a benign reason for defrauding another person, but the fraud remains because of the discordance between words and belief combined with the intent to mislead the plaintiff: *Smith v. Chadwick* (1854), 9 App. Cas. 187 at p. 201; *Bradford Building Society v. Borders*, [1941] 2 All E.R. 205 at p. 211; *Beckman v. Wallace* (1913), 29 O.L.R. 96 (C.A.) at p. 101.

[322] In promoting its fraudulent misrepresentation claim, Kim Orr relied on *Gregory v. Jolley* (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), which was a case where a trial judge erred by not applying the third branch of the test articulated in *Derry v. Peek*. Justice Sharpe discussed the trial judge's failure to consider whether the appellant had made out a case of fraud based on recklessness and stated at para. 20:

With respect to the law, the trial judge's reasons show that he failed to consider whether the appellant had made out a case of fraud on the basis of recklessness. While he referred to a case that in turn referred to the test from *Derry v. Peek*, the reasons for judgment demonstrate to my satisfaction that the trial judge simply did not take into account the possibility that fraud could be made out if the respondent made misrepresentations of material fact without regard to their truth. The trial judge's reasons speak only of an intention to defraud or of statements calculated to mislead or misrepresent. He makes no reference to recklessness or to statements made without an honest belief in their truth. As *Derry v. Peek* holds, that state of mind is sufficient proof of the mental element required for civil fraud, whatever the motive of the party making the representation. In another leading case on civil fraud, *Edgington v. Fitzmaurice*, (1885), 29 Ch. D.459 at 481-82 (C.A.), Bowen L.J. stated: "[I]t is immaterial whether they made the statement knowing it to be untrue, or recklessly, without caring whether it was true or not, because to make a statement recklessly for the purpose of influencing another person is dishonest." The failure to give adequate consideration to the contention that the respondent had been reckless with the truth in regard to the income figures he gave in order to obtain disability insurance constitutes an error of law justifying the intervention of this court.

[323] From this passage, Kim Orr extracts the notion that there is a viable fraudulent misrepresentation against forty defendants all of whom individually can be shown to be reckless as opposed to careless. That seems unlikely, but more to the point, recklessness is only half the battle. The overall motive may not matter, but the defendant still must have had the intent to deceive, which in *Gregory v. Jolley* was the intent to obtain disability insurance to which he was not qualified to receive.

[324] Recklessness alone is not enough to constitute fraudulent misrepresentation, as Justice Cumming notes at para. 25 of his judgment in *Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada)*, [2000] O.J. No. 4595 (S.C.J.), where he states:

The representation must have been made with knowledge of its falsehood or recklessness without belief in its truth. The representation must have been made by the representor with the intention that it should be acted upon by the representee and the representee must in fact have acted upon it.

[325] I conclude that the fraudulent misrepresentation action is a substantial weakness in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*. In fairness, I should add that I think that the unjust enrichment causes of action and oppression remedy claims in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* add little.

[326] The unjust enrichment claims in *Labourers* seem superfluous. If Sino-Forest, Chan, Horsley, Mak, Martin, Murray, Poon, Banc of America, Canaccord, CIBC, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse USA, Dundee, Maison, Merrill, RBC, Scotia and TD, are found to be liable for misrepresentation or negligence, then the damages they will have to pay will far exceed the disgorgement of any unjust enrichment. If they are found not to have committed any wrong, then there will be no basis for an unjust enrichment claim for recapture of the gains they made on share transactions or from their remuneration for services rendered. In other words, the claims for unjust enrichment are unnecessary for victory and they will not snatch victory if the other claims are defeated. Much the same can be said about the oppression remedy claim. That said, these claims in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* will not strain the forensic resources of the plaintiffs in the same way as taking on a massive fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action would do in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest*.

[327] For the purposes of this carriage motion, I have little to say about the "Integrity Representation" approach to the misrepresentation claims that are at the heart of the claims against the defendants in *Northwest v. Sino-Forest* or of the "GAAP" misrepresentation employed in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, or the focus on the authorized intermediaries in *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. Short of deciding the motion for certification, there is no way of deciding which approach is more likely to lead to certification or which approach the defendants will attack as deficient. For present purposes, I am simply satisfied that the class members are best served by the approach in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*.

[328] The cohesive, yet adequately comprehensive, approach used in *Smith v. Sino-Forest* appears to me close to *Labourers v. Sino-Forest*, but in my opinion, *Smith v. Sino-Forest* wants for the inclusion of the bondholders, and, as noted above, there are other factors which favour *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* over *Smith v. Sino-Forest*. That said, it was a close call for me to choose *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* and not *Smith v. Sino-Forest*.

H. CONCLUSION


[329] For the above Reasons, I grant carriage to Koskie Minsky and Siskinds with leave to the plaintiffs in *Labourers v. Sino-Forest* to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

[330] In granting leave, I grant leave generally and the plaintiffs are not limited to the amendments sought as a part of this carriage motion. It will be for the plaintiffs to decide whether some amendments are in order to respond to the lessons learned from this carriage motion, and it is not too late to have more representative plaintiffs.


[331] I repeat that a carriage motion is without prejudice to the defendants' rights to challenge the pleadings and whether any particular cause of action is legally tenable.

[332] I make no order as to costs, which is in the usual course in carriage motions.

Released: January 6, 2012


Perell, J.

SCHEDULE "A"



CITATION: Smith v Sino-Forest Corporation, 2012 ONSC24
COURT FILE NO.: 11-CV-428238CP
COURT FILE NO.: 11-CV-431153CP
COURT FILE NO.: 11-CV-435826CP
DATE: January 6, 2012

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

BETWEEN:

Douglas Smith and Zhongjun Goa
Plaintiff

- and -

Sino-Forest Corporation et al.
Defendants

AND BETWEEN:

**The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund
of Central and Eastern Canada and the
Trustees of the International Union of
Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan
for Operating Engineers in Ontario**
Plaintiff

- and -

Sino-Forest Corporation et al.
Defendants

AND BETWEEN:

**Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P., Comité
Syndical National de Retraite Bâtirente Inc.**
Plaintiff

- and -


Sino-Forest Corporation et al.
Defendants

REASONS FOR DECISION

Perell, J.

TAB 9

Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL



ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR.)	WEDNESDAY, THE 25 th
)	
JUSTICE MORAWETZ)	DAY OF JULY, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS*
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND
 ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION

ORDER
(Mediation)

THIS MOTION, made by FTI Consulting Canada Inc. in its capacity as monitor (the "**Monitor**") of Sino-Forest Corporation (the "**Applicant**") for a consent order concerning mediation and related relief was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Monitor's Notice of Motion dated July 13, 2012 and the Fifth Report of the Monitor dated July 13, 2012 (the "**Fifth Report**"), the Responding Motion Record of the Applicants and the Responding Motion Record of Pöyry Beijing (as defined below), and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicant, the Monitor, the ad hoc committee of Noteholders (the "**Ad Hoc Noteholders**"), the ad hoc group of purchasers of the Applicant's securities (the "**Plaintiffs**") and the other defendants in the Ontario Class Action and the Quebec Class Action (the "**Third Party Defendants**") and those other parties present, no one appearing for any of the other parties served with the Monitor's Motion Record, although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Alma Cano sworn July 13, 2012, filed.

SERVICE AND INTERPRETATION

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record, including the Fifth Report, is hereby abridged and validated such that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.
2. THIS COURT ORDERS that capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meaning given to them in the Fifth Report.

MEDIATION

3. THIS COURT ORDERS that the parties eligible to participate in the Mediation pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Order are the Applicant, the Plaintiffs, the Third Party Defendants (which shall be read to include Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited (“**Pöyry Beijing**”)), the Monitor, the Ad Hoc Noteholders and any insurers providing coverage in respect of the Applicant and the Third Party Defendants (collectively, the “**Mediation Parties**”).
4. THIS COURT ORDERS that the subject matter of the Mediation shall be the resolution of the claims of the Plaintiffs against the Applicant and the Third Party Defendants as set out in the statements of claim in the Ontario Class Action and the Quebec Class Action and any and all related claims (the “**Subject Claims**”), provided that for the purpose of the Mediation, the Plaintiffs shall not seek contribution from any of the Mediation Parties with respect to amounts that could have been sought by the Plaintiffs from Pöyry Beijing had the Plaintiffs not reached a settlement with Pöyry Beijing (the “**Pöyry Settlement**”) and provided that the Plaintiffs shall provide to the Mediation Parties, within 10 days of the date of this Order or such further time as this Court may direct, a written summary of evidence proffered by Pöyry Beijing pursuant to the Pöyry Settlement, which summary shall be treated in the same manner as material in the Data Room (as defined below) pursuant to this Order.
5. THIS COURT ORDERS that, where practicable, the Mediation Parties shall participate in the Mediation in person and with representatives present with full authority to settle the Subject Claims (including any insurer providing coverage), provided that, where not practicable, the Mediation Parties may participate in the Mediation through counsel or other representatives, subject to those counsel or other representatives having access to representatives with full

authority and undertaking to promptly pursue instructions with respect to any proposed agreements that arise from the Mediation.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS that parties in addition to the Mediation Parties shall only have standing to participate in the Mediation on consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, acting reasonably, or by further Order of this Court.

DATA ROOM

7. THIS COURT ORDERS that in connection with the Mediation, as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than August 3, 2012, the Applicant shall provide access to the Mediation Parties to the existing data room maintained by Merrill (the "**Data Room**"), provided however that prior to access to the Data Room, all participants (other than the Applicant, the incumbent directors of the Applicant and the Monitor) shall have entered into a confidentiality agreement with the Applicant on terms reasonably acceptable to the Applicant and the Monitor.

8. THIS COURT ORDERS that any Mediation Parties who enter into a confidentiality agreement as contemplated by paragraph 7 of this order shall comply with the terms of such confidentiality agreement.

9. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant, its subsidiaries and affiliates, and their directors, officers, employees, agents and advisors, shall incur no liability in connection with causing, effecting or acquiescing in the establishment of the Data Room or disclosure in respect of such materials and the information contained therein in accordance with this Order. The materials in the Data Room shall be made available without any representation as to the truth of their contents or their completeness, and persons relying on those materials shall do so at their own risk. The disclosure of such materials and the information contained therein in accordance with this Order is not and shall not be public disclosure in any respect. Nothing in this paragraph affects any rights or causes of action that any person may have in relation to the prior disclosure of any of the contents of the Data Room, insofar as such rights or causes of action are independent from and not related to the provision of materials and information in accordance with this Order.

MEDIATION SCHEDULE

10. THIS COURT ORDER THAT, the schedule for the Mediation shall be as follows:
- (a) the Mediation shall be conducted on September 4th and 5th, and if a third day is required, on September 10th, 2012 (the “**Mediation Dates**”);
 - (b) additional Mediation dates shall only be added, and any adjournments of any mediation dates shall only be accepted, with the prior written consent of all Mediation Parties;
 - (c) the Mediation shall be conducted at a location to be determined by the Mediator (as defined below); and
 - (d) the Applicant, the Plaintiffs and the Third Party Defendants shall deliver their respective written position statements to each other and to the other Mediation Parties on or before August 27, 2012.

APPOINTMENT OF THE MEDIATOR

11. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Honourable Justice Newbould shall be appointed mediator (the “**Mediator**”).

12. THIS COURT ORDERS that, prior to the commencement of the Mediation, the Mediator shall have the right to communicate with this Court and the Monitor from time to time as deemed necessary or advisable by the Mediator in their sole discretion.

TERMINATION OF THE MEDIATION

13. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Mediation process shall be terminated under any of the following circumstances:

- (a) by declaration by the Mediator that a settlement has been reached;
- (b) by declaration by the Mediator that further efforts at mediation are no longer considered worthwhile;

- (c) for any other reason determined by the Mediator;
- (d) mutual agreement by the Mediation Parties; or
- (e) further Order of this Court,

provided that, the Mediation shall in any event terminate on September 10, 2012, unless extended with the prior written consent of all Mediation Parties.

NO IMPACT ON OTHER PROCEEDINGS

14. THIS COURT ORDERS that all offers, promises, conduct statements, whether written or oral, made in the course of the Mediation are inadmissible in any arbitration or court proceeding. No person shall subpoena or require the Mediator to testify, produce records, notes or work product in any other existing or future proceedings, and no video or audio recording will be made of the Mediation. Evidence that is otherwise admissible or discoverable shall not be rendered inadmissible or non-discoverable as a result of its use in the Mediation. In the event that the Mediation Parties (or any group of them) do reach a settlement, the terms of that settlement will be admissible in any court or other proceeding required to enforce it, unless the Mediation Parties agree otherwise. Information disclosed to the Mediator by any Mediation Party at a private caucus during the Mediation shall remain confidential unless such Mediation Party authorizes disclosure.

15. THIS COURT ORDERS that nothing in this Order nor the participation of any party in the Mediation shall provide such party with rights within these proceedings than such party may otherwise have.

16. THIS COURT ORDERS that, subject to any applicable stay of proceedings, nothing in this Order shall prevent the Applicant, the Monitor or any other party of standing from otherwise pursuing the resolution of claims under the Claims Procedure Order granted by this Court on May 14, 2012, or any other matter in these CCAA proceedings, including without limitation, the filing and advancement of the Meetings Order and a Plan.


CONFIDENTIALITY

17. THIS COURT ORDERS that any mediation briefs or other documents filed by the Mediation Parties shall be used only in the context of the Mediation and for no other purpose and shall be kept confidential by all such parties irrespective of whether such Mediation Parties sign a confidentiality agreement.

18. THIS COURT ORDERS that any mediation briefs or other documents filed by the Mediation Parties that contain information obtained from the Data Room may not be shared with or otherwise disclosed to any person or entity that has not signed a confidentiality agreement, other than the Applicant, the incumbent directors of the Applicant, the Monitor and Mediator.

MISCELLANEOUS

19. THIS COURT ORDERS that the terms of this Order may only be varied by further Order of this Court, which may be sought on an ex parte basis on consent of the Mediation Parties.



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REGISTERED AT / ENREGISTRÉ À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO /
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:
JUL 25 2012

DEBITANT:

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IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

(PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT TORONTO)

ORDER
(Mediation)

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
Lawyers for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.,
in its capacity as Monitor of the Applicant

TAB 10

Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

THE HONOURABLE MR.)	FRIDAY, THE 27 th
)	
JUSTICE MORAWETZ)	DAY OF JULY, 2012



**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, AS AMENDED
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION**

ORDER

THIS MOTION made by the Applicant, Sino-Forest Corporation ("**SFC**") regarding the status of shareholder claims and related indemnity claims was heard this day, at the courthouse at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario,

ON READING the Motion Record of the Applicant, the Responding Motion Record of Ernst & Young LLP, the Book of Previously Filed Materials and Court Orders, and the Responding Motion Record of BDO Limited and the facts of the parties, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Moving Party, Sino-Forest Corporation, the Monitor, the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders, Ernst & Young, BDO, and certain underwriters named as defendants in the Ontario Class Action:

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that further service of the Notice of Motion and Motion Record on any party not already served is hereby dispensed with, such that this motion is properly returnable today.
2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the claims against SFC resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in SFC, including, without


limitation, the claims by or on behalf of current or former shareholders asserted in the proceedings listed in Schedule "A", (collectively, the "Shareholder Claims") are "equity claims" as defined in section 2 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "CCAA"), being claims in respect of monetary losses resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest.

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any indemnification claims against SFC related to or arising from the Shareholder Claims, including, without limitation, by or on behalf of any of the other defendants to the proceedings listed in Schedule "A", (the "Related Indemnity Claims") are "equity claims" under the CCAA, being claims for contribution or indemnity in respect of claims that are equity claims.
4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in paragraph 3 determines whether this Order extends to the aspect of any Related Indemnity Claims that corresponds to defence costs in connection with the defence of any Shareholder Claims.
5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the order is without prejudice to SFC's right to apply for a similar order with respect to (i) any claims that are in respect of Securities other than shares and (ii) any indemnification claims against SFC related thereto.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:

AUG 03 2012

PER/FAN:



Schedule "A"

1. *Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada et al. v. Sino-Forest Corporation et al.* (Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No. CV-11-431153-00CP)
2. *Guining Liu v. Sino-Forest Corporation et al.* (Quebec Superior Court, Court File No: 200-06-000132-111)
3. *Allan Haigh v. Sino-Forest Corporation et al.* (Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench, Court File No. 2288 of 2011)
4. *David Leopard et al. v. Allen T.Y. Chan et al.* (District Court of the Southern District of New York, Court File No. 650258/2012)

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES CREDITORS' ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE
MATTER OF A PLAN OR COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION
Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

Proceedings commenced in Toronto

**ORDER
(Regarding the Status of Shareholder
Claims and Related Indemnity Claims
under the CCAA)**

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Lawyers for the Applicant

TAB 11

CITATION: Sino-Forest Corporation (Re), 2012 ONSC 4377
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9667-00CL
DATE: 20120727

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

(COMMERCIAL LIST)

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION, Applicant

BEFORE: MORAWETZ J.

COUNSEL: Robert W. Staley and Jonathan Bell, for the Applicant

Jennifer Stam, for the Monitor

Kenneth Dekker, for BDO Limited

Peter Griffin and Peter Osborne, for Ernst & Young LLP

Benjamin Zarnett, Robert Chadwick and Brendan O'Neill, for the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders

James Grout, for the Ontario Securities Commission

Emily Cole and Joseph Marin, for Allen Chan

Simon Bieber, for David Horsley

David Bish, John Fabello and Adam Slavens, for the Underwriters Named in the Class Action

Max Starnino and Kirk Baert, for the Ontario Plaintiffs

Larry Lowenstein, for the Board of Directors

HEARD: June 26, 2012

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

[1] Sino-Forest Corporation ("SFC" or the "Applicant") seeks an order directing that claims against SFC, which result from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in SFC, are "equity claims" as defined in section 2 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") including, without limitation: (i) the claims by or on behalf of current or former shareholders asserted in the proceedings listed in Schedule "A" (collectively, the "Shareholder Claims"); and (ii) any indemnification claims against SFC related to or arising from the Shareholder Claims, including, without limitation, those by or on behalf of any of the other defendants to the proceedings listed in Schedule "A" (the "Related Indemnity Claims").

[2] SFC takes the position that the Shareholder Claims are "equity claims" as defined in the CCAA as they are claims in respect of a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in SFC and, therefore, come within the definition. SFC also takes the position that the Related Indemnity Claims are "equity claims" as defined in the CCAA as they are claims for contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim that is an equity claim and, therefore, also come within the definition.

[3] On March 30, 2012, the court granted the Initial Order providing for the CCAA stay against SFC and certain of its subsidiaries. FTI Consulting Canada Inc. was appointed as Monitor.

[4] On the same day, the Sales Process Order was granted, approving Sales Process procedures and authorizing and directing SFC, the Monitor and Houlihan Lokey to carry out the Sales Process.

[5] On May 14, 2012, the court issued a Claims Procedure Order, which established June 20, 2012 as the Claims Bar Date.

[6] The stay of proceedings has since been extended to September 28, 2012.

[7] Since the outset of the proceedings, SFC has taken the position that it is important for these proceedings to be completed as soon as possible in order to, among other things, (i) enable the business operated in the Peoples Republic of China ("PRC") to be separated from SFC and put under new ownership; (ii) enable the restructured business to participate in the Q4 sales season in the PRC market; and (iii) maintain the confidence of stakeholders in the PRC (including local and national governmental bodies, PRC lenders and other stakeholders) that the business in the PRC can be successfully separated from SFC and operate in the ordinary course in the near future.

[8] SFC has negotiated a Support Agreement with the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders and intends to file a plan of compromise or arrangement (the "Plan") under the CCAA by no later than August 27, 2012, based on the deadline set out in the Support Agreement and what they submit is the commercial reality that SFC must complete its restructuring as soon as possible.

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[9] Noteholders holding in excess of \$1.296 billion, or approximately 72% of the approximately \$1.8 billion of SFC's noteholders' debt, have executed written support agreements to support the SFC CCAA Plan as of March 30, 2012.

Shareholder Claims Asserted Against SFC

(i) Ontario

[10] By Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim dated April 26, 2012 (the "Ontario Statement of Claim"), the Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada and other plaintiffs asserted various claims in a class proceeding (the "Ontario Class Proceedings") against SFC, certain of its current and former officers and directors, Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y"), BDO Limited ("BDO"), Poyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited ("Poyry") and SFC's underwriters (collectively, the "Underwriters").

[11] Section 1(m) of the Ontario Statement of Claim defines "class" and "class members" as:

All persons and entities, wherever they may reside who acquired Sino's Securities during the Class Period by distribution in Canada or on the Toronto Stock Exchange or other secondary market in Canada, which securities include those acquired over the counter, and all persons and entities who acquired Sino's Securities during the Class Period who are resident of Canada or were resident of Canada at the time of acquisition and who acquired Sino's Securities outside of Canada, except the Excluded Persons.

[12] The term "Securities" is defined as "Sino's common shares, notes and other securities, as defined in the OSA". The term "Class Period" is defined as the period from and including March 19, 2007 up to and including June 2, 2011.

[13] The Ontario Class Proceedings seek damages in the amount of approximately \$9.2 billion against SFC and the other defendants.

[14] The thrust of the complaint in the Ontario Class Proceedings is that the class members are alleged to have purchased securities at "inflated prices during the Class Period" and that absent the alleged misconduct, sales of such securities "would have occurred at prices that reflected the true value" of the securities. It is further alleged that "the price of Sino's Securities was directly affected during the Class Period by the issuance of the Impugned Documents".

(ii) Quebec

[15] By action filed in Quebec on June 9, 2011, Guining Liu commenced an action (the "Quebec Class Proceedings") against SFC, certain of its current and former officers and directors, E&Y and Poyry. The Quebec Class Proceedings do not name BDO or the Underwriters as defendants. The Quebec Class Proceedings also do not specify the quantum of damages sought, but rather reference "damages in an amount equal to the losses that it and the other members of the group suffered as a result of purchasing or acquiring securities of Sino at inflated prices during the Class Period".

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[16] The complaints in the Quebec Class Proceedings centre on the effect of alleged misrepresentations on the share price. The duty allegedly owed to the class members is said to be based in "law and other provisions of the *Securities Act*", to ensure the prompt dissemination of truthful, complete and accurate statements regarding SFC's business and affairs and to correct any previously-issued materially inaccurate statements.

(iii) **Saskatchewan**

[17] By Statement of Claim dated December 1, 2011 (the "Saskatchewan Statement of Claim"), Mr. Allan Haigh commenced an action (the "Saskatchewan Class Proceedings") against SFC, Allen Chan and David Horsley.

[18] The Saskatchewan Statement of Claim does not specify the quantum of damages sought, but instead states in more general terms that the plaintiff seeks "aggravated and compensatory damages against the defendants in an amount to be determined at trial".

[19] The Saskatchewan Class Proceedings focus on the effect of the alleged wrongful acts upon the trading price of SFC's securities:

The price of Sino's securities was directly affected during the Class Period by the issuance of the Impugned Documents. The defendants were aware at all material times that the effect of Sino's disclosure documents upon the price of its Sino's [sic] securities.

(iv) **New York**

[20] By Verified Class Action Complaint dated January 27, 2012, (the "New York Complaint"), Mr. David Leopard and IMF Finance SA commenced a class proceeding against SFC, Mr. Allen Chan, Mr. David Horsley, Mr. Kai Kit Poon, a subset of the Underwriters, E&Y, and Ernst & Young Global Limited (the "New York Class Proceedings").

[21] SFC contends that the New York Class Proceedings focus on the effect of the alleged wrongful acts upon the trading price of SFC's securities.

[22] The plaintiffs in the various class actions have named parties other than SFC as defendants, notably, the Underwriters and the auditors, E&Y, and BDO, as summarized in the table below. The positions of those parties are detailed later in these reasons.

	Ontario	Quebec	Saskatchewan	New York
E&Y LLP	X	X	-	X
E&Y Global	-	-	-	X
BDO	X	-	-	-

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Poyry	X	X	-	-
Underwriters	11	-	-	2

Legal Framework

[23] Even before the 2009 amendments to the CCAA dealing with equity claims, courts recognized that there is a fundamental difference between shareholder equity claims as they relate to an insolvent entity versus creditor claims. Essentially, shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditor claims are not being paid in full. Simply put, shareholders have no economic interest in an insolvent enterprise: *Blue Range Resource Corp. (Re)*, (2004) 4 W.W.R. 738 (Alta. Q.B.) [*Blue Range Resources*]; *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, (2006) CanLII 1773 (Ont. S.C.J.) [*Stelco*]; *Royal Bank of Canada v. Central Capital Corp.* (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 494 (C.A.).

[24] The basis for the differentiation flows from the fundamentally different nature of debt and equity investments. Shareholders have unlimited upside potential when purchasing shares. Creditors have no corresponding upside potential: *Nelson Financial Group Limited (Re)*, 2010 ONSC 6229 [*Nelson Financial*].

[25] As a result, courts subordinated equity claims and denied such claims a vote in plans of arrangement: *Blue Range Resource, supra*; *Stelco, supra*; *EarthFirst Canada Inc. (Re)* (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 102 (Alta. Q.B.) [*EarthFirst Canada*]; and *Nelson Financial, supra*.

[26] In 2009, significant amendments were made to the CCAA. Specific amendments were made with the intention of clarifying that equity claims are subordinated to other claims.

[27] The 2009 amendments define an "equity claim" and an "equity interest". Section 2 of the CCAA includes the following definitions:

"Equity Claim" means a claim that is in respect of an equity interest, including a claim for, among others, (...)

(d) a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest or from the rescission, or, in Quebec, the annulment, of a purchase or sale of an equity interest, or

(e) contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d);

"Equity Interest" means

(a) in the case of a company other than an income trust, a share in the company – or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a share in the company – other than one that is derived from a convertible debt,

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[28] Section 6(8) of the CCAA prohibits a distribution to equity claimants prior to payment in full of all non-equity claims.

[29] Section 22(1) of the CCAA provides that equity claimants are prohibited from voting on a plan unless the court orders otherwise.

Position of Ernst & Young

[30] E&Y opposes the relief sought, at least as against E&Y, since the E&Y proof of claim evidence demonstrates in its view that E&Y's claim:

- (a) is not an equity claim;
- (b) does not derive from or depend upon an equity claim (in whole or in part);
- (c) represents discreet and independent causes of action as against SFC and its directors and officers arising from E&Y's direct contractual relationship with such parties (or certain of such parties) and/or the tortious conduct of SFC and/or its directors and officers for which they are in law responsible to E&Y; and
- (d) can succeed independently of whether or not the claims of the plaintiffs in the class actions succeed.

[31] In its factum, counsel to E&Y acknowledges that during the periods relevant to the Class Action Proceedings, E&Y was retained as SFC's auditor and acted as such from 2007 until it resigned on April 5, 2012.

[32] On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters LLC ("Muddy Waters") issued a report which purported to reveal fraud at SFC. In the wake of that report, SFC's share price plummeted and Muddy Waters profited from its short position.

[33] E&Y was served with a multitude of class action claims in numerous jurisdictions.

[34] The plaintiffs in the Ontario Class Proceedings claim damages in the aggregate, as against all defendants, of \$9.2 billion on behalf of resident and non-resident shareholders and noteholders. The causes of action alleged are both statutory, under the *Securities Act (Ontario)* and at common law, in negligence and negligent misrepresentation.

[35] In its factum, counsel to E&Y acknowledges that the central claim in the class actions is that SFC made a series of misrepresentations in respect of its timber assets. The claims against E&Y and the other third party defendants are that they failed to detect these misrepresentations and note in particular that E&Y's audit did not comply with Canadian generally accepted accounting standards. Similar claims are advanced in Quebec and the U.S.

[36] Counsel to E&Y notes that on May 14, 2012 the court granted a Claims Procedure Order which, among other things, requires proofs of claim to be filed no later than June 20, 2012. E&Y takes issue with the fact that this motion was then brought notwithstanding that proofs of claim and D&O proofs of claim had not yet been filed.

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[37] E&Y has filed with the Monitor, in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, a proof of claim against SFC and a proof of claim against the directors and officers of SFC.

[38] E&Y takes the position that it has contractual claims of indemnification against SFC and its subsidiaries and has statutory and common law claims of contribution and/or indemnity against SFC and its subsidiaries for all relevant years. E&Y contends that it has stand-alone claims for breach of contract and negligent and/or fraudulent misrepresentation against the company and its directors and officers.

[39] Counsel submits that E&Y's claims against Sino-Forest and the SFC subsidiaries are:

- (a) creditor claims;
- (b) derived from E&Y retainers by and/or on behalf of Sino-Forest and the SFC subsidiaries and E&Y's relationship with such parties, all of which are wholly independent and conceptually different from the claims advanced by the class action plaintiffs;
- (c) claims that include the cost of defending and responding to various proceedings, both pre- and post-filing; and
- (d) not equity claims in the sense contemplated by the CCAA. E&Y's submission is that equity holders of Sino-Forest have not advanced, and could not advance, any claims against SFC's subsidiaries.

[40] Counsel further contends that E&Y's claim is distinct from any and all potential and actual claims by the plaintiffs in the class actions against Sino-Forest and that E&Y's claim for contribution and/or indemnity is not based on the claims against Sino-Forest advanced in the class actions but rather only in part on those claims, as any success of the plaintiffs in the class actions against E&Y would not necessarily lead to success against Sino-Forest, and vice versa. Counsel contends that E&Y has a distinct claim against Sino-Forest independent of that of the plaintiffs in the class actions. The success of E&Y's claims against Sino-Forest and the SFC subsidiaries, and the success of the claims advanced by the class action plaintiffs, are not co-dependent. Consequently, counsel contends that E&Y's claim is that of an unsecured creditor.

[41] From a policy standpoint, counsel to E&Y contends that the nature of the relationship between a shareholder, who may be in a position to assert an equity claim (in addition to other claims) is fundamentally different from the relationship existing between a corporation and its auditors.

Position of BDO Limited

[42] BDO was auditor of Sino-Forest Corporation between 2005 and 2007, when it was replaced by E&Y.

[43] BDO has filed a proof of claim against Sino-Forest pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order.

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[44] BDO's claim against Sino-Forest is primarily for breach of contract.

[45] BDO takes the position that its indemnity claims, similar to those advanced by E&Y and the Underwriters, are not equity claims within the meaning of s. 2 of the CCAA.

[46] BDO adopts the submissions of E&Y which, for the purposes of this endorsement, are not repeated.

Position of the Underwriters

[47] The Underwriters take the position that the court should not decide the equity claims motion at this time because it is premature or, alternatively, if the court decides the equity claims motion, the equity claims order should not be granted because the Related Indemnity Claims are not "equity claims" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA.

[48] The Underwriters are among the defendants named in some of the class actions. In connection with the offerings, certain Underwriters entered into agreements with Sino-Forest and certain of its subsidiaries providing that Sino-Forest and, with respect to certain offerings, the Sino-Forest subsidiary companies, agree to indemnify and hold harmless the Underwriters in connection with an array of matters that could arise from the offerings.

[49] The Underwriters raise the following issues:

- (i) Should this court decide the equity claims motion at this time?
- (ii) If this court decides the equity claims motion at this time, should the equity claims order be granted?

[50] On the first issue, counsel to the Underwriters takes the position that the issue is not yet ripe for determination.

[51] Counsel submits that, by seeking the equity claims order at this time, Sino-Forest is attempting to pre-empt the Claims Procedure Order, which already provides a process for the determination of claims. Until such time as the claims procedure in respect of the Related Indemnity Claims is completed, and those claims are determined pursuant to that process, counsel contends the subject of the equity claims motion raises a merely hypothetical question as the court is being asked to determine the proper interpretation of s. 2 of the CCAA before it has the benefit of an actual claim in dispute before it.

[52] Counsel further contends that by asking the court to render judgment on the proper interpretation of s. 2 of the CCAA in the hypothetical, Sino-Forest has put the court in a position where its judgment will not be made in the context of particular facts or with a full and complete evidentiary record.

[53] Even if the court determines that it can decide this motion at this time, the Underwriters submit that the relief requested should not be granted.

Position of the Applicant

[54] The Applicant submits that the amendments to the CCAA relating to equity claims closely parallel existing U.S. law on the subject and that Canadian courts have looked to U.S. courts for guidance on the issue of equity claims as the subordination of equity claims has long been codified there: see e.g. *Blue Range Resources, supra*, and *Nelson Financial, supra*.

[55] The Applicant takes the position that based on the plain language of the CCAA, the Shareholder Claims are "equity claims" as defined in s. 2 as they are claims in respect of a "monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest".

[56] The Applicant also submits the following:

- (a) the Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and New York Class Actions (collectively, the "Class Actions") all advance claims on behalf of shareholders.
- (b) the Class Actions also allege wrongful conduct that affected the trading price of the shares, in that the alleged misrepresentation "artificially inflated" the share price; and
- (c) the Class Actions seek damages relating to the trading price of SFC shares and, as such, allege a "monetary loss" that resulted from the ownership, purchase or sale of shares, as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA.

[57] Counsel further submits that, as the Shareholder Claims are "equity claims", they are expressly subordinated to creditor claims and are prohibited from voting on the plan of arrangement.

[58] Counsel to the Applicant also submits that the definition of "equity claims" in s. 2 of the CCAA expressly includes indemnity claims that relate to other equity claims. As such, the Related Indemnity Claims are equity claims within the meaning of s. 2.

[59] Counsel further submits that there is no distinction in the CCAA between the source of any claim for contribution or indemnity; whether by statute, common law, contractual or otherwise. Further, and to the contrary, counsel submits that the legal characterization of a contribution or indemnity claim depends solely on the characterization of the primary claim upon which contribution or indemnity is sought.

[60] Counsel points out that in *Return on Innovation Capital v. Gandi Innovations Limited*, 2011 ONSC 5018, leave to appeal denied, 2012 ONCA 10 [*Return on Innovation*] this court characterized the contractual indemnification claims of directors and officers in respect of an equity claim as "equity claims".

[61] Counsel also submits that guidance on the treatment of underwriter and auditor indemnification claims can be obtained from the U.S. experience. In the U.S., courts have held that the indemnification claims of underwriters for liability or defence costs constitute equity claims that are subordinated to the claims of general creditors. Counsel submits that insofar as

- Page 10 -

the primary source of liability is characterized as an equity claim, so too is any claim for contribution and indemnity based on that equity claim.

[62] In this case, counsel contends, the Related Indemnity Claims are clearly claims for "contribution and indemnity" based on the Shareholder Claims.

Position of the Ad Hoc Noteholders

[63] Counsel to the Ad Hoc Noteholders submits that the Shareholder Claims are "equity claims" as they are claims in respect of an equity interest and are claims for "a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest" per subsection (d) of the definition of "equity claims" in the CCAA.

[64] Counsel further submits that the Related Indemnity Claims are also "equity claims" as they fall within the "clear and unambiguous" language used in the definition of "equity claim" in the CCAA. Subsection (e) of the definition refers expressly and without qualification to claims for "contribution or indemnity" in respect of claims such as the Shareholder Claims.

[65] Counsel further submits that had the legislature intended to qualify the reference to "contribution or indemnity" in order to exempt the claims of certain parties, it could have done so, but it did not.

[66] Counsel also submits that, if the plain language of subsection (e) is not upheld, shareholders of SFC could potentially create claims to receive indirectly what they could not receive directly (*i.e.*, payment in respect of equity claims through the Related Indemnity Claims) – a result that could not have been intended by the legislature as it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

[67] Counsel to the Ad Hoc Noteholders also submits that, before the CCAA amendments in 2009 (the "CCAA Amendments"), courts subordinated claims on the basis of:

- (a) the general expectations of creditors and shareholders with respect to priority and assumption of risks; and
- (b) the equitable principles and considerations set out in certain U.S. cases: *see e.g. Blue Range Resources, supra*.

[68] Counsel further submits that, before the CCAA Amendments took effect, courts had expanded the types of claims characterized as equity claims; first to claims for damages of defrauded shareholders and then to contractual indemnity claims of shareholders: *see Blue Range Resources, supra* and *EarthFirst Canada, supra*.

[69] Counsel for the Ad Hoc Noteholders also submits that indemnity claims of underwriters have been treated as equity claims in the United States, pursuant to section 510(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. This submission is detailed at paragraphs 20-25 of their factum which reads as follows:

- Page 11 -

20. The desire to more closely align the Canadian approach to equity claims with the U.S. approach was among the considerations that gave rise to the codification of the treatment of equity claims. Canadian courts have also looked to the U.S. law for guidance on the issue of equity claims where codification of the subordination of equity claims has been long-standing.

Janis Sarra at p. 209, Ad Hoc Committee's Book of Authorities, Tab 10.

Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, "Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* and the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*" (2003) at 158, [...]

Blue Range [Resources] at paras. 41-57 [...]

21. Pursuant to § 510(b) of the *U.S. Bankruptcy Code*, all creditors must be paid in full before shareholders are entitled to receive any distribution. § 510(b) of the *U.S. Bankruptcy Code* and the relevant portion of § 502, which is referenced in § 510(b), provide as follows:

§ 510. Subordination

(b) For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or for reimbursement or contribution allowed under 502 on account of such a claim, shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security, except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common stock.

§ 502. Allowance of claims or interests

(e) (1) Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section and paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable with the debtor on or has secured the claim of a creditor, to the extent that

...

(B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for reimbursement or contribution; or

...

(2) A claim for reimbursement or contribution of such an entity that becomes fixed after the commencement of the case shall be determined,

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and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) of this section, the same as if such claim had become fixed before the date of the filing of the petition.

22. U.S. appellate courts have interpreted the statutory language in § 510(b) broadly to subordinate the claims of shareholders that have a nexus or causal relationship to the purchase or sale of securities, including damages arising from alleged illegality in the sale or purchase of securities or from corporate misconduct whether predicated on pre or post-issuance conduct.

Re Telegroup Inc. (2002), 281 F. 3d 133 (3rd Cir. U.S. Court of Appeals) [...]

American Broadcasting Systems Inc. v. Nugent, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case Number 98-17133 (24 January 2001) [...]

23. Further, U.S. courts have held that indemnification claims of underwriters against the corporation for liability or defence costs when shareholders or former shareholders have sued underwriters constitute equity claims in the insolvency of the corporation that are subordinated to the claims of general creditors based on: (a) the plain language of § 510(b), which references claims for "reimbursement or contribution" and (b) risk allocation as between general creditors and those parties that play a role in the purchase and sale of securities that give rise to the shareholder claims (i.e., directors, officers and underwriters).

In re Mid-American Waste Sys., 228 B.R. 816, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 27 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) [*Mid-American*] [...]

In re Jacom Computer Servs., 280 B.R. 570, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) [...]

24. In *Mid-American*, the Court stated the following with respect to the "plain language" of § 510(b), its origins and the inclusion of "reimbursement or contribution" claims in that section:

... I find that the plain language of § 510(b), its legislative history, and applicable case law clearly show that § 510(b) intends to subordinate the indemnification claims of officers, directors, and underwriters for both liability and expenses incurred in connection with the pursuit of claims for rescission or damages by purchasers or sellers of the debtor's securities. The meaning of amended § 510(b), specifically the language "for reimbursement or contribution . . . on account of [a claim arising from rescission or damages arising from the purchase or sale of a security]," can be discerned by a plain reading of its language.

... it is readily apparent that the rationale for section 510(b) is not limited to preventing shareholder claimants from improving their position vis-a-

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vis general creditors; Congress also made the decision to subordinate based on risk allocation. Consequently, when Congress amended § 510(b) to add reimbursement and contribution claims, it was not radically departing from an equityholder claimant treatment provision, as NatWest suggests; it simply added to the subordination treatment new classes of persons and entities involved with the securities transactions giving rise to the rescission and damage claims. The 1984 amendment to § 510(b) is a logical extension of one of the rationales for the original section — because Congress intended the holders of securities law claims to be subordinated, why not also subordinate claims of other parties (e.g. officers and directors and underwriters) who play a role in the purchase and sale transactions which give rise to the securities law claims? As I view it, in 1984 Congress made a legislative judgment that claims emanating from tainted securities law transactions should not have the same priority as the claims of general creditors of the estate. [emphasis added]

[...]

25. Further, the U.S. courts have held that the degree of culpability of the respective parties is a non-issue in the disallowance of claims for indemnification of underwriters; the equities are meant to benefit the debtor's direct creditors, not secondarily liable creditors with contingent claims.

In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 148 B.R. 982, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) [...]

[70] Counsel submits that there is no principled basis for treating indemnification claims of auditors differently than those of underwriters.

Analysis

Is it Premature to Determine the Issue?

[71] The class action litigation was commenced prior to the CCAA Proceedings. It is clear that the claims of shareholders as set out in the class action claims against SFC are "equity claims" within the meaning of the CCAA.

[72] In my view, this issue is not premature for determination, as is submitted by the Underwriters.

[73] The Class Action Proceedings preceded the CCAA Proceedings. It has been clear since the outset of the CCAA Proceedings that this issue — namely, whether the claims of E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters as against SFC, would be considered "equity claims" — would have to be determined.

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[74] It has also been clear from the outset of the CCAA Proceedings, that a Sales Process would be undertaken and the expected proceeds arising from the Sales Process would generate proceeds insufficient to satisfy the claims of creditors.

[75] The Claims Procedure is in place but, it seems to me that the issue that has been placed before the court on this motion can be determined independently of the Claims Procedure. I do not accept that any party can be said to be prejudiced if this threshold issue is determined at this time. The threshold issue does not depend upon a determination of quantification of any claim. Rather, its effect will be to establish whether the claims of E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters will be subordinated pursuant to the provisions of the CCAA. This is independent from a determination as to the validity of any claim and the quantification thereof.

Should the Equity Claims Order be Granted?

[76] I am in agreement with the submission of counsel for the Ad Hoc Notcholders to the effect that the characterization of claims for indemnity turns on the characterization of the underlying primary claims.

[77] In my view, the claims advanced in the Shareholder Claims are clearly equity claims. The Shareholder Claims underlie the Related Indemnity Claims.

[78] In my view, the CCAA Amendments have codified the treatment of claims addressed in pre-amendment cases and have further broadened the scope of equity claims.

[79] The plain language in the definition of "equity claim" does not focus on the identity of the claimant. Rather, it focuses on the nature of the claim. In this case, it seems clear that the Shareholder Claims led to the Related Indemnity Claims. Put another way, the inescapable conclusion is that the Related Indemnity Claims are being used to recover an equity investment.

[80] The plain language of the CCAA dictates the outcome, namely, that the Shareholder Claims and the Related Indemnity Claims constitute "equity claims" within the meaning of the CCAA. This conclusion is consistent with the trend towards an expansive interpretation of the definition of "equity claims" to achieve the purpose of the CCAA.

[81] In *Return on Innovation*, Newbould J. characterized the contractual indemnification claims of directors and officers as "equity claims". The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal. The analysis in *Return on Innovation* leads to the conclusion that the Related Indemnity Claims are also equity claims under the CCAA.

[82] It would be totally inconsistent to arrive at a conclusion that would enable either the auditors or the Underwriters, through a claim for indemnification, to be treated as creditors when the underlying actions of the shareholders cannot achieve the same status. To hold otherwise would indeed provide an indirect remedy where a direct remedy is not available.

[83] Further, on the issue of whether the claims of E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters fall within the definition of equity claims, there are, in my view, two aspects of these claims and it is necessary to keep them conceptually separate.

[84] The first and most significant aspect of the claims of E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters constitutes an "equity claim" within the meaning of the CCAA. Simply put, but for the Class Action Proceedings, it is inconceivable that claims of this magnitude would have been launched by E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters as against SFC. The class action plaintiffs have launched their actions against SFC, the auditors and the Underwriters. In turn, E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters have launched actions against SFC and its subsidiaries. The claims of the shareholders are clearly "equity claims" and a plain reading of s. 2(1)(e) of the CCAA leads to the same conclusion with respect to the claims of E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters. To hold otherwise, would, as stated above, lead to a result that is inconsistent with the principles of the CCAA. It would potentially put the shareholders in a position to achieve creditor status through their claim against E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters even though a direct claim against SFC would rank as an "equity claim".

[85] I also recognize that the legal construction of the claims of the auditors and the Underwriters as against SFC is different than the claims of the shareholders against SFC. However, that distinction is not, in my view, reflected in the language of the CCAA which makes no distinction based on the status of the party but rather focuses on the substance of the claim.

[86] Critical to my analysis of this issue is the statutory language and the fact that the CCAA Amendments came into force after the cases relied upon by the Underwriters and the auditors.

[87] It has been argued that the amendments did nothing more than codify pre-existing common law. In many respects, I accept this submission. However, I am unable to accept this submission when considering s. 2(1) of the CCAA, which provides clear and specific language directing that "equity claim" means a claim that is in respect of an equity interest, including a claim for, among other things, "(e) contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d)".

[88] Given that a shareholder claim falls within s. 2(1)(d), the plain words of subsections (d) and (e) lead to the conclusions that I have set out above.

[89] I fail to see how the very clear words of subsection (e) can be seen to be a codification of existing law. To arrive at the conclusion put forth by E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters would require me to ignore the specific words that Parliament has recently enacted.

[90] I cannot agree with the position put forth by the Underwriters or by the auditors on this point. The plain wording of the statute has persuaded me that it does not matter whether an indemnity claim is seeking no more than allocation of fault and contribution at common law, or whether there is a free-standing contribution and indemnity claim based on contracts.

[91] However, that is not to say that the full amount of the claim by the auditors and Underwriters can be characterized, at this time, as an "equity claim".

[92] The second aspect to the claims of the auditors and underwriters can be illustrated by the following hypothetical: if the claim of the shareholders does not succeed against the class action defendants, E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters will not be liable to the class action plaintiffs. However, these parties may be in a position to demonstrate that they do have a claim against

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SFC for the costs of defending those actions, which claim does not arise as a result of "contribution or indemnity in respect of an equity claim".

[93] It could very well be that each of E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters have expended significant amounts in defending the claims brought by the class action plaintiffs which, in turn, could give rise to contractual claims as against SFC. If there is no successful equity claim brought by the class action plaintiffs, it is arguable that any claim of E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters may legitimately be characterized as a claim for contribution or indemnity but not necessarily in respect of an equity claim. If so, there is no principled basis for subordinating this portion of the claim. At this point in time, the quantification of such a claim cannot be determined. This must be determined in accordance with the Claims Procedure.

[94] However, it must be recognized that, by far the most significant part of the claim, is an "equity claim".

[95] In arriving at this determination, I have taken into account the arguments set forth by E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters. My conclusions recognize the separate aspects of the Related Indemnity Claims as submitted by counsel to the Underwriters at paragraph 40 of their factum which reads:

...it must be recognized that there are, in fact, at least two different kinds of Related Indemnity Claims:

- (a) indemnity claims against SFC in respect of Shareholder Claims against the auditors and the Underwriters; and
- (b) indemnity claims against SFC in respect of the defence costs of the auditors and the Underwriters in connection with defending themselves against Shareholder Claims.

Disposition

[96] In the result, an order shall issue that the claims against SFC resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of equity interests in SFC, including, without limitation, the claims by or on behalf of current or former shareholders asserted in the proceedings listed in Schedule "A" are "equity claims" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA, being claims in respect of monetary losses resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest. It is noted that counsel for the class action plaintiffs did not contest this issue.

[97] In addition, an order shall also issue that any indemnification claim against SFC related to or arising from the Shareholders Claims, including, without limitation, by or on behalf of any of the other defendants to the proceedings listed in Schedule "A" are "equity claims" under the CCAA, being claims for contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim that is an equity claim. However, I feel it is premature to determine whether this order extends to the aspect of the Related Indemnity Claims that corresponds to the defence costs of the Underwriters and the auditors in connection with defending themselves against the Shareholder Claims.

[98] A direction shall also issue that these orders are made without prejudice to SFC's rights to apply for a similar order with respect to (i) any claims in the statement of claim that are in respect of securities other than shares and (ii) any indemnification claims against SFC related thereto.



MORAWETZ J.

Date: July 27, 2012

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SCHEDULE "A" – SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS

1. *Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada et al. v. Sino-Forest Corporation et al.* (Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No. CV-11-431153-00CP)
2. *Guining Liu v. Sino-Forest Corporation et al.* (Quebec Superior Court, Court File No.: 200-06-000132-111)
3. *Allan Haigh v. Sino-Forest Corporation et al.* (Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench, Court File No. 2288 of 2011)
4. *David Leopard et al. v. Allen T.Y. Chan et al.* (District court of the Southern District of New York, Court File No. 650258/2012)

TAB 12

Court File No.: CV-12-9667-00CL


**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR.)
)
JUSTICE MORAWETZ)
)

FRIDAY , THE 21ST DAY

OF DECEMBER, 2012



**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED, AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPRISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION**

Court File No.: CV-11-431153-00CP

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

BETWEEN:

**THE TRUSTEES OF THE LABOURERS' PENSION FUND OF CENTRAL AND
EASTERN CANADA, THE TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 793 PENSION PLAN FOR OPERATING
ENGINEERS IN ONTARIO, SJUNDE AP-FONDEN, DAVID GRANT and ROBERT
WONG**

Plaintiffs

- and -

**SINO-FOREST CORPORATION, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, BDO LIMITED (formerly
known as BDO MCCABE LO LIMITED), ALLEN T.Y. CHAN, W. JUDSON MARTIN,
KAI KIT POON, DAVID J. HORSLEY, WILLIAM E. ARDELL, JAMES P. BOWLAND,
JAMES M.E. HYDE, EDMUND MAK, SIMON MURRAY, PETER WANG, GARRY J.
WEST, PÖYRY (BEIJING) CONSULTING COMPANY LIMITED, CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (CANADA), INC., TD SECURITIES INC., DUNDEE SECURITIES
CORPORATION, RBC DOMINION SECURITIES INC., SCOTIA CAPITAL INC., CIBC
WORLD MARKETS INC., MERRILL LYNCH CANADA INC., CANACCORD
FINANCIAL LTD., MAISON PLACEMENTS CANADA INC., CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (USA) LLC and MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH
INCORPORATED (successor by merger to Banc of America Securities LLC)**

Defendants

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by the Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's Securities, including the plaintiffs in the action commenced against Sino-Forest Corporation ("Sino-Forest") in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, bearing (Toronto) Court File No. CV-11-431153-00CP (the "Ontario Plaintiffs" and the "Ontario Class Action", respectively) for an order i) approving the form of notice to class members, and everyone, including non-Canadians, who has, had, could have had or may have a claim of any kind against Ernst & Young LLP, Ernst & Young Global Limited or any of its member firms and any person or entity affiliated or connected thereto ("Ernst & Young"), in relation to Sino-Forest, Ernst & Young's audits of Sino-Forest's financial statements and any other work performed by Ernst & Young related to Sino-Forest., of the hearing to approve the Ernst & Young Settlement (as defined in the Plan of Compromise and Reorganization of Sino-Forest dated December 3, 2012 as approved by the Order of the Honourable Justice Morawetz dated December 10, 2012 (the "Plan")) between the Ontario Plaintiffs and the defendant Ernst & Young ("Notice"); and ii) approving the plan of distribution of the Notice ("Notice Plan"), was heard on December 20, 2012, in Toronto, Ontario.

WHEREAS the Ontario Plaintiffs and Ernst & Young have agreed to the Ernst & Young Settlement in order to resolve all Ernst & Young Claims, including all claims asserted or that could be asserted against Ernst & Young in the above-captioned class proceeding;

AND ON BEING ADVISED that the defendant Sino-Forest has delivered to counsel for the plaintiffs a list of holders of Sino-Forest's securities as of June 2, 2011 (the "June 2, 2011 Shareholder List");

AND ON READING the materials filed, and on hearing submissions of counsel for the Ontario Plaintiffs and Ernst & Young, and upon hearing from counsel to the Monitor of Sino-Forest, FTI Consulting Inc.,

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service and filing of this notice of motion and motion record is validated and abridged and any further service thereof is dispensed with.
2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Notice substantially in the form attached as **Schedule "A"** be and hereby is approved and shall be published, subject to the right of the plaintiffs and Ernst & Young to make minor non-material amendments to such form, by mutual agreement, as may be necessary or desirable.
3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that notice shall be provided as follows:
 - a. Siskinds LLP and Koskie Minsky LLP (together, "Class Counsel") shall provide or cause to be provided a copy of the Notice directly, either electronically or by mail, to all individuals or entities who have contacted Siskinds LLP and Koskie Minsky LLP (together, "Class Counsel") or Siskinds Desmeules sncrl ("Desmeules") regarding this action, and to any person or entity who requests a copy of the Notice, provided that such person or entity has furnished his, her or its contact information to Class Counsel or Desmeules;
 - b. Within 5 business days of this Order, copies of the Notice, in English and French, will be posted by Class Counsel on their websites;
 - c. Within 5 business days of this Order, a copy of the Notice, in English and French, will be posted by Sino-Forest in a prominent location on the main page of the Sino-Forest website;


- d. Within 5 business days of this Order, Class Counsel will send or will cause to be sent copies of the Notice to the addresses on the June 2, 2011 Shareholder List and to the current Service Lists in Court File Nos. CV-12-9667-00CL (the CCAA Proceeding) and CV-11-431153-00CP (the Ontario Class Action) by electronic mail;
- e. Within 5 business days of this Order, Class Counsel will send or cause to be sent copies of the Notice to all 196 Canadian brokers who are known to Class Counsel, with a cover letter directing those brokers to provide a copy of the Notice, either by mail or electronically, to those of their clients who are or have been beneficial owners of Sino-Forest securities. Brokers will be requested to send a statement to Class Counsel or its designee indicating that such mailing or electronic communication was completed as directed;
- f. Within 5 business days of this Order, Class Counsel will issue and cause to be disseminated a press release which incorporates the Notice;
- g. Class Counsel will provide hyper-links to the Notice from the following Twitter accounts:
- i. @kmlawllp; and
 - ii. @SiskindsLLP;
- h. Within 5 business days of this Order, Class Counsel will cause copies of the Notice to be published in the following print publications:
- i. *The Globe and Mail*, in English, in one weekday publication;
 - ii. *Wall Street Journal*, in English, in one weekday publication;

- iii. *National Post*, in English, in one weekday publication
 - iv. *La Presse*, in French, in one weekday publication; and
 - v. *Le Soleil*, in French, in one weekday publication.
4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any persons objecting to the Settlement Agreement (as defined in the Notice), other than the persons who have filed a Notice of Appearance in the CCAA proceedings (the "Core Parties"), shall:
- a. deliver a Notice of Objection substantially in the form attached hereto as Schedule "B" ("Notice of Objection") to be received by the Monitor by no later than 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on January 18, 2013, by mail, courier or email transmission, to the coordinates indicated on the Notice of Objection; and,
 - b. comply with the litigation timetable attached hereto as Schedule "C",

and forthwith upon receipt of a Notice of Objection, the Monitor shall provide a copy of same to each of the Applicant, the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders, the Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's Securities and Ernst & Young LLP, and shall deliver a report to this court attaching all such notices.

5. **THIS COURT REQUESTS**, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada), together with such other statutes, regulations and protocols as may apply, and as a matter of comity, that all courts, regulatory and administrative bodies, and other tribunals, in all provinces and territories of Canada, in the United States of America, and in all other nations or states, recognize this order and act in aid of and in a manner complementary to this order and this court in carrying out the terms of this order.

Date: December 21, 2012


 The Honourable Justice Morawetz

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT A TORONTO
 ON / BOOK NO:
 LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:



DEC 21 2012

SCHEDULE "A": NOTICE

(ATTACHED)

SINO-FOREST CORPORATION

NOTICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WITH ERNST & YOUNG LLP

TO: Everyone, including non-Canadians, who acquired Sino-Forest Corporation (“Sino-Forest”) securities (including shares and/or notes) in the primary or secondary market in any jurisdiction between March 31, 2006 and August 26, 2011 (the “E&Y Settlement Class”) and to everyone, including non-Canadians, who has, had, could have had or may have a claim of any kind against Ernst & Young LLP, Ernst & Young Global Limited or any of its member firms and any person or entity affiliated or connected thereto (“Ernst & Young”), in relation to Sino-Forest, Ernst & Young’s audits of Sino-Forest’s financial statements and any other work performed by Ernst & Young related to Sino-Forest.

Background of Sino-Forest Class Action and CCAA Proceeding

In June and July of 2011, class actions were commenced in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (the “Ontario Proceeding”) and the Québec Superior Court (the “Québec Proceeding”) (collectively, the “Proceedings”) by certain plaintiffs (the “Plaintiffs”) against Sino-Forest, its senior officers and directors, its underwriters, a consulting company, and its auditors, including Ernst & Young. In January 2012, a proposed class action was commenced against Sino-Forest and other defendants in the Southern District of New York (the “US Action”). The actions alleged that the public filings of Sino-Forest contained false and misleading statements about Sino-Forest’s assets, business, and transactions.

Since that time, the litigation has been vigorously contested. On March 30, 2012, Sino-Forest obtained creditor protection under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (the “CCAA”), within which proceeding the Ontario Superior Court ordered a stay of proceedings against the company and other parties, including Ernst & Young (the “CCAA Proceeding”). Orders and other materials relevant to the CCAA Proceeding can be found at the CCAA Monitor’s website at <http://cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/sfc/> (the “Monitor’s Website”).

On December 10, 2012, a Plan of Arrangement was approved by the court in the CCAA Proceeding. As part of this Plan of Arrangement, the court approved a framework by which the Plaintiffs may enter into settlement agreements with any of the third-party defendants to the Proceedings. The Plan expressly contemplates the Ernst & Young Settlement (as defined in the Plan), approval of which is now sought.

Who Acts For the E&Y Settlement Class

Koskie Minsky LLP, Siskinds LLP, and Siskinds Desmeules, senci ("Class Counsel") represent the E&Y Settlement Class in the Proceedings. If you want to be represented by another lawyer, you may hire one to appear in court for you at your own expense.

You will not have to directly pay any fees and expenses to Class Counsel. However, if this action succeeds or there is a monetary settlement, Class Counsel will seek to have their fees and expenses paid from any money obtained for the class or paid separately by the defendants.

Proposed Settlement with Ernst & Young

The Plaintiffs have entered into a proposed settlement with Ernst & Young (the "Settlement Agreement"). If the settlement is approved, it will be final and binding and there will be no ability to pursue a claim (if any) against Ernst & Young through an opt-out process under class proceedings or similar legislation. The proposed settlement would settle, extinguish and bar all claims, globally, against Ernst & Young in relation to Sino-Forest including the allegations in the Proceedings. Ernst & Young does not admit to any wrongdoing or liability. The terms of the proposed settlement do not involve the resolution of any claims against Sino-Forest or any of the other defendants. For an update on CCAA orders affecting Sino-Forest, please see the CCAA Monitor's website: www.cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/sfc. A complete copy of the Settlement Agreement and other information about these proceedings is available at: www.kmlaw.ca/sinoforestclassaction and www.classaction.ca (the "Class Action Website").

The proposed settlement, if approved and its conditions fulfilled, provides that Ernst & Young will pay CAD\$117,000,000.00 to a Settlement Trust to be administered in accordance with orders of the court. It is the intention of Class Counsel to seek the court's approval of a plan of allocation that distributes the settlement funds, net of counsel fees and other administrative costs and expenses, to members of the E&Y Settlement Class.

In return, the action will be dismissed against Ernst & Young, and there will be an order forever barring claims against it in relation to Sino-Forest including any allegations relating to the Proceedings, including claims (if any) that could be advanced through an opt-out process under class proceedings or similar legislation. In considering whether or how they are affected by the proposed settlement, members of the E&Y Settlement Class and anyone else with claims against Ernst & Young in relation to Sino-Forest should consider the effect of the orders made and steps taken in the Sino-Forest CCAA Proceedings. More information on the Sino-Forest CCAA Proceedings can be found on the Monitor's Website.

The settlement agreement with Ernst & Young is subject to court approval, as discussed below.

Hearings to Approve Settlement on February 4, 2013 in Toronto, Ontario and Subsequent Hearings in Ontario, Quebec and the United States.

On February 4, 2013 at 10:00 a.m. (Eastern Time), there will be a settlement approval hearing before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The hearing will be heard at the Canada Life Building, 330 University Avenue, 8th Floor, Toronto, Ontario. The exact courtroom number will be available on a notice board on the 8th Floor.

If the settlement approval motion which is being heard by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on February 4, 2013 (the "Settlement Approval Motion") is granted, then there will be a further hearing at a later date before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (the "Ontario Allocation/Fee Motion") at which Class Counsel will seek that Court's approval of (1) the plan for allocating the net Ernst & Young settlement fund among the members of the E&Y Settlement Class; and (2) the fees and expense reimbursement requests of Class Counsel.

In addition, if the Settlement Approval Motion is granted, then there may be additional hearings at later dates in the Quebec Superior Court (the "Quebec Motion") and in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "US Motion") at which recognition and implementation of the Settlement Approval Motion and the Ernst & Young Settlement may be sought.

If the Settlement Approval Motion is granted, then a further notice will be disseminated to members of the E&Y Settlement Class advising them of the time and place of the Ontario Allocation/Fee Motion and any Quebec Motion and/or US Motion.

Members of the E&Y Settlement Class, and everyone, including non-Canadians, who has, had, could have had or may have a claim of any kind against Ernst & Young, in relation to Sino-Forest, Ernst & Young's audits of Sino-Forest's financial statements and any other work performed by Ernst & Young related to Sino-Forest, may attend at the hearing of the Settlement Approval Motion and ask to make submissions regarding the proposed settlement with Ernst & Young.

Persons intending to object to the Ernst & Young Settlement Agreement are required to: (a) deliver a Notice of Objection, substantially in the form that can be found on the Monitor's Website and the Class Action Website, and, if this Notice is received by mail, enclosed with this Notice (the "Notice of Objection"), to the Monitor, by regular mail, courier or email transmission, to the coordinates indicated on the Notice of Objection, so that it is received by no later than 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on January 18, 2013; and (b) comply with the litigation timetable set forth below. Copies of the Notices of Objection sent to the Monitor will be filed with the court.

Litigation Timetable

By order of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, persons intending to participate in the Settlement Approval Motion must comply with the following timetable:

1. Motion materials are to be delivered no later than January 11, 2013.
2. Responding motion materials are to be delivered by January 18, 2013.
3. Cross-examinations on affidavits (if any) are to be conducted on January 24 and 25, 2013.
4. Written Submissions are to be exchanged on January 30, 2013.

Further Information

If you would like additional information or to object to the Ernst & Young Settlement Agreement, please contact Koskie Minsky LLP, Siskinds LLP, or Siskinds Desmeules LLP at the addresses below:

Koskie Minsky LLP

20 Queen St. West, Suite 900, Box 52, Toronto, ON, M5H 3R3

Re: Sino-Forest Class Action

Tel: **1.866.474.1739**

Email: **sinoforestclassaction@kmlaw.ca**

Siskinds LLP

680 Waterloo Street, P.O. Box 2520 London, ON N6A 3V8

Re: Sino-Forest Class Action

Tel: **1.800.461.6166 x.2380**

Email: **nicole.young@siskinds.com**

Siskinds Desmeules, sencrl

43 Rue Buade, Bureau 320, Québec City, Québec, G1R 4A2

Re: Sino-Forest Class Action

Tel: **418.694-2009**

Email: **simon.hebert@siskindsdesmeules.com**

Interpretation

If there is a conflict between the provisions of this notice and the Settlement Agreement, the terms of the Settlement Agreement will prevail.

Please do not direct inquiries about this notice to the Court. All inquiries should be directed to Class Counsel.

DISTRIBUTION OF THIS NOTICE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

275

SCHEDULE "B"

NOTICE OF OBJECTION

TO: FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC.
acting in its capacity as Monitor of Sino-Forest Corporation
TD Waterhouse Tower
79 Wellington Street West
Suite 2010, P.O. Box 104
Toronto, Ontario M5K 1G8

Attention: Jodi Porepa

Email: Jodi.porepa@fticonsulting.com

RE: SINO-FOREST CORPORATION—PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WITH ERNST & YOUNG LLP (the "ERNST & YOUNG SETTLEMENT")

I, _____ (please check all boxes that apply):
(insert name)

- am a current shareholder of Sino -Forest Corporation
- am a former shareholder of Sino -Forest Corporation
- am a current noteholder of Sino -Forest Corporation
- am a former noteholder of Sino -Forest Corporation
- other (please explain)

I acknowledge that pursuant to the order of Mr. Justice Morawetz dated December ²¹~~20~~ 2012 (the "Order"), persons wishing to object to the Ernst & Young Settlement are required to complete and deliver this Notice of Objection to FTI Consulting Canada Inc., acting in its capacity as Monitor of Sino-Forest Corporation, by mail, courier or email to be received by no later than 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on January 18, 2013, and comply with the litigation timetable appended as Schedule C to the Order.

I hereby give notice that I object to the Ernst & Young Settlement, for the following reasons:

- I DO NOT intend to appear at the hearing of the motion to approve the Ernst & Young Settlement, and I understand that my objection will be filed with the court prior to the hearing the motion at 10:00 a.m. on February 4, 2013, at 330 University Ave., 8th Floor Toronto, Ontario.
- I DO intend to appear, in person or by counsel, and to make submissions at the hearing of the motion to approve the Ernst & Young Settlement at 10:00 a.m. on February 4, 2013, at 330 University Ave., 8th Floor Toronto, Ontario.

MY ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IS:

MY LAWYER'S ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IS (if applicable):

Name:

Name:

Address:

Address:

Tel.:

Tel.:

Fax:

Fax:

Email:

Email:

Date: _____

Signature: _____

SCHEDULE "C"
LITIGATION TIMETABLE

1. Motion materials are to be delivered no later that **January 11, 2013**.
2. Responding motion materials are to be delivered by **January 18, 2013**.
3. Cross-examinations on affidavits (if any) are to be conducted on **January 24 and 25, 2013**,
4. Factums are to be exchanged on **January 30, 2013**
5. Motion to be heard on **February 4, 2013**.

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, AS AMENDED
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT
TORONTO

ORDER

Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP

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Toronto, ON M5V 3H1

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680 Waterloo Street

London, ON N6A 3V8

A. Dimitri Lascaris / Charles M. Wright

Tel: 519.672.2121 / Fax: 519.672.6065

Lawyers for the Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's
Securities, including the Representative Plaintiffs in the Ontario Class
Action

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TAB 13

Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS*
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION

AFFIDAVIT OF W. JUDSON MARTIN
(Sworn November 29, 2012)

I, W. Judson Martin, of the City of Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, People's Republic of China, **MAKE OATH AND SAY:**

1. I am the Vice-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Sino-Forest Corporation ("SFC"). I therefore have personal knowledge of the matters set out below, except where otherwise stated. Where I do not possess personal knowledge, I have stated the source of my information and I believe such information to be true. Where I indicate that I have been advised by counsel, that advice has been provided by Bennett Jones LLP, counsel for SFC in this proceeding.
2. Capitalized terms not defined in this affidavit are as defined in my affidavit sworn March 30, 2012 (the "Initial Order Affidavit") and the Thirteenth Report of the Monitor dated November 22, 2012 (the "Monitor's Thirteenth Report"). A copy of my Initial Order Affidavit (without exhibits) is attached as Exhibit "A".

3. All currency references in this affidavit refer to U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated.
4. This affidavit is sworn in support of a motion by SFC for an order (the "Sanction Order") under section 6(1) of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA") sanctioning an amended plan of compromise and reorganization (the "Plan") between SFC and its creditors. I understand that a draft of the form of Sanction Order being sought was included in the Plan Supplement filed by SFC on November 21, 2012, and any further changes to the form of Sanction Order will be filed prior to the hearing.
5. This affidavit identifies a number of affidavits I have previously sworn along with Monitor's reports and other materials that SFC is relying on in support of the Sanction Order motion. Such materials will be filed in a separate brief prior to the hearing.
6. I am advised by counsel that if the Plan is approved, SFC and Newco (defined below) intend to rely on the Sanction Order for the purposes of relying on the exemption from the registration requirements of the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended, pursuant to section 3(a)(10) thereof for the issuance of the Newco Shares, Newco Notes, and to the extent they may be deemed to be securities, the Litigation Trust Interest, and any other securities to be issued pursuant to the Plan.

I. BACKGROUND

7. As I explained in greater detail in the Initial Order Affidavit, SFC is an integrated forest plantation operator and forest products company, with most of its assets and the majority of its business operations located in the southern and eastern regions of the People's Republic of China

(the "PRC"). SFC's registered office is in Toronto and its principal business office is in Hong Kong.

A. Muddy Waters and SFC's Independent Committee

8. As a result of a report issued by short-seller Muddy Waters LLC ("Muddy Waters") on June 2, 2011, which alleged that SFC was a "near total fraud" and a "Ponzi scheme", SFC found itself embroiled in multiple class actions across Canada and in the U.S., investigations and regulatory proceedings with the Ontario Securities Commission (the "OSC"), the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and the RCMP.

9. As I have described in prior affidavits filed with the Court and above, immediately after the allegations were made by Muddy Waters, the Board appointed an independent committee (the "IC") of the Board, which in turn engaged professionals in Ontario, Hong Kong and in the PRC to assist in investigating the allegations. The IC retained Osler Hoskin & Harcourt LLP in Canada, Mallesons (an international law firm with offices in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong) and Jun He Law Offices (a PRC law firm). The IC also appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers to assist with the investigations.

10. The Board also retained new company counsel, Bennett Jones LLP, to assist and work with the IC and the IC's advisors, to assist management, to respond to class action claims against SFC and to respond on behalf of SFC to inquiries and demands from securities regulators.

11. The IC was active and met frequently to supervise professionals and receive reports about their progress.

12. The IC and its advisors worked to compile and analyze the vast amount of data required for their review of Sino-Forest's operations and business, the relationships between Sino-Forest and other entities, and Sino-Forest's ownership of assets. The IC supervised the investigation and preparation of three reports that addressed those aspects, described the extensive work of the IC and its advisors and the conclusions that could be reached from the work undertaken by them. Redacted versions of the IC reports were publicly disclosed.

13. The IC set out to address the issues raised by Muddy Waters in three core areas: (i) the verification of timber assets reported by Sino-Forest, (ii) the value of the timber assets held by Sino-Forest, and (iii) revenue recognition. In addition, in its First Interim Report, the IC's accounting advisors confirmed SFC's cash balances in specific account as at June 13, 2011, for accounts located inside and outside of the PRC. The results of the IC's efforts are described in greater detail in my Initial Order Affidavit.

B. Efforts to Obtain Audit Opinions

14. In late August 2011 the IC's efforts uncovered information that raised conduct issues about certain members of former management of Sino-Forest. This information was shared by the IC with staff of the OSC. This information resulted in the OSC imposing a temporary cease trade order (the "TCTO") on the securities of SFC on August 26, 2011, which order was later continued and continues in force.

15. Arising from these developments, certain former members of management were placed on administrative leave. The Board appointed me as Chief Executive Officer of SFC after Allen Chan resigned as Chairman, CEO and a Director, on August 28, 2011.

16. Following the events of late August, 2011, the IC continued its investigative work. From late August 2011 onward, under the Board's oversight, considerable effort was directed at determining if the issues identified by Muddy Waters and by investigative work to date could be resolved with sufficient time to allow SFC to become current in its financial reporting, and to obtain an audit opinion for 2011. Failure to issue quarterly results or to issue audited annual financial results could lead to the possible acceleration and enforcement of approximately \$1.8 billion in notes issued by SFC and guaranteed by many of its Subsidiaries.

17. Notwithstanding considerable efforts by the Board, the IC, management and advisors, in mid-November 2011, SFC's Audit Committee recommended, and the Board agreed, that SFC should defer the release of SFC's third quarter 2011 financial statements until certain conduct issues could be resolved to the satisfaction of the Board and SFC's external auditor.

18. By December 2011, it appeared that it would not be possible to obtain an audit opinion for 2011 in sufficient time to avoid defaults under SFC's Note Indentures, nor would it be possible to issue third quarter 2011 financial results.

19. On December 16, 2011, the Board established a Special Restructuring Committee ("RC") of the Board, comprised exclusively of directors independent of management of SFC, for the purpose of supervising, analyzing and managing the strategic options available to SFC. Subsequent to its appointment, the RC has been fully engaged and active in supervising and supporting SFC's restructuring efforts.

C. Defaults under the Indentures and the Support Agreement

20. SFC's inability to file its third quarter 2011 financial statements ultimately resulted in a default under its note indentures. After extensive discussions with an ad hoc committee of Noteholders (the "Ad Hoc Noteholders"), Noteholders representing a majority in principal amount of SFC's senior notes agreed to waive the default arising from the failure to release the SFC 2011 third quarter results. While the waiver agreements prevented an acceleration of the note indebtedness as a result of SFC's failure to file its 2011 third quarter results, the waiver agreements would have expired on April 30, 2012 (or any earlier termination of the waiver agreements in accordance with their terms). In addition, SFC's pending failure to file its audited financial statements for its fiscal year ended December 31, 2011 by March 30, 2012, would have caused another potential acceleration and enforcement event, creating additional uncertainty around SFC's business.

21. Following extensive arm's length negotiations between SFC and the Ad Hoc Noteholders, the parties agreed on a framework for a consensual resolution of SFC's defaults under its note indentures and the restructuring of its business, and entered into a restructuring support agreement (the "Support Agreement") on March 30, 2012, which was initially executed by holders of SFC's Notes holding approximately 40% of the aggregate principal amount of the Notes.

22. As further discussed below, additional Consenting Noteholders subsequently executed joinder agreements to the Support Agreement, resulting in Noteholders representing more than 72% of the aggregate principal amount of the Notes agreeing to support the restructuring contemplated by the Support Agreement.

23. Throughout this process, the Board and certain members of SFC management engaged with the Ad Hoc Noteholders, both through counsel and directly on a principal-to-principal basis, to assist them in understanding the restructuring challenges faced by SFC and its stakeholders, and to provide information to the Ad Hoc Noteholders in connection with their due diligence efforts.

24. From a commercial perspective, the restructuring contemplated by the Support Agreement was intended to separate Sino-Forest's business operations from the problems facing the parent holding company outside of the PRC, with the intention of saving and preserving the value of SFC's underlying business. To this end, two possible transactions were contemplated:

- (a) First, a court-supervised Sale Process being undertaken to determine if any person or group of persons would purchase SFC's business operations for an amount in excess of a threshold amount of consideration (which was set at 85% of the amount outstanding under the Notes at the CCAA filing date), with the potential for excess above such threshold amount being directed to stakeholders subordinate to the Noteholders. The Sale Process was intended to ensure that SFC pursued all avenues available to it to maximize value for its stakeholders;
- (b) Second, if the Sale Process was not successful, a transfer of the six immediate holding companies that own SFC's business to the Affected Creditors in compromise of their claims against SFC and the creation of a litigation trust (including funding) that would enable SFC's litigation claims against any Person not otherwise released within the CCAA proceedings to be preserved and pursued

for the benefit of SFC's stakeholders in accordance with the Support Agreement (the "Restructuring Transaction").

25. The decision to enter into the Support Agreement was given careful consideration by the Board of SFC. But for the negotiation and execution of the Support Agreement, SFC would have been unable to prevent the acceleration and enforcement of the rights of the Noteholders as soon as April 30, 2012, in which case SFC and Sino-Forest would have been unable to continue as a going concern.

26. The Support Agreement provided that SFC would make an application under the CCAA in order to implement the Sale Process and, failing receipt of a qualified bid, to implement the Restructuring Transaction.

27. Quite apart from the provisions of the Support Agreement, the circumstances facing SFC and its Subsidiaries (as described above and in the Initial Order Affidavit) necessitated the commencement of these CCAA proceedings in order to attempt to separate the business operations of Sino-Forest from the challenges facing the holding company parent in order to allow the business to be saved.

28. SFC applied to this Honourable Court and obtained an Initial Order under the CCAA on March 30, 2012 (the "Initial Order"), pursuant to which a limited stay of proceedings was also granted in respect of the Subsidiaries. The stay of proceedings provided for in the Initial Order was subsequently extended by Orders dated May 31, September 28, October 10, and November 23, 2012, and unless further extended by the Court, will expire on February 1, 2013.

II. THE NATURE OF SFC'S ASSETS AND SFC'S EFFORTS TO MARKET THEM

A. SFC's Assets

29. As described in the Initial Order Affidavit, SFC is a holding company with six direct subsidiaries of SFC (the place of incorporation is indicated in parentheses): Sino-Panel Holdings Limited (BVI); Sino-Global Holdings Inc. (BVI); Sino-Panel Corporation (Canada); Sino-Wood Partners Limited (Hong Kong); Sino-Capital Global Inc. (BVI) and Sino-Forest International (Barbados) Corporation (Barbados) (collectively, the "Direct Subsidiaries"). SFC also holds all of the preference shares of Sino-Forest Resources Inc. (BVI).

30. In addition, SFC holds an indirect majority interest in Greenheart Group Limited (Bermuda), an investment holding company whose shares are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Together with its subsidiaries, Greenheart owns certain rights and manages hardwood forest concessions in the Republic of Suriname and a radiata pine plantation on freehold land in New Zealand. Greenheart has its own distinct operations and financing arrangements and is not party to or a guarantor of the notes issued by SFC. Greenheart and SFC operate out of separate office buildings in Hong Kong.

31. Including SFC, Sino-Forest Resources Inc. and the Direct Subsidiaries, there are 137 entities that make up the Sino-Forest companies: 67 companies incorporated in the PRC (with 11 branch companies), 58 BVI incorporated entities, 7 Hong Kong incorporated entities, 2 Canadian entities and 3 entities incorporated in other jurisdictions. Greenheart and its subsidiaries are not included in the foregoing. A list of all of the SFC subsidiaries (the "Subsidiaries") is attached as Exhibit "B" (which does not include subsidiaries of Greenheart, but does contain SFC branch companies). The term "Sino-Forest" is used herein to refer to the global enterprise as a whole.

32. I understand that in addition to claims against SFC, numerous stakeholders have asserted claims against the Subsidiaries in respect of their claims against SFC. As has been apparent from the outset of these proceedings, in order to achieve the commercial objective of separating the Sino-Forest business from the parent holding company, any successful resolution to these proceedings must provide a "clean break" between SFC and the Subsidiaries. Accordingly, as further described below, the Plan provides for the transfer of SFC's assets, including the Direct Subsidiaries, to Newco for the benefit of all of SFC's Affected Creditors as well as a release of the Subsidiaries in respect of such claims.

B. The Sale Process

33. As discussed above, the Support Agreement contemplated the sale of the assets of SFC (i.e. its Subsidiaries) through a court-supervised sale process in which the assets of SFC were offered for an amount of consideration equal to a minimum required threshold as set out in the Support Agreement, which was set at 85% of the outstanding amount of the Notes as of the CCAA filing date.

34. SFC applied for and obtained an order from this Court on March 30, 2012 (the "Sale Process Order") approving the sale process procedures (the "Sale Process Procedures") and authorizing and directing SFC, the Monitor, and SFC's financial advisor, Houlihan Lokey ("Houlihan"), to do all things reasonably necessary to perform each of their obligations under the Sale Process Order.

35. Pursuant to the Sale Process Procedures, SFC, through Houlihan sought out potential qualified strategic and financial purchasers (including existing shareholders and noteholders) of

SFC's assets on a global basis and attempted to engage such potential purchasers in the Sale Process.

36. The Sale Process Procedures approved in the Sale Process Order were carried out by the applicable parties. In particular, as described in the Fourth Report of the Monitor:

- (a) a notice was published in the Globe & Mail and the Wall Street Journal with respect to the Sale Process;
- (b) a teaser letter was sent to 85 potentially interested parties; and
- (c) fourteen confidentiality agreements were negotiated with parties who indicated an interest in the business.

37. The Sale Process Procedures provided SFC with up to 90 days from the day of the Sale Process Order to solicit letters of intent and, if qualified letters of intent were received within the required time period, a further 90 days to solicit qualified bids. As set out in the Sale Process Order, to constitute a Qualified Letter of Intent, the letter of intent must have, among other things, indicated that the bidder was offering to acquire SFC's assets for consideration not less than the Qualified Consideration. Qualified Consideration was defined in the Sale Process Procedures as:

"Qualified Consideration" means cash consideration payable to SFC (or such other form of consideration as may be acceptable to SFC and the Initial Consenting Noteholders) in an amount equal to 85% of the aggregate principal amount of the Notes, plus all accrued and unpaid interest on Notes, at the regular rates provided therefor pursuant to the Note indentures, up to and including March 30, 2012.

38. A number of letters of intent were received by SFC on or about the June 28, 2012 deadline set out in the Sale Process Procedures. However, in accordance with the Sale Process Order, SFC, Houlihan and the Monitor determined that none of the letters of intent constituted a Qualified Letter of Intent, because none of them offered to acquire the assets of SFC for the Qualified Consideration. As such, on July 10, 2012, SFC announced the termination of the Sale Process and SFC's intention to proceed with the Restructuring Transaction.

III. SINO-FOREST'S STAKEHOLDERS

39. In order to move forward with its restructuring efforts in a timely manner, it was critical for SFC to ascertain all claims against SFC, its Subsidiaries and its directors and officers in order to assess what impact such claims may have with respect to its restructuring. Accordingly, SFC, in consultation with the Monitor, developed a claims process, which was approved by Order of this Honourable Court on May 14, 2012 (the "Claims Process Order"). The Claims Process Order was not appealed.

40. Under the Claims Process Order, Proofs of Claim and D&O Proofs of Claim were required to be filed with the Monitor on or before the Claims Bar Date (June 20, 2012), while Restructuring Claims were required to be filed on or before the Restructuring Claims Bar Date (the later of the Claims Bar Date and 30 days after a Person is deemed to receive a Proof of Claim Document Package). D&O Indemnity Proofs of Claim were also required to be filed with the Monitor on a date that was relative to when the director or officer received notice of a D&O Proof of Claim.

41. In order to identify the nature and extent of claims asserted against the Subsidiaries, the Claims Process Order required any claimant that had or intended to assert a right or claim against

one or more Subsidiaries relating to a purported claim made against SFC to so indicate on their Proof of Claim.

42. In its Thirteenth Report, the Monitor described the claims submitted pursuant to the Claims Process Order, certain of which are also discussed below.

A. The Noteholders

43. As indicated, at the date of filing, Sino-Forest had approximately \$1.8 billion of principal amount of debt owing under the Notes, plus accrued and unpaid interest. There are four series of Notes issued and outstanding, as follows:

- (a) *2017 Senior Notes:* There are \$600 million in principal amount of guaranteed senior notes that were issued on October 21, 2010, bearing interest at a rate of 6.25% per annum, payable semi-annually (the "2017 Senior Notes"). These are supported by guarantees from 60 Subsidiaries and share pledges from ten of those same Subsidiaries.
- (b) *2016 Convertible Notes:* There are \$460 million in principal amount of convertible guaranteed notes that were issued on December 17, 2009, bearing interest at a rate of 4.25% payable semi-annually (the "2016 Convertible Notes"). These notes are supported by guarantees from 64 Subsidiaries.
- (c) *2014 Senior Notes:* There are \$399,517,000 in principal amount of senior notes that were issued on July 27, 2009, bearing interest at a rate of 10.25% per annum, payable semi-annually (the "2014 Senior Notes"). These notes are supported by

supported by guarantees from 60 Subsidiaries and share pledges from ten of those same Subsidiaries.

- (d) *2013 Convertible Notes:* There are \$345 million in principal amount of convertible guaranteed notes that were issued on July 23, 2008, bearing interest at a rate of 5% per annum, payable semi-annually (the "2013 Convertible Notes"). These notes are supported by guarantees from 64 Subsidiaries.

The 2017 Senior Notes, 2016 Convertible Notes, 2014 Senior Notes and 2013 Convertible Notes are collectively referred to herein as the "Notes" and holders of the Notes, the "Noteholders".

44. As of the date of the Support Agreement, the Initial Consenting Noteholders held approximately 40% of the aggregate principal amount of the four series of Notes. Pursuant to certain notice provisions established in the Initial Order, SFC continued to solicit additional Noteholder support and all Noteholders who wished to become Consenting Noteholders and participate in the Early Consent Consideration; (each as defined in the Support Agreement and described below) were given the opportunity to do so by the early consent deadline of May 15, 2012. As of May 15, 2012, Noteholders (including the Initial Consenting Noteholders) holding in aggregate approximately 72% of the principal amount of the Notes, and representing more than 66.67% of the principal amount of each of the four series of Notes, agreed to support the Plan.

B. Shareholders / Former Noteholders

45. As I explained in the Initial Order Affidavit, SFC and certain of its officers, directors and employees, along with SFC's former auditors, technical consultants and the Underwriters

(defined below) involved in prior equity and debt offerings, have been named as defendants in eight class action lawsuits.

46. Five of these class action lawsuits, commenced by three separate groups of counsel, were filed in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on June 8, 2011, June 20, 2011, July 20, 2011, September 26, 2011 and November 14, 2011. A carriage motion in relation to these actions was heard on December 20 and 21, 2011, and by Order dated January 6, 2012, Justice Perell appointed Koskie Minsky LLP and Siskinds LLP as class counsel. As a result, Koskie Minsky LLP and Siskinds LLP discontinued their earliest action, and their other two actions have been consolidated and will move forward as one proceeding. The other two Ontario actions, commenced by other counsel, have been stayed.

47. Pursuant to Justice Perell's January 6, 2012 Order, Koskie Minsky LLP and Siskinds LLP have filed a fresh as amended Statement of Claim in the consolidated proceeding. A copy of that amended Statement of Claim is attached as Exhibit "C". The plaintiffs in the Ontario Class Action (the "Ontario Class Action Plaintiffs"), on behalf of current and former shareholders of SFC, seek damages against SFC and the other defendants in the Ontario Class Action in the amount of \$6.5 billion for general damages, \$174.8 million in connection with a prospectus issued in June 2007, \$330 million in relation to a prospectus issued in June 2009, and \$319.2 million in relation to a prospectus issued in December 2009. The market cap for SFC during the times of the alleged misrepresentations ranged from \$546.5 million to \$6.15 billion.

48. The Ontario Class Action Plaintiffs also assert claims on behalf of former holders of SFC's Notes in the amounts of \$345 million for the 2013 Convertible Notes, \$400 million for the 2014 Senior Notes, \$460 million for the 2016 Convertible Notes, and \$600 million for the 2017 Senior

Notes, for a total claim of approximately \$1.8 billion. The first class action claim that asserted any claims on behalf of Noteholders was issued on September 26, 2011. The Noteholder component of this claim asserts, among other things, damages for loss of value in the Notes. In the months following the Muddy Waters report, the relevant Notes traded at a range of \$53 to \$64 per \$100 amount of principal owing.

49. A similar class action was filed in Quebec. Attached as Exhibit "D" is a copy of the Quebec pleading. A third class action was filed in Saskatchewan. Attached as Exhibit "E" is a copy of the Saskatchewan Statement of Claim. While a Proof of Claim was filed by the plaintiffs in the Quebec class action, no Proof of Claim was filed by the plaintiffs in the Saskatchewan class action.

50. Additionally, on January 27, 2012, a class action was commenced against SFC and other defendants in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, U.S.A. The complaint alleges that the action is brought on behalf of persons who purchased SFC shares on the over-the-counter market and on behalf of non-Canadian purchasers of SFC debt securities. The quantum of damages sought is not specified in the complaint. Attached as Exhibit "F" is a copy of the most recent version of the Complaint in the New York proceeding. The plaintiffs in the New York proceeding have filed a Proof of Claim in this proceeding.

51. In this proceeding, an "Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's Securities" (the "Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee") has appeared to represent the interests of shareholders and noteholders who have asserted class action claims against SFC and others. The Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee is represented in this proceeding by Siskinds LLP, Koskie Minsky, and Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP. As indicated above, two of these

firms won the right to represent the plaintiffs in the Ontario class action, and the Siskind firm is plaintiff counsel in the Quebec class action.

52. On June 26, 2012, SFC brought a motion for an order directing that claims against SFC that arise in connection with the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in SFC and related indemnity claims are "equity claims" as defined in section 2 of the CCAA, including the claims by or on behalf of current or former shareholders asserted in class action proceedings commenced against SFC. The equity claims motion did not purport to deal with the component of the class action proceedings that relate to debt claims.

53. The Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee did not oppose the relief requested. The relief was opposed only by SFC's former auditors and the Underwriters.

54. In reasons released on July 27, 2012, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G", this Honourable Court granted the relief sought by SFC (the "Equity Claims Decision"), finding at paragraph 77 that "the claims advanced in the Shareholder Claims are clearly equity claims."

55. The Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee did not appeal this decision. I am advised by counsel that none of the parties who later appealed the decision suggested that the Court's determination on the characterization of the shareholder claims against SFC was incorrect. As further discussed below, the Equity Claims Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario on November 23, 2012.

56. Consistent with the Equity Claims Decision, shareholder claims against SFC are subordinated and not entitled to vote or receive distributions under the Plan.

57. On October 26, 2012, the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee stated that they would not directly or indirectly oppose the Plan, so long as no amendment is made to the Plan that in the opinion of the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee, in the good faith exercise of its discretion, would be materially prejudicial to the interests of the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee.

58. The Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee will not oppose a Plan which provides that: (i) all shareholder claims against SFC will be subordinated as "Equity Claims" and released without consideration under the Plan; (ii) all former noteholder claims against SFC will be released without consideration under the Plan (other than a 25% interest in the Litigation Trust); and (iii) the quantum of the "Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit" in the Plan (as further discussed below) will be set at \$150 million.

59. As discussed below, the Plan preserves all of the aforementioned claims against defendants to the Class Action Claims (present or future) other than SFC, the Subsidiaries, the Named Directors and Officers or the Trustees under the Notes (the "Third Party Defendants"), subject in the case of any Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims to the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit.

60. SFC's existing shares will be cancelled pursuant to the Plan and the Plan Sanction Order.

C. Auditors

61. Since 2000 SFC has had two auditors: Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y"), who acted as auditor from 2000 to 2004 and 2007 to 2012, and BDO Limited ("BDO"), who acted as auditor from 2005 to 2006.

62. I understand from counsel to SFC that the auditors have asserted claims against SFC for contribution and indemnity for any amounts paid or payable in respect of the shareholder class actions, with each of the auditors having asserted claims in excess of \$6.5 billion. In addition the auditors have asserted claims for payment of professional fees associated with SFC after the release of the Muddy Waters report, and generalized claims for damage to reputation. A summary extract from E&Y's Proof of Claim is attached as Exhibit "H". A summary extract from BDO's Proof of Claim is attached as Exhibit "I".

63. In the Equity Claims Decision, the Court stated at paragraph 84 that "the claims of E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters constitutes an 'equity claim' within the meaning of the CCAA. Simply put, but for the Class Action Proceedings, it is inconceivable that claims of this magnitude would have been launched by E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters as against SFC."

64. The auditors and Underwriters appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The hearing of that appeal was held on November 13, 2012. On November 23, 2012, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Attached as Exhibit "J" is a copy of the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

65. Consistent with the Equity Claims Decision and the Court of Appeal's dismissal of the appeal, the claims of the auditors for indemnity in respect of the shareholder class action claims are subordinated and are not entitled to vote or receive any distributions under the Plan. The auditors' claims for defence costs relating to the defence of shareholder class actions (which have not yet been determined to be equity or debt claims) are treated as Unresolved Claims under the Plan.

66. The auditors have also asserted indemnification claims in respect of the class action claims against them by the former Noteholders. As these indemnification claims have not been determined to be "equity claims", the Plan provides for these claims by placing Plan consideration in respect of the amount of these claims into the Unresolved Claims Reserve, to be distributed to the defendants if any of these claims become non-contingent Proven Claims. The amount of these potential indemnification claims has been limited to a global limit of \$150 million by operation of the "Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claim Limit" under the Plan, which limits the amount of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims against the Third Party Defendants to \$150 million in the first instance. The Plan preserves the right to contest these indemnity claims, including the right to seek an order of the CCAA Court that these indemnification claims in respect of claims by former noteholders should be subordinated in the same manner as the indemnification claims in respect of the shareholders actions have been.

67. The auditors have also asserted claims against the Subsidiaries for, among other things, indemnification in connection with the shareholder class actions. Those claims have tended to treat SFC and the Subsidiaries interchangeably or as one collective entity. These claims are released under the Plan in the same manner as the Noteholders' guarantee claims against the Subsidiaries are released under the Plan.

D. Underwriters

68. In each instance where SFC has had a debt or equity public offering, such offering has been underwritten. The following firms have acted as SFC's underwriters and also have been named as defendants in the Ontario Class Action: Credit Suisse Securities (Canada) Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC

Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Cannacord Financial Ltd and Maison Placements Canada Inc. (the "Underwriters"). Certain of the Underwriters also are defendants in the New York class action.

69. Like the auditors, the Underwriters have filed claims against SFC seeking contribution and indemnity for the shareholder class actions. A copy of a representative sample of a proof of claim filed by one of the Underwriters is attached as Exhibit "K".

70. The Equity Claims Decision discussed above, upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario, applies equally to the Underwriters as it does to the auditors. Accordingly, the Underwriters' indemnity claims in respect of shareholder claims have been subordinated and are not entitled to vote or receive any distributions under the Plan. The Underwriters' claims for defence costs relating to the defence of shareholder class action, together with such claims of the auditors, are treated as Unresolved Claims under the Plan.

71. The Underwriters have also asserted indemnification claims in respect of the class action claims against them by the former Noteholders. For the same reasons and subject to the same terms as described above with respect to the auditors' indemnification claims, the Plan provides for these claims by placing Plan consideration in respect of the amount of these claims into the Unresolved Claims Reserve, limited to a global limit of \$150 million by operation of the Plan.

72. Certain of the Underwriters have also asserted claims against the Subsidiaries in connection with the four Note offerings. Like all other SFC-related claims against the Subsidiaries, these claims are released under the Plan.

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E. Ontario Securities Commission

73. On June 8, 2011, six days after the Muddy Waters report was released and the Board of SFC appointed the IC to investigate the allegations contained in that report, the OSC publicly announced that it was investigating matters related to SFC.

74. SFC believes that it has cooperated with the OSC. Under the supervision of the Board, SFC has made extensive production of documents, including documents sourced from jurisdictions outside of the OSC's power to compel production. Under the supervision of the Board, SFC also has facilitated interviews by the OSC with SFC and other Sino-Forest personnel. In circumstances where OSC staff sought to examine Sino-Forest personnel resident in the PRC, outside the OSC's jurisdiction to compel attendance at examination, SFC arranged to bring individuals to Hong Kong to be examined.

75. Absent cooperation from SFC, SFC was at risk that the OSC would seek to exercise additional powers in relation to SFC beyond imposing the TCTO. These additional powers could have extended to the appointment of a receiver over SFC. The Board's decision to inform the OSC of the results of the IC's investigative work, and to cooperate with the OSC's investigation, was important to preserving stakeholder value.

76. SFC has responded to extensive inquiries and has provided periodic oral briefings to OSC staff. The three reports prepared by the IC were provided to OSC staff on an unredacted basis. A significant portion of the professional costs incurred by SFC subsequent to June 2, 2011 relates to the production of documents and other information to OSC staff, and to producing Sino-Forest personnel for interviews with OSC staff.

77. In April 2012, SFC received an Enforcement Notice from OSC staff. Enforcement Notices typically are issued by OSC staff at or near the end of an investigation, identify issues that have been the subject of investigation, and advise that staff contemplate commencing formal proceedings in relation to those issues. Enforcement Notices afford recipients an opportunity to make representations before a decision is taken by staff of the OSC to commence formal proceedings. OSC staff asserted that the Enforcement Notice was protected from disclosure pursuant to sections 16 and 17 of the Ontario *Securities Act*.

78. On May 22, 2012, a Notice of Hearing and Statement of Allegations was issued by OSC staff against SFC, Allen Chan, Albert Ip, Alfred C.T. Hung, George Ho, Simon Yeung, and David Horsley. A copy of the Statement of Allegations is attached as Exhibit "L". OSC staff alleged in the Statement of Allegations that SFC and the other respondents, except David Horsley, had engaged in a complex fraudulent scheme to inflate the assets and revenue of SFC and made materially misleading statements in SFC's public disclosure record. It is further alleged by OSC staff that such conduct was contrary to the Ontario *Securities Act* and contrary to the public interest. No date has been set for a hearing on the merits.

79. On September 25, 2012, SFC received a second "Enforcement Notice" from OSC staff, which OSC staff again asserted was protected from disclosure. SFC issued a press release announcing the receipt of this Enforcement Notice on September 26, 2012, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "M". The press release describes how the second Enforcement Notice includes a further allegation, which is similar in nature to the allegations in the Statement of Allegations discussed above.

80. By letter dated September 13, 2012, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "N", counsel for OSC staff advised that OSC staff would not be seeking any monetary sanctions against SFC, and that they would not seek monetary sanctions against any of the directors and officers of SFC in excess of CAD\$100 million. This amount was later reduced to CAD\$84 million, as set out in a further letter dated October 25, 2012, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "O".

F. Trade Creditors and Other Creditors

81. As SFC is a holding company whose business is substantially carried out through its subsidiaries in the PRC and Hong Kong, SFC has very few trade creditors. The Monitor's Thirteenth Report explains that only three trade claims have been filed pursuant to the Claims Process Order. Other than a claim filed by the former Chief Financial Officer of SFC arising from the termination of his employment, I am not aware of any other creditors of significance that have filed claims pursuant to the Claims Process Order.

IV. EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN ARRIVING AT A NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION

82. The fundamental component of SFC's proposed restructuring, being a complete separation of the Subsidiaries and the Sino-Forest business from SFC in compromise of the claims asserted against SFC, has not changed since the commencement of these proceedings.

83. As indicated above, SFC obtained the support of 72% of the Noteholders to its proposed restructuring at an early stage of this proceeding. On October 26, 2012, SFC also obtained the non-objection to the Plan of the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee. Significant efforts have been made to arrive at a consensual resolution with the other stakeholders described above.

84. On July 25, 2012, this Honourable Court issued a mediation order (the "Mediation Order"), on the consent of all parties, directing that a mediation take place on September 4 and 5, 2012.

85. In advance of the mediation, SFC established a confidential data room, as contemplated by the Mediation Order. That data room made available to those parties to the mediation who signed non-disclosure agreements with SFC approximately 18,000 documents that had been assembled in order to potentially make them available to participants in the Sale Process and additional documents that were requested by the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee.

86. The mediation took place on September 4 and 5, 2012. Justice Newbould acted as the mediator. While the mediation did not result in a global resolution, it is my understanding from counsel that all parties appeared to participate in good faith with a view to arriving at a consensual resolution. I am advised by counsel that there have been further discussions continuing among certain of the parties since the conclusion of the mediation, but those discussions have not resulted in a further settlement as at the date of the swearing of this affidavit. I am not aware of the specifics of the matters which may have been discussed by other parties to the mediation.

87. Following the mediation, SFC conducted extensive negotiations with the Ad Hoc Noteholders, with the participation of the Monitor and its counsel, to produce the draft plan that was filed with the Court on October 19, 2012 (the "October 19 Draft Plan"). On October 26, 2012, the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee confirmed that they would not object to the October 19 Draft Plan.

88. As discussed above, SFC's main creditors consist of (i) the Noteholders and (ii) the Third Party Defendants who claim indemnity from SFC and its subsidiaries on a contingent basis, the

contingency being whether or not they are ultimately found to be liable in the shareholder and noteholder class actions that are pending against them.

89. As a result of the Equity Claims Decision, the Third Party Defendants' indemnity claims in respect of shareholder class action claims are subordinated equity claims (leaving aside that they are contingent and contested in any event). With respect to the Third Party Defendants' indemnity claims in respect of the noteholder class action claims against them, these claims have now been limited to \$150 million, collectively and in the aggregate for all Third Party Defendants, by operation of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit, which has limited the underlying claims by former noteholders against the Third Party Defendants to \$150 million. As discussed, the Plan provides for these contingent, unresolved claims through the creation of the Unresolved Claims Reserve.

V. THE PLAN

A. Background and Overview

90. On August 28, 2012, SFC brought a motion for an order approving the filing of the Plan (the "Plan Filing and Meeting Order") and for calling a meeting of creditors to vote on the Plan. I swore an affidavit in connection with that motion, a copy of which is attached without exhibits as Exhibit "P".

91. On August 31, 2012, this Honourable Court issued the Plan Filing and Meeting Order as well as an endorsement stating that the Plan Filing and Meeting Order was made without any determination of (a) the test for approval of the Plan; (b) the validity or quantum of any claims; and (c) the classification of creditors for voting purposes. The endorsement also stated that the

Plan Filing and Meeting Order did not prevent or restrict any party from opposing the Sanction Order now being sought. A copy of the endorsement is attached as Exhibit "Q".

92. The Plan sets out to achieve the following purposes:

- (a) to effect a full, final and irrevocable compromise, release, discharge, cancellation and bar of all Affected Claims;
- (b) to effect the distribution of the consideration provided for herein in respect of Proven Claims;
- (c) to transfer ownership of the Sino-Forest business to Newco and then to Newco II, in each case free and clear of all claims against SFC and certain related claims against the Subsidiaries, so as to enable the SFC Business to continue on a viable, going concern basis for the benefit of the Affected Creditors; and
- (d) to allow Affected Creditors and Noteholder Class Action Claimants to benefit from contingent value that may be derived from litigation claims to be advanced by the Litigation Trustee.

93. SFC believes that the Plan represents the best available outcome in the circumstances and that those with an economic interest in SFC, when considered as a whole, will derive a greater benefit from the implementation of the Plan and the continuation of the business of Sino-Forest as a going concern than would result from a bankruptcy or liquidation of SFC and Sino-Forest. SFC also believes that the Plan reasonably takes into account the interests of the Third Party Defendants, who seek indemnity and contribution from SFC and its Subsidiaries on a contingent basis, in the event that they are found to be liable to SFC's stakeholders.

94. Given that the Sale Process was not successful, the Plan contemplates that a new company and a further subsidiary ("Newco" and "Newco II", respectively) will be incorporated and SFC will transfer substantially all of its assets to Newco in compromise and satisfaction of all claims made against it. The result will be that Newco will own, directly or indirectly, all of SFC's Subsidiaries and SFC's interest in Greenheart and its subsidiaries as well as any intercompany debts owed by the Subsidiaries to SFC. Pursuant to the Plan, as explained in further detail below, the shares of Newco will be distributed to the Affected Creditors.

95. The terms of the October 19 Draft Plan were described in greater detail in the Monitor's Thirteenth Report. This Plan was amended on November 28, 2012. Attached as Exhibit "R" is a copy of the Plan, as amended. Attached as Exhibit "S" is a blackline comparison of the Plan to the October 19 Draft Plan filed with the Court. Attached as Exhibit "T" is a copy of the Plan Supplement dated November 21, 2012 (the "Plan Supplement").

B. Distributions Under the Plan

96. The Plan contemplates the distribution of (1) Newco Shares, (2) Newco Notes, and (3) Litigation Trust Interests, each as further described below.

1. Newco Shares

97. Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, Affected Creditors with Proven Claims are entitled to their pro-rata share of 92.5% of the Newco Shares and Early Consenting Noteholders also entitled to their pro-rata share of 7.5% of the Newco Shares.

98. As set out in Exhibit C to the Plan Supplement, Newco will be incorporated as an exempt company under the laws of the Cayman Islands pursuant to the Plan. It will have a single class of voting shares, being the Newco Shares. Newco is not, and there is no current intention for

Newco to become, a reporting issuer in any jurisdiction of Canada or elsewhere and the Newco Shares will not be listed on any stock exchange or quotation service on the Plan Implementation Date. The board of directors of Newco will initially consist of up to five directors that will be satisfactory to the Initial Consenting Noteholders. Thereafter, directors will be elected by shareholders on an annual basis at Newco's annual general meeting. Certain shareholders holding large blocks of shares will be entitled to elect directors.

99. As set out in Exhibit C to the Plan Supplement, prior to the Plan Implementation Date, it is intended that Newco will organize Newco II as a wholly-owned subsidiary and an exempt company under the laws of the Cayman Islands, for the purpose of acquiring from Newco the SFC assets to be transferred by SFC to Newco on the implementation of the Plan. The purpose of this step is to organize Newco (namely, Newco II) in a tax and jurisdictionally efficient manner for purposes of any subsequent sale of all or substantially all of Newco's assets (for example, Newco II will own all of the Direct Subsidiaries in a single jurisdiction, rather than in four separate jurisdictions).

100. Newco will be named Evergreen China Holdings Ltd. and Newco II will be named Evergreen China Holdings II Ltd.

2. *Newco Notes*

101. Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, Affected Creditors with Proven Claims are entitled to their pro-rata share of the Newco Notes.

102. As set out in Exhibit D to the Plan Supplement (which defines the capitalized terms used in this paragraph), Newco Notes in the aggregate principal amount of US\$300 million will be issued under an Indenture. They will be guaranteed by the Subsidiary Guarantors and secured by

pledges, mortgages and/or charges of the Collateral as described in Exhibit D to the Plan Supplement. Interest may be paid in cash or in PIK notes at rates prescribed in the Indenture and described in Exhibit D to the Plan Supplement. The Newco Notes will mature seven (7) years after the Original Issue Date, unless earlier redeemed pursuant to the terms thereof and the Indenture.

3. *Litigation Trust Interests*

103. Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, Affected Creditors with Proven Claims are entitled to their pro-rata share of 75% of the Litigation Trust Interests and the Noteholder Class Action Claimants are entitled to their pro-rata share of 25% of the Litigation Trust Interests.

104. The Litigation Trust will hold the Litigation Trust Claims (each as defined in the Plan), which include all claims and actions that have been or may be asserted by or on behalf of (i) SFC against any and all third parties, and (ii) the Note Indenture Trustees (on behalf of the Noteholders) against any and all persons in connection with the Notes; provided that Litigation Trust Claims will not include claims released under the Plan or claims advanced in the Class Actions.

105. The Litigation Trust will be governed by a Litigation Trust Agreement, a draft form of which was attached as Exhibit B to the Plan Supplement. The Litigation Trust will be funded by SFC with the Litigation Funding Amount, \$1 million. Pursuant to the Plan, Newco may subsequently elect to advance additional funding to the Litigation Trust. The Litigation Trustee (who has not yet been selected) will be charged with the responsibility to preserve and enhance the value of the Litigation Trust Assets (as defined in the Litigation Trust Agreement), through the prosecution, compromise and settlement, abandonment or dismissal of all claims held by the

Litigation Trust. In addition, the Plan contemplates that, prior to the Plan Implementation Date, SFC and the Initial Consenting Noteholders may agree to exclude one or more claims from being transferred to the Litigation Trust in which case such claims will be released on the Plan Implementation Date.

106. I am advised by counsel that the Litigation Trust Claims will be transferred to the Litigation Trust subject to the equities, limitation defences and other defences that otherwise may be asserted against SFC, and none of those equities, litigation defences and other defences are purported to be compromised by the Plan.

107. SFC will also be transferring all respective rights, title and interests in and to any lawyer-client privilege, work product privilege or other privilege or immunity attaching to any documents or communications associated with the Litigation Trust Claims to the Litigation Trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the Litigation Trust.

C. Reserves Established Under the Plan

108. The Plan contemplates the establishment of the Administration Charge Reserve, the Unaffected Claims Reserve, the Unresolved Claims Reserve, and the Monitor's Post-Implementation Reserve. Notwithstanding that the Initial Order created a Directors' Charge of \$3.2 million, the Named Directors and Officers have agreed to stand back from making any claims against the Directors' Charge as part of the comprehensive arrangements inherent in the Plan agreed to by the Initial Consenting Noteholders such that the Plan no longer provides for a Directors' Charge Reserve. The Monitor's Thirteenth Report also describes the purpose of each of these Reserves.

109. The amount of the Administration Charge Reserve is \$500,000 or such other amount as may be agreed to by the Monitor and the Initial Consenting Noteholders. The amount of the Unaffected Claims Reserve will be established on the Plan Implementation Date and is estimated to be \$1,800,000. The amount of the Monitor's Post-Implementation Reserve will initially be \$5,000,000 or such other amount as may be agreed by SFC, the Monitor and the Initial Consenting Noteholders.

110. Any funds remaining in the Administration Charge Reserve or the Unaffected Claims Reserve will be transferred to the Monitor's Post-Implementation Reserve. The Monitor may, in its discretion, release excess cash from the Monitor's Post-Implementation Reserve to Newco. Once the Monitor determines that the cash remaining in the Monitor's Post-Implementation Reserve is no longer necessary for administering SFC, the Monitor shall transfer the remaining funds to Newco.

111. The Unresolved Claims Reserve will contain Newco Shares, Newco Notes, and Litigation Trust Interests in respect of any Unresolved Claims. It is expected that the Unresolved Claims as at the Plan Implementation Date will consist primarily of the contingent and unresolved indemnity claims against SFC by the Third Party Defendants in respect of (a) Class Action Indemnity Claims relating to the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims, which have been limited to \$150 million collectively and in the aggregate by operation of the consensual Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit; (b) \$30 million in respect of unresolved claims for reimbursement of Defence Claim Costs; and (c) \$500,000 in respect of unresolved claims filed by certain trade and other creditors, some of which have been accepted for voting purposes but not yet for distribution purposes.

112. Pursuant to the Plan and the Sanction Order, each of SFC, the Monitor, and the Initial Consenting Noteholders have reserved all rights to seek or obtain an Order at any time directing that any Unresolved Claims should be disallowed in whole or in part or should receive the same treatment as Equity Claims. The Plan and the Sanction Order provide that all parties with Unresolved Claims will have standing in respect of any proceeding to determine whether or not an Unresolved Claim constitutes a Proven Claim (in whole or in part) entitled to consideration under the Plan.

113. The Plan Supplement also describes the establishment of SFC Escrow Co., which will act as the Unresolved Claims Escrow Agent. Subject to the terms of the Plan, SFC Escrow Co. will hold distributions in respect of any Unresolved Claim in existence at the Plan Implementation Date in escrow until settlement or final determination of the Unresolved Claim in accordance with the Claims Process Order, the Meeting order, the Plan or otherwise, as applicable.

1. Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims

114. As I discussed above, there is a component of the class action claims that relates to the debt issuances and, in some respect, some of the class action plaintiffs are former noteholders. Section 4.4(a) of the Plan makes clear that those claims, as against SFC, the Subsidiaries or the Named Directors and Officers (other than those claims that are Section 5.1(2) D&O Claims, Conspiracy Claims or Non-Released D&O Claims) are fully, finally, irrevocably and forever compromised and released. However, these Noteholder Class Action Claims against Third Party Defendants are not compromised or released and may continue to proceed against the Third Party Defendants, provided that the Class Action Plaintiffs have agreed that the aggregate amount of such claims that may be asserted against Third Party Defendants in respect of

Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims shall not exceed the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit, which has been established at a global amount of \$150 million in the aggregate for all Third Party Defendants.

115. The Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit was established after extensive and difficult negotiations and discussion spanning many months among the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee, the Ad Hoc Noteholders and SFC. As a result of the limit, the maximum exposure of the Third Party Defendants with respect to Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims is, in the aggregate, \$150 million. Accordingly, the maximum potential indemnity claims of such Third Party Defendants against SFC are likewise limited to \$150 million in the aggregate. Such contingent indemnity claims are treated as Unresolved Claims under the Plan, and the potential Plan consideration that could be distributed in respect of any such indemnity claims that could become Proven Claims will be held in escrow in the Unresolved Claims Reserve.

2. Defence Costs

116. The Equity Claims Decision, as affirmed by the Court of Appeal, did not determine whether Defence Cost Claims of the auditors and Underwriters would be treated in the same manner as their indemnity claims against the company. Accordingly, the Plan treats Defence Cost Claims as Unresolved Claims, with the potential Plan consideration that could be distributed in respect of any such claims that could become Proven Claims to be held in the Unresolved Claims Reserve.

D. Releases Under the Plan

117. The Plan includes releases for certain parties (the "Released Parties"), including certain current and former directors and officers of SFC (collectively, the "Named Directors and Officers"). The identification of the Named Directors and Officers and the scope of the releases were heavily negotiated among various constituents as part of the negotiation of the Plan and form a fundamental element of the commercial deal embodied in the Plan.

118. There are four main categories of claims against the Named Directors and Officers that will not be released pursuant to the Plan:

- (a) Non-Released D&O Claims, being claims for fraud or criminal conduct;
- (b) Conspiracy Claims;
- (c) Section 5.1(2) D&O Claims; and
- (d) Non-monetary remedies of the OSC.

119. The Plan contemplates that recovery in respect of claims against the Named Directors and Officers of SFC in respect of any Section 5.1(2) D&O Claims and any Conspiracy Claims shall be directed to insurance proceeds available from the insurance policies maintained by SFC.

120. SFC maintained director and officer insurance coverage in 2011 providing for a total of \$60 million of coverage, which applies to both defence costs and any damages or settlements. The primary policy is provided by ACE INA Insurance with a policy limit of \$15 million, with excess layers provided by Chubb, ERIS (Lloyds) and Travelers (collectively, the "2011 Insurance Policies"). Slightly in excess of \$10 million of the \$60 million limit has been paid out

on account of insured costs incurred by SFC and by other insured persons under the 2012 policies.

121. When the 2011 policies were not renewed after their expiry on December 31, 2011, SFC obtained coverage from other providers totalling \$55 million for 2012 (the "2012 Insurance Policies"). The 2012 Insurance Policies contain a "prior acts" exclusion, and therefore are not available to respond to claims arising from the Muddy Waters allegations.

122. Both the 2011 Insurance Policies and 2012 Insurance Policies provide for three types of coverage: (a) director and officer liability; (b) corporate liability for indemnifiable loss; and (c) corporate liability arising from securities claims. The insurance policies are subject to a number of exclusions, and contain coverage and claims limits.

123. In addition to the release of the Named Directors and Officers, and advisors involved in these proceedings, the Plan provides for releases of all claims relating to claims against SFC that may be made against the Subsidiaries. As I explained in my Initial Order Affidavit, while SFC is a holding company, the "business" of SFC is conducted through the Subsidiaries (which are not CCAA applicants).

124. There can be no effective restructuring of SFC's business and separation from its Canadian parent (which SFC has said from the outset was the objective of the commencement of these proceedings) if the claims asserted against the Subsidiaries arising out of or connected to claims against SFC remain outstanding. Just as the claims of the Noteholders against the Subsidiaries are to be released under the Plan upon implementation, so are the other claims against the Subsidiaries which relate to claims asserted against SFC (as well as any claims that the Subsidiaries have against SFC).

VI. THE MEETING

125. The Plan Filing and Meeting Order sets out the procedure for the calling and conduct of the meeting of creditors to vote in respect of the Plan.

A. Meeting Materials, Notice, and Mailing

126. The Plan Filing and Meeting Order approved the forms of Information Circular, Notice to Affected Creditors, Ordinary Affected Creditors' Proxy, Noteholders' Proxy, Instructions to Ordinary Affected Creditors, Instructions to Registered Noteholders, Instructions to Unregistered Noteholders and Instructions to Participant Holders (collectively, the "Meeting Materials"). A copy of the Meeting Materials is attached as Exhibit "U".

127. The Mailing Date set out in the Plan Filing and Meeting Order was to be no later than September 20, 2012, provided that such date could be extended by the Monitor with the consent of SFC and the Initial Consenting Noteholders. The Mailing Date was ultimately set as October 24, 2012.

128. A separate order was obtained by the Monitor on October 24, 2012 (the "Revised Noteholder Mailing Process Order") to effect a more efficient process for the mailing of the Meeting Materials to the Noteholders. A copy of the Revised Noteholder Mailing Process Order is attached as Exhibit "V".

129. The Monitor has set out in its Thirteenth Report how the Plan Filing and Meeting Order was complied with and how notice was effected as required.

130. The Plan Filing and Meeting Order permits SFC, with the consent of the Monitor to amend, restate, modify and/or supplement any of such materials, subject to the terms of the Plan, provided that the Monitor, SFC or the Chair shall communicate the details of any such amendments, restatements, modifications and/or supplements to Affected Creditors present at the Meeting prior to any vote being taken at the meeting, among other things.

131. The Plan Supplement was distributed in accordance with the terms of the Plan Filing and Meeting Order to Affected Creditors. The Plan (as amended on November 28, 2012) was provided to the CCAA service list as well as posted on the Monitor's website on November 28, 2012.

132. Based on information provided to me by counsel and by the Monitor in its Thirteenth Report, I believe that SFC has complied with all requirements in the Plan Filing and Meeting Order with respect to the mailing of the Meeting Materials.

B. The Meeting

133. The Plan Filing and Meeting Order authorized SFC to call the Meeting and to hold and conduct the Meeting on the Meeting Date at the offices of Bennett Jones LLP, 3400 One First Canadian Place, Toronto, Ontario, for the purpose of seeking approval of the Plan by the Affected Creditors with Voting Claims at the Meeting in the manner set forth in the Plan Filing and Meeting Order.

134. The Meeting Date was set to be November 29, 2012, and this was communicated to Affected Creditors in the Meeting Materials. Further changes to the Plan resulted in the Meeting Date being extended to November 30, 2012. SFC issued a press release announcing this

extension, and the Monitor's counsel also communicated the fact of the extension by way of email to the Service List. The location of the Meeting was moved to the offices of Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, counsel to the Monitor, at 1 First Canadian Place, 100 King Street West, 16th Floor, Toronto, Ontario.

135. The outcome of the Meeting will be reported in a further report by the Monitor prior to the Sanction Order hearing.

C. Entitlement to Vote and Classification of Creditors

136. The voting process is described in some detail in the Monitor's Thirteenth Report. By way of general overview only, the Plan Filing and Meeting Order provides that the only Persons entitled to vote at the Meeting are the Beneficial Noteholders with Voting Claims that have beneficial ownership of one or more Notes as at the Voting Record Date (August 31, 2012), and Ordinary Affected Creditors with Voting Claims as at the Voting Record Date.

137. The Plan Filing and Meeting Order provides that each Affected Creditor with an Unresolved Claim could also attend the Meeting and is entitled to one vote at the Meeting in respect of such Unresolved Claim. The Monitor is required to keep a separate record of votes cast by Affected Creditors with Unresolved Claims and to report on such vote at the Sanction Hearing.

138. The Plan Filing and Meeting Order provides that each of the Third Party Defendants is entitled to vote as a member of the Affected Creditors Class in respect of any Class Action Indemnity Claim that it has properly filed in respect of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims, provided that the aggregate value of all such claims shall, for voting purposes, be

deemed to be limited to the amount of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit. The Monitor is required to keep a separate record of votes cast by the Third Party Defendants in respect of such Class Action Indemnity Claims and to report to the Court with respect thereto at the Sanction Hearing.

139. The Plan Filing and Meeting Order provides that the following Persons do not have the right to vote at the Meeting: Unaffected Creditors; Noteholder Class Action Claimants; Equity Claimants; any Person with a D&O Claim; any Person with a D&O Indemnity Claim (other than a D&O Indemnity Claim in respect of Defence Costs Claims or in respect of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims); any Person with a Subsidiary Intercompany Claim; and any other Person asserting Claims against SFC whose Claims do not constitute Affected Creditor Claims on the Voting Record Date.

VII. STEPS TAKEN AT THE OSC WITH RESPECT TO PLAN STEPS

140. The mailing of the Meeting Materials, the holding of the Meeting, and the steps contemplated to implement the Plan could have individually or collectively constituted an act in furtherance of a trade, which would have been contrary to the TCTO first made by the OSC on August 26, 2011.

141. To avoid that result, SFC sought and obtained two orders of the OSC to vary the TCTO. First, on September 18, 2012, the OSC issued an order varying the TCTO to permit the distribution of the Meeting Materials as contemplated by the Plan Filing and Meeting Order. A copy of the September 18, 2012 order is attached as Exhibit "W".

142. Second, on October 26, 2012, the OSC issued an order varying the TCTO to permit: (a) the holding of the Meeting; and (b) the CCAA Plan Trades and all acts in furtherance thereof, other than CCAA Plan Trades required to give effect to an Alternative Sale Transaction, provided that the requisite creditor approval is obtained, this Honourable Court issues a sanction order, and SFC has complied and is in compliance with the terms of all CCAA court orders. A copy of the October 26, 2012 order is attached as Exhibit "X".

143. As a result, except in the circumstances where an Alternative Sale Transaction was being pursued, there are no further regulatory requirements that relate to the OSC that are needed to effectuate the transactions contemplated in the Plan, other than an order from the OSC and other provincial securities regulators for a decision that SFC is not a reporting issuer effective as of the implementation date of the Plan. If granted, that order would result in SFC and Newco not being reporting issuers in Ontario or any other province in Canada following the implementation date of the Plan.

VIII. PLAN SANCTION

A. SFC Has Complied with the CCAA and the Orders Granted in these Proceedings

144. As I explained in my Initial Order Affidavit and as was found by this Honourable Court in its endorsement on the Initial Order, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "Y", SFC is a "debtor company" under section 2 of the CCAA. It is a "company" continued under the CBCA that has debts far in excess of the CDN \$5 million statutory requirement, and is insolvent with liabilities to creditors far exceeding CDN \$1,000.

145. Since the commencement of these proceedings, SFC has complied with the provisions of the CCAA, the Initial Order and all subsequent Orders of the Court granted in these proceedings. I am not aware, and I am advised by counsel that they are unaware, of any steps taken by SFC that are not authorized by the CCAA.

146. This Honourable Court has been kept up to date with regular updates provided in affidavits that I have sworn and in reports of the Monitor that have been filed with the Court. In particular, SFC made full and timely disclosure of, among other things: (a) developments occurring at the OSC and with OSC Staff; (b) steps taken by SFC in response to various developments in SFC's business, including a number of departures of senior management personnel at SFC; (c) the efforts to negotiate a global resolution of issues among all stakeholders; (d) the efforts to market the assets of SFC pursuant to the Sale Process Order; and (e) developments in SFC's business, including the difficulties SFC has experienced in realizing upon and recovering receivables from third parties.

147. Accordingly, after consulting with counsel and reviewing the documents described above, I believe that all steps taken by SFC since the inception of this proceeding have been authorized by the CCAA.

B. The Plan is Fair and Reasonable

148. Since the Muddy Waters report was issued on June 2, 2011, SFC has expended considerable efforts and resources examining alternatives to find the best possible resolution to the issues facing the company described above.

149. Prior to filing for the protection under the CCAA, SFC did everything within its power to avoid the defaults that ultimately forced it to commence insolvency proceedings. However, as described above and in my Initial Order Affidavit, SFC was in default under certain of the Notes as a result of being unable to issue 2011 third quarter financial statements. While waivers of such defaults were obtained for a period of time, those waivers were set to expire at the end of April, 2012 and the Noteholders, with the guarantees and share pledges described above, would have been in a position to enforce their rights under the Note Indentures. Any alternative to the commencement of CCAA proceedings would have risked the immediate cessation of the Sino-Forest business resulting in significant detriment to SFC's stakeholders.

150. As previously discussed, following the commencement of these CCAA proceedings, SFC conducted a court supervised Sale Process to determine whether there was a potential purchaser willing to purchase the assets of SFC for the Qualified Consideration. With the assistance of Houlihan, the market was thoroughly canvassed and no such bidder could be found. In accordance with the Sale Process Procedures, SFC terminated the Sale Process and proceeded towards developing the Plan to implement the Restructuring Transaction.

151. The Plan that will ultimately be put to Affected Creditors at the Meeting was the subject of significant and extensive negotiations. In negotiating the Plan, the Board of SFC considered the interests of all stakeholders of SFC. Alternatives were explored throughout the negotiations, and the Plan was the product of such negotiations. I do not believe that there are other viable alternatives that would have been acceptable to SFC and its creditors. The Plan represents the best available alternative remaining in these proceedings, and provides a better result for SFC's creditors than could be achieved through a bankruptcy or liquidation.

152. As discussed above, SFC is a holding company and the Sino-Forest business is held through the Subsidiaries. To recover any value in a bankruptcy or liquidation scenario, creditors would need to realize upon the assets where they are resident. The majority of SFC's business operations are located in the PRC, and the majority of SFC's forest plantations are located in the southern and eastern regions of the PRC, primarily in inland regions suitable for large-scale replanting. Other jurisdictions where bankruptcy or liquidations would need to take place would be in Hong Kong or the British Virgin Islands (the "BVI").

153. Beyond the legal hurdles of effecting any bankruptcy or liquidation in these various jurisdictions, any of SFC's creditors seeking a liquidation in the PRC, Hong Kong or BVI, will be confronted with significant difficulties in collecting receivables as has been detailed by the Monitor in its earlier reports and which I described during my cross-examination on an earlier report and in dealing with the substantial claims that have been asserted against the Subsidiaries as identified in the claims process. Significant efforts have been expended by Sino-Forest over the past several months to recover its receivables, and notwithstanding long-standing relationships with many of the parties owing such amounts, SFC has largely been unsuccessful. The ability of third party creditors of a Canadian parent company (or a liquidator appointed outside of the PRC in respect of the Subsidiaries) to collect such receivables in these various regions is speculative, at best.

154. Any creditors in a bankruptcy or liquidation scenario in these various jurisdictions would also have significant challenges in monetizing any of the assets of the Subsidiaries, given the challenges in establishing title capable of being transferred to a buyer that have been described in the reports of the Independent Committee, my earlier affidavits and certain reports of the Monitor. Even if such assets were successfully monetized, insofar as such assets are located in

the PRC, creditors would be faced with the numerous legal and regulatory issues associated with removing funds from the PRC.

155. Any liquidation or bankruptcy of SFC, through its Subsidiaries, would result in loss of value to the creditors of SFC and its Subsidiaries as a going concern. As I have testified on a number of occasions, significantly greater value can be obtained through the Sino-Forest business continuing as a going concern than could be obtained through piecemeal dismantling of the enterprise through a bankruptcy or liquidation.

156. In developing the Plan, I do not believe that SFC or the Board has acted in a manner that unfairly disregards, or is unfairly prejudicial to, or oppresses the interests of any stakeholders. It is not unfair for shareholders to not receive any distribution under the Plan given that there are insufficient funds to satisfy the claims of SFC's creditors. The treatment of shareholder claims and related indemnity claims is fair and consistent with the Equity Claims Decision, as affirmed by the Court of Appeal. As I have described above, a sizeable majority of the Noteholders have agreed to support the Plan, and the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee and the Quebec Class Action Plaintiffs have stated that they will not oppose it. To the extent that certain claims are Unresolved Claims at the time of the Plan's implementation, such claims are provided for through the creation of the Unresolved Claims Reserve, which will preserve the potential Plan Consideration in respect of such claims, to the extent that any of them (or any part of any of them) becomes a Proven Claim.

157. SFC has stated from the outset of these proceedings that it is necessary to have a clean break for the Subsidiaries from SFC in order for these proceedings to be successful. The primary purpose of the CCAA proceeding was to extricate the business of Sino-Forest, through the

operation of SFC's Subsidiaries, from the cloud of uncertainty surrounding SFC. Accordingly, there is a clear and rational connection between the release of the Subsidiaries and the Plan and it is difficult to see how any viable plan could be made that does not cleanse the Subsidiaries of the claims made against SFC. The Subsidiaries are effectively contributing their assets to SFC to satisfy SFC's obligations under their guarantees of SFC's Note indebtedness, for the benefit of the Affected Creditors (the Subsidiaries are not asserting against SFC for doing so, and in fact are releasing SFC from any such claims and guaranteeing the Newco Notes).

158. The Plan will enable SFC to achieve a going concern outcome for the business of Sino-Forest that fully and finally deals with debt issues and will extract the business of Sino-Forest from the uncertainties surrounding SFC. The Plan will provide stability for Sino-Forest's employees, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders, and provide a path for recovery of the debt owed to SFC's non-subordinated creditors.

159. The Plan preserves the rights of aggrieved parties, including SFC, to pursue those parties that are alleged to share some or all of the responsibility for the problems that caused SFC to file for CCAA protection in the first place. Releases are not being granted to individuals who have been charged by OSC staff, or to other individuals against whom the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee wishes to preserve litigation claims.

160. The Named Directors and Officers group consists principally of Board members and members of management who have been important to efforts to avoid note defaults and later to facilitate SFC's restructuring efforts. It also included some individuals formerly associated with SFC who, to SFC's knowledge, are not implicated in any conduct issues. The Named Directors and Officers are Andrew Agnew, William E. Ardell, James Bowland, Leslie Chan, Michael

Cheng, Lawrence Hon, James M.E. Hyde, Richard M. Kimel, R. John (Jack) Lawrence, Jay A. Lefton, Edmund Mak, Tom Maradin, Simon Murray, James F. O'Donnell, William P. Rosenfeld, Peter Donghong Wang, Garry West, Kee Y. Wong, and me.

161. I have described above the steps taken to investigate conduct issues, avoid note defaults and ultimately to facilitate the restructuring efforts. These efforts would not have been possible without the active participation of the Board and members of remaining management.

162. In addition to these positive efforts, the Board also dealt with conduct issues as facts came to light. As described above, certain individuals were placed on administrative leave following late August 2011. As described in prior affidavits, since the commencement of these CCAA proceedings, Allen Chan, Alfred Hung, George Ho, Simon Yeung, Albert Ip, and David Horsley have ceased to be employed by Sino-Forest. Other less senior employees also have ceased to be employed by Sino-Forest.

163. Finally, a release of the Named Directors and Officers is necessary to effect a greater recovery for SFC's creditors, rather than preserve indemnification rights and dilutive participation entitlements for the Named Directors and Officers.

164. For the reasons discussed above, SFC believes that the Plan provides a fair and reasonable balance among its stakeholders while providing the ability for the Sino-Forest to continue as a going concern for the benefit of stakeholders.

165. As I have explained in several prior affidavits, to achieve a going concern outcome for the business of Sino-Forest, SFC cannot remain in CCAA for much longer. There have already been considerable strains on Sino-Forest's business relationships and the company's ability to

collect very sizable accounts receivable have been significantly constrained by the fact of these insolvency proceedings. Moreover, as indicated by the Monitor's Thirteenth Report and the proposed cash flow forecast in the Monitor's Twelfth Report, while SFC has sufficient cash to exist to February 1, 2013, SFC's cash position is being rapidly depleted and SFC will likely have insufficient funds to continue operating in these CCAA proceedings for any extended period of time beyond February 1, 2013.

166. Subject to obtaining approval of the Plan by the requisite majority of Affected Creditors with Proven Claims at the Meeting, for the reasons stated above, I believe that the Plan is appropriate and should be sanctioned by this Honourable Court.

SWORN BEFORE ME at the City of Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, People's Republic of China, this 29th day of November, 2012

Chan Ching Yee

Chan Ching Yee
Solicitor

A Commissioner of Oaths **Reed Smith
Richards Butler
20/F Alexandra House
Hong Kong SAR**

W. Judson Martin

W. Judson Martin

TAB 14

Court File No.: CV-12-9667-00CL

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION**

Court File No.: CV-11-431153-00CP

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

BETWEEN:

**THE TRUSTEES OF THE LABOURERS' PENSION FUND OF CENTRAL AND
EASTERN CANADA, THE TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 793 PENSION PLAN FOR OPERATING
ENGINEERS IN ONTARIO, SJUNDE AP-FONDEN, DAVID GRANT and ROBERT
WONG**

Plaintiffs

- and -

**SINO-FOREST CORPORATION, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, BDO LIMITED (formerly
known as BDO MCCABE LO LIMITED), ALLEN T.Y. CHAN, W. JUDSON MARTIN,
KAI KIT POON, DAVID J. HORSLEY, WILLIAM E. ARDELL, JAMES P. BOWLAND,
JAMES M.E. HYDE, EDMUND MAK, SIMON MURRAY, PETER WANG, GARRY J.
WEST, PÖYRY (BEIJING) CONSULTING COMPANY LIMITED, CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (CANADA), INC., TD SECURITIES INC., DUNDEE SECURITIES
CORPORATION, RBC DOMINION SECURITIES INC., SCOTIA CAPITAL INC., CIBC
WORLD MARKETS INC., MERRILL LYNCH CANADA INC., CANACCORD
FINANCIAL LTD., MAISON PLACEMENTS CANADA INC., CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (USA) LLC and MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH
INCORPORATED (successor by merger to Banc of America Securities LLC)**

Defendants

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES M. WRIGHT

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I, CHARLES M. WRIGHT, of the City of London, in the Province of Ontario, AFFIRM:

1. I am a partner at Siskinds LLP, who, along with Koskie Minsky LLP (together, "Class Counsel"), are counsel to the plaintiffs (the "Representative Plaintiffs") in the above-captioned class proceeding (the "Ontario Action").
2. Class Counsel have retained Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP for purposes of the above-captioned proceeding (the "Insolvency Proceeding") under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"), who act for the Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's Securities (together with the Representative Plaintiffs, the "Ontario Plaintiffs").
3. Siskinds Demeules is counsel to the plaintiffs in the class proceeding in the Province of Quebec Superior Court styled as *Guining Liu v. Sino-Forest Corporation, et al.*, File No. 200-06-000132-111.
4. I have knowledge of the matters deposed to below. Where I make statements in this affidavit that are not within my personal knowledge, I have indicated the source of my information, and I believe such information to be true.

NATURE OF THIS MOTION

5. On November 29, 2012, the Ontario Plaintiffs entered into Minutes of Settlement with the defendant, Ernst & Young LLP, in order to resolve all claims against Ernst & Young LLP, Ernst & Young Global Limited and any of its member firms, and any person or entity affiliated with or connected thereto ("Ernst & Young", as more fully defined in the Plan of Compromise and Reorganization of the Applicant under the CCAA dated December 3, 2012 (the "Plan")) including all claims that have been asserted or that could have been asserted against Ernst & Young in these class proceedings (the "Ernst & Young Claims", as more fully defined in the as

defined in the Plan). Along with the Minutes of Settlement, the framework of the proposed settlement and release of Ernst & Young is contained in the Plan, and in particular at Article 11.1 and the corresponding definitions (the "Ernst & Young Release" and the "Ernst & Young Settlement"). A copy of the Minutes of Settlement is attached hereto as **Exhibit "A."** Copies of the draft settlement approval orders are attached hereto as **Exhibits "B-1"** and **"B-2."** A copy of the Plan is attached hereto as **Exhibit "C"** and a copy of the order sanctioning the Plan dated December 10, 2012 (the "Sanction Order") is attached hereto as **Exhibit "D."** The endorsement and reasons of the Honourable Justice Morawetz sanctioning the Plan are attached hereto as **Exhibits "E-1"** and **"E-2."** Where I have used capitalized terms that I have not defined in this affidavit, those terms have the same meanings attributed to them in the draft settlement orders or the Plan.

6. I affirm this affidavit in support of the motion brought by the Ontario Plaintiffs for approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement.

OVERVIEW OF THE SETTLEMENT

7. Subject to the terms of the Ernst & Young Settlement, Ernst & Young has agreed to pay CAD\$117,000,000.00 (the "Settlement Amount") to a Settlement Trust to be administered in accordance with orders of the court.

8. In consideration for the Settlement Amount, it is a condition of the Ernst & Young Settlement that Ernst & Young will receive a full and final release in respect of all claims relating to its relationship with Sino-Forest Corporation ("Sino"), its subsidiaries and affiliates, as more fully defined as the Ernst & Young Release in the Plan.

9. The Ernst & Young Settlement is also conditional on the approvals by courts in Ontario, Quebec and the United States and certain other conditions contained in the Minutes of Settlement, the Plan and the Sanction Order.
10. The draft settlement approval orders provide that the distribution of the net Settlement Amount¹ shall be made to the Securities Claimants.

BACKGROUND OF THE ACTION

11. Sino shares were publicly traded at all material times on the Toronto Stock Exchange (the "TSX"), on the Berlin exchange, on the over-the-counter market in the United States and on the TradeGate market. Sino shares also traded on alternative trading venues in Canada and elsewhere including, without limitation, AlphaToronto and PureTrading. During the period from March 19, 2007 through June 2, 2011, approximately 93.4% of the aggregate global volume of trade in Sino common shares took place in Canada (82.9% on the TSX and 10.5% on other trading venues in Canada).
12. Sino also issued and had various notes outstanding. These notes were offered to investors by way of offering memoranda, and were underwritten by various financial institutions who are defendants in the Ontario Action. In addition to those primary market offerings, these notes traded in the secondary market.
13. On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters Research ("Muddy Waters") released a research report alleging fraud against Sino and alleging that it "massively exaggerates its assets." The release of this report was immediately followed by a dramatic decline in Sino's share price.

¹ The net Settlement Amount is the amount remaining from the Settlement Amount after payment of administration and notice costs, class counsel fees and expenses as approved by the Court and payment to Claims Funding International in accordance with the funding order of Justice Perell dated May 17, 2012, attached hereto as **Exhibit "F."**

14. On June 1, 2011, the day prior to the publication of the Muddy Waters report, Sino's common shares closed at \$18.21. After the Muddy Waters report became public, Sino shares fell to \$14.46 on the TSX (a decline of 20.6%), at which point trading was halted. When trading resumed the next day, Sino's shares fell to a close of \$5.23 (a decline of 71.3% from June 1).

15. A copy of the Muddy Waters report is attached hereto as **Exhibit "G."**

16. Sino's notes also fell in value following the Muddy Waters report. On May 9, 2012 an auction was held to settle the credit derivative trades for Sino-Forest credit default swaps ("CDS"). CDS are essentially an insurance contract for debt instruments, and the price set in that auction represents the market's view of the value of the notes as of May 9, 2012. The CDS auction price was 29% of the notes' face values.

17. On June 3, 2011, Sino issued and filed on SEDAR a press release titled "Sino-Forest Comments on Share Price Decline," which is attached hereto as **Exhibit "H."**

18. On June 6, 2011, Sino issued and filed on SEDAR a press release titled "Sino-Forest Releases Supporting Evidence against Allegations from Short Seller," and announced that a committee of its Board of Directors (the "Independent Committee") had been established and had retained Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP to conduct an investigation into Muddy Waters' allegations. Attached hereto as **Exhibit "I"** is a copy of that press release.

19. Also on June 6, 2011, Sino issued a press release titled "Sino-Forest Independent Committee Appoints PricewaterhouseCoopers," relating to the Independent Committee's investigation into Muddy Waters' allegations, which is attached hereto as **Exhibit "J."**

20. On June 13, 2011, Muddy Waters issued a document titled "Reaction to TRE Q1 Earnings Call," which is attached hereto as **Exhibit "K."**

continued since that time, and has been aided not only by Dacheng, but also by Hong Kong-based investigators specializing in financial fraud; two separate Toronto-based firms that specialize in forensic accounting, generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards; a lawyer qualified to practice in the Republic of Suriname, where Sino purported to own, through an affiliate, certain timber assets; and a financial economist who specializes in the measurement of damages in securities class actions.

32. On June 9, 2011, Siskinds Desmeules, a Quebec City law firm affiliated with Siskinds, commenced a parallel proceeding against Sino, Ernst & Young LLP and certain other defendants in the Quebec Superior Court. Class Counsel in Ontario and Quebec have been working together in a coordinated manner in both of these proceedings.

33. There were also two other proposed class proceedings commenced in Ontario relating to Sino. *Smith et al. v. Sino Forest Corporation et al.*, commenced on June 8, 2011 (the "*Smith Action*") and *Northwest & Ethical Investments L.P. et al. v. Sino-Forest Corporation et. al.*, commenced on September 26, 2011 (the "*Northwest Action*"). Rochon Genova LLP acted for the plaintiffs in the *Smith Action*, and Kim Orr LLP acted for the plaintiffs in the *Northwest Action*.

34. A copy of the Statement of Claim issued in the *Northwest Action* is attached hereto as **Exhibit "T."**

35. In the *Northwest Action*, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the misrepresentations alleged were made by the defendants (including Ernst & Young) with knowledge, fraudulently, recklessly or negligently. The Statement of Claim made specific allegations of fraud against

each of the defendants (including Ernst & Young) at paragraphs 226-228 and allegations of knowing, reckless or willfully blind misrepresentations elsewhere.

36. In December 2011, there was a motion to determine which of the three actions in Ontario should be permitted to proceed and which should be stayed. By order dated January 6, 2012, attached hereto as Exhibit "U," the Honourable Justice Perell granted carriage to the Ontario Plaintiffs. His Honour stayed the *Smith Action* and the *Northwest Action*, and appointed Siskinds LLP and Koskie Minsky LLP to prosecute the Ontario Action on behalf of the proposed class. Following that decision, and pursuant to the Court's order, David Grant was added as a proposed representative plaintiff and the scope of the class was expanded to its current scope.

37. On January 27, 2012, the Washington, DC-based law firm of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC ("US Plaintiffs' Counsel") commenced a proposed class action against Sino, Ernst & Young LLP, Ernst & Young Global Limited and other defendants in the New York Supreme Court (the "US Action"). The US Action was transferred from the New York state court to the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York in March 2012.

38. United States securities class actions procedure features a process by which the "lead plaintiff" is selected. On October 18, 2012, US Plaintiffs' Counsel issued the press release required by that process. All parties that intended to seek lead plaintiff status were required to move the U.S. Court within 60 days (by December 17, 2012). A review of the electronic database indicates that David Leopard, IMF Finance SA and Myong Hyon Yoo, represented by US Plaintiffs' Counsel, moved for appointment as lead plaintiffs on December 17, 2012. No other parties filed motions for appointment as lead plaintiffs by the December 17, 2012 deadline.

39. By way of Order of the United States District Court Southern District of New York dated January 4, 2013, David Leopard, IMF Finance SA and Myong Hyon Yoo were appointed as the lead plaintiffs and US Plaintiffs' Counsel as lead counsel to represent the interests of the proposed class. The US action is presently ongoing, and asserts claims on behalf of a class of:

i) all persons or entities who, from March 19, 2007 through August 26, 2011 (the "Class Period") purchased the common stock of Sino-Forest on the Over-the-Counter ("OTC") market and who were damaged thereby; and ii) all persons or entities who, during the Class Period, purchased debt securities issued by Sino-Forest other than in Canada and who were damaged thereby.

40. Class Counsel have had numerous interactions with US Plaintiffs' Counsel concerning developments in the Canadian and New York litigation.

41. On April 18, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, a copy of which is attached hereto and marked as **Exhibit "V."** A Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim was served on the defendants as part of the Ontario Plaintiffs' motion record in support of their motion seeking leave under Part XXIII.1 of the *Securities Act* (the "Leave Motion"). Attached and marked as **Exhibit "W"** is a copy of the Proposed Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR CERTIFICATION AND LEAVE

42. In March and April 2012, the Ontario Plaintiffs brought (a) a motion for certification of the Ontario Action as a class action under the *CPA*; and (b) a motion for leave to proceed with statutory claims under Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario *Securities Act* (the "*OSA*").

43. The Ontario Plaintiffs filed voluminous motion records in support of their motions, comprising evidence from their investigations and expert reports. The motion records included:

- (a) an affidavit of Steven Chandler, a former senior law enforcement official from Hong Kong who was involved in investigating Sino in China;

- (b) an affidavit of Alan Mak, an expert in forensic accounting;
- (c) an affidavit of Dennis Deng, a lawyer qualified to practice in the People's Republic of China, and a partner in Dacheng law firm; and
- (d) an affidavit of Carol-Ann Tjon-Pian-Gi, a lawyer qualified to practice in the Republic of Suriname.

44. Justice Perell set a schedule for the proceeding by way of Order dated March 26, 2012. The defendants entered into a tolling agreement with the Ontario Plaintiffs and a separate tolling agreement was entered into amongst the defendants to deal with any potential claims over or third party claims. The tolling agreement between the defendants and the Ontario Plaintiffs was made as of March 6, 2012, and suspended the running of time for the purpose of the proposed Part XXIII.1 claims of the Ontario Plaintiffs and members of the putative class until February 28, 2013. Following the *CCAA* stay of proceedings, a second tolling agreement between these parties was made as of May 8, 2012, wherein the parties agreed that the running of time for the purpose of the proposed Part XXIII.1 claims of the Ontario Plaintiffs and members of the putative class was to be suspended as of March 6, 2012 until the earlier of 12 months following the lifting of the *CCAA* stay or February 1, 2014. This tolling agreement was a result of the Ontario Plaintiffs agreeing to consent to the stay order.

45. The certification and leave motions were scheduled for November 21 to 30, 2012. Those motions were not heard in November 2012 as a result of Sino's insolvency.

SINO'S INSOLVENCY

46. On March 30, 2012, Sino commenced the Insolvency Proceeding and obtained an order for an interim stay of proceedings against the company, its subsidiaries and its directors and officers. Pursuant to an order on May 8, 2012, the stay of proceedings was extended to all other

defendants in the action, including Ernst & Young. The Ontario Plaintiffs agreed not to oppose this order on condition that (a) there was an order permitting a settlement approval hearing and certification hearing relating to a settlement with the defendant Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited (described below); and (b) the defendants execute the second tolling agreement reflecting the delay caused by the Insolvency Proceeding. The stay of proceedings is currently extended through to February 1, 2013.

47. From the outset, it was apparent to counsel to the Ontario Plaintiffs that the Insolvency Proceeding presented a material risk to the Ontario Plaintiffs. Namely that in order to effect a restructuring that generated as much value as possible for Sino's creditors, there could be a plan of arrangement that had the effect of imposing an unfavourable settlement on the Ontario Plaintiffs.

48. Consequently, Class Counsel immediately entered into negotiations with other stakeholders in the Insolvency Proceeding, and took a number of steps to vigorously represent the interests of the purchasers of Sino's securities. The following were among Class Counsel's main objectives:

- (a) Reserving the Ontario Plaintiffs' rights to object to various features of the Insolvency Proceeding, so as to generate and/or preserve momentum for the Ontario Plaintiffs' claims and positions;
- (b) Ensuring that a Claims Process was established that identified the universe of stakeholders having an interest in the Insolvency Proceeding while ensuring the recognition of the totality of the representative claim advanced by the Ontario Plaintiffs;
- (c) Establishing a process for the mediation in the Insolvency Proceeding through which the positions of the various stakeholders would be defined; and

- (d) Obtaining access to information that would permit Class Counsel to make informed recommendations to the Ontario Plaintiffs and the court in connection with the terms of any Plan.

49. To further these objectives, Class Counsel took a number of steps in the Insolvency Proceeding, including the following:

- (a) Bringing or appearing in response to the following motions:
 - (i) March 30, 2012 – Attending at the initial application regarding *CCAA* protection and sales process for Sino and its subsidiaries, including a stay of proceedings against Sino, its subsidiaries and directors and officers;
 - (ii) April 13, 2012 – Attending at the Company's motion regarding stay extension;
 - (iii) April 20, 2012 – Bringing a motion regarding advice and direction on the *CCAA* stay and its impact on the pending motions in the Ontario Action;
 - (iv) April 20, 2012 – Attending at the Company's motion regarding expansion of the powers of the Monitor;
 - (v) May 8, 2012 – Attending and participating actively in the motion regarding a third party stay;
 - (vi) May 8, 2012 – Bringing a motion regarding Pöyry settlement leave;
 - (vii) May 14, 2012 – Attending and participating in a motion regarding Claims Procedure Order, including granting of leave to the Ontario Plaintiffs to file a Claim in respect of the substance of the matters set out in the Ontario Action on behalf of the proposed Class and the same leave to the Quebec Plaintiffs;
 - (viii) May 14, 2012 – Attending a motion brought by Contrarian, one of Sino's noteholders;
 - (ix) May 17, 2012 – Bringing a motion in the Ontario Action regarding a third-party funding agreement;

- (x) May 17, 2012 – Bringing a motion in the Ontario Action regarding Pöyry settlement approval;
- (xi) May 31, 2012 – Attending at the Company’s motion regarding stay extension;
- (xii) June 26, 2012 – Attending at the Company’s motion regarding the status of Shareholder Claims and Related Indemnity Claims under the *CCAA*;
- (xiii) July 25, 2012 – Precipitating and attending at a motion regarding mediation in the *CCAA* proceedings, which included an order that the Ontario Plaintiffs were a party to the mediation;
- (xiv) July 27, 2012 – Attending at the Company’s motion regarding the status of Shareholder Claims and Related Indemnity Claims under the *CCAA*;
- (xv) July 30, 2012 – Bringing a motion regarding document production and a data room;
- (xvi) August 31, 2012 – Attending at the Company’s motion regarding plan filing and meeting Order;
- (xvii) August 31, 2012 – Attending at the Company’s motion regarding adjournment of Ad Hoc Committee’s motion (regarding appointment of Representative Plaintiff and leave to vote on Plan of Compromise);
- (xviii) September 28, 2012 – Attending at the Company’s motion regarding stay extension;
- (xix) October 9, 2012 – Attending and participating in the Company’s motion regarding adjournment of the Ad Hoc Committee’s motion (regarding lifting of the stay against the Third Parties);
- (xx) October 9, 2012 – Attending at the Company’s motion regarding stay extension;
- (xxi) October 28, 2012 – Bringing a motion to limit the scope of stay to exclude to the Third Party Defendants and others;
- (xxii) October 29, 2012 – Attending at the Company’s motion regarding revised noteholder noticing process;

- (xxiii) November 13, 2012 – Attending an appeal regarding Equity Claims decision; and
- (xxiv) November 23, 2012 – Attending at the Company's motion regarding stay extension;
- (xxv) December 7, 2012 – Attending and participating in the motion to sanction the Plan;

- (b) almost from the inception of the Insolvency Proceeding, engaging in extensive and protracted negotiations with the Ad Hoc Noteholder Group and with Sino with respect to the terms of the Plan of Reorganization;
- (c) bringing a motion early in the proceeding seeking various relief challenging the framework of the Insolvency Proceeding, such as the appointment of a receiver and providing for representation on behalf of the Class Members, and reserving all rights with respect to those issues throughout the Insolvency Proceeding;
- (d) supporting a motion for an order increasing the powers of the Monitor to administer Sino which took away powers from entrenched management and the then-existing board, protecting the assets of the company for all stakeholders and ensuring greater transparency and balance in the proceeding;
- (e) negotiating the claims procedure in the Insolvency Proceeding and obtaining the right to file a representative claim so as to protect the interests of the putative Class;
- (f) obtaining a data room of confidential non-public documents from Sino, which related principally to the audits of Sino's financial statements so as to permit the Ontario Plaintiffs to negotiate with other stakeholders at the Mediation and respond to any plan of arrangement in an informed manner;
- (g) examining all applicable insurance policies and indemnity agreements and assessed the capacity to pay of various defendants, including Ernst & Young;
- (h) compelling the attendance of Sino's CEO at a cross-examination and testing his evidence in the Insolvency Proceeding;

Sino *CCAA* proceedings and that it is conditional upon the full and final release of Ernst & Young by order of the *CCAA* court.

67. Paragraph 11 and Schedule B of the Minutes of Settlement make it clear that the settlement is conditional upon obtaining orders in the *CCAA* proceedings and in the United States Bankruptcy Court resolving all claims against Ernst & Young in relation to Sino.

68. The framework of the Ernst & Young Settlement, as contemplated by the Minutes of Settlement, is contained in the Plan at Article 11.1, and includes the framework for the Ernst & Young Release.

69. A similar framework for Named Third Party Defendants, including the Underwriters and BDO, is contained at Article 11.2 of the Plan. The Ernst & Young Settlement was the template for the framework for the Named Third Party Defendant settlement provisions.

70. Article 11.2 in respect of Named Third Party Defendants provides the Ontario Plaintiffs (and the Underwriters and BDO) with the ability to complete further settlements within the context of the *CCAA* proceedings, subject to further court approval. Such settlements could have the benefit of a full release for the Underwriters or BDO, if ordered by the Court, and would likely result in those parties paying a premium for settlement to resolve all claims against them, to the benefit of the Class.

71. Ernst & Young and the Ontario Plaintiffs supported the Plan on the basis of the inclusion of the framework for the Ernst & Young Settlement and the Ernst & Young Release in the Plan. Ernst & Young, as a creditor of Sino, voted in favour of the Plan. Ernst & Young and the Ontario Plaintiffs supported the Plan at the sanction hearing.

THE ONTARIO PLAINTIFFS SUPPORT THE SETTLEMENT

72. The Ontario Plaintiffs are:

- (a) The trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada ("Labourers Fund"). The Labourers Fund is a multi-employer pension plan providing benefits for employees working in the construction industry. The trustees of the Labourers Fund manage more than \$2.5 billion of assets. During the period from March 19, 2007 to June 2, 2011 the Labourers Fund purchased 360,700 Sino common shares. Most of those shares were purchased in the secondary market over the TSX. The Labourers Fund also purchased Sino common shares pursuant to a prospectus that Sino issued during the Class Period. As at the day before the issuance of the Muddy Waters report, the Labourers Fund held a total of 128,700 Sino shares. The Labourers Fund is a long-standing client of Koskie Minsky LLP;
- (b) The trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers ("OE Fund"). The OE Fund is a multi-employer pension plan providing pension benefits for operating engineers in Ontario. The trustees of the OE Fund manage approximately \$1.5 billion of assets. The OE Fund purchased 465,130 Sino common shares over the TSX during the Class Period, and held 436,300 such shares at the day before the issuance of the Muddy Waters report. The OE Fund is a long-standing client of Koskie Minsky LLP;
- (c) Sjunde AP-Fonden ("AP7"), the Swedish National Pension Fund. AP7 manages billions of dollars in assets. AP7 purchased 139,398 common shares over the TSX during the Class Period, and held all of those shares as at the day before the issuance of the Muddy Waters report;
- (d) David Grant, an individual resident in Calgary, Alberta. During the Class Period, he purchased 100 of the Sino 6.25% Guaranteed Senior Notes due 2017 pursuant to an offering memorandum. Mr. Grant continued to hold these notes as at the day before the issuance of the Muddy Waters report; and

(e) Robert Wong, an individual residing in Kincardine, Ontario. Mr. Wong purchased hundreds of thousands Sino shares from 2002 (when he first became a Sino shareholder) through June 2011. During the Class Period, he purchased 896,400 Sino common shares in the secondary market over the TSX and 30,000 shares pursuant to a prospectus that Sino issued during the Class Period, for a total of 926,400 shares. Mr. Wong continued to hold 518,700 Sino common shares at the day before the issuance of the Muddy Waters report.

73. Collectively, the Ontario Plaintiffs owned 1,223,098 Sino common shares at the day before the issuance of the Muddy Waters report, and those shares had a market value immediately prior to the issuance of the Muddy Waters report of approximately \$23.3 million.

74. I am advised by Jonathan Ptak of Koskie Minsky that the trustees of the Labourers Fund and the OE Fund are extremely pleased with the settlement with Ernst & Young and have instructed Class Counsel to seek approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement. I am advised by Dimitri Lascaris that Robert Wong, David Grant and AP7 are also very pleased with the settlement and have instructed Class Counsel to seek approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement.

75. In addition, I am advised by Mr. Lascaris that the proposed settlement with Ernst & Young is supported by the institutions that were the two largest shareholders of Sino, namely, New York-based Paulson & Co. Inc. ("Paulson") and Arizona-based Davis Selected Advisers LP ("Davis"). Paulson and Davis, respectively, owned approximately 14.1 % and 12.6% of Sino's outstanding common shares prior to the issuance of the Muddy Waters report, representing in aggregate a market value of more than \$1.1 billion.

76. Class Counsel have been retained by Davis. Mr. Lascaris advises me that, since the commencement of the class action, he has had numerous and extensive discussions with responsible officials of both Davis and Paulson in regard to the progress generally of the class

action and the Insolvency Proceeding, and in regard in particular to negotiations with Ernst & Young and the terms of and rationale for the settlement.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING THE FAIRNESS AND REASONABLENESS OF THE SETTLEMENT

Experience of Class Counsel

77. Siskinds LLP and Koskie Minsky LLP both have extensive experience litigating and resolving complex class action litigation similar to this case. In addition, Kessler Topaz Meltzer and Check LLP, counsel to AP7, are one of the leading U.S. class action firms with particular expertise in securities class actions.

78. Siskinds acted for the plaintiffs in the first action certified as a class proceeding under the CPA, *Bendall v McGhan Medical Corp* (1993), 14 OR (3d) 734 (Gen Div). Since that time, Siskinds has been lead or co-lead counsel to the plaintiffs in well over 100 class proceedings and has successfully resolved over 60 such proceedings, in areas such as securities, competition (price-fixing), product liability (particularly with respect to pharmaceuticals and medical products), the environment and consumer claims.

79. To the date of this affidavit, Siskinds has had approximately 20 securities class actions and 2 derivative proceeding settlements approved by courts, including most recently the *SunOpta*, *CV Technologies*, *Bear Lake Gold*, *PetroKazakhstan*, *Gildan Activewear*, *Canadian Superior Energy*, *Redline Communications*, *Gammon Gold*, and *Arctic Glacier* securities class action settlements.

80. Koskie Minsky has prosecuted class actions at all levels of court in Ontario as well as before the Supreme Court of Canada, and has been responsible for shaping class actions law through leading cases including *Cloud v The Attorney General of Canada*, *Pearson v Inco Ltd*, *Caputo v Imperial Tobacco*, and *Markson v MBNA Canada Bank*. Koskie Minsky has

prosecuted actions for securities fraud, pension fund and investment claims, intellectual property violations, environmental damage and residential school abuse, among others.

81. Koskie Minsky has acted for shareholders in securities class actions, including *Lawrence v Atlas Cold Storage Holdings Inc*, *Toeys v Yorkton*, and *Frohlinger v Nortel Networks Corp*.

82. Paliare Roland has appeared as counsel in many CCAA restructuring proceedings, and has acted for a variety of stakeholders in those proceedings, including stakeholders acting in representative capacities. Past engagements include, among others, advising and appearing on behalf of a number of institutional and other investors including various dissident noteholders in connection with the restructuring of Canada's non-bank asset backed commercial paper market, advising and appearing on behalf of the Superintendent of Financial Services in his capacity as administrator of Ontario's Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund in connection with the restructuring of Nortel Networks Corporation and its global subsidiaries, advising and appearing on behalf of the United Steelworkers in connection with the Stelco restructuring, as well as in connection with the restructuring of a variety of other steel mills, pulp mills, and manufacturing facilities across Ontario, and advising and appearing on behalf of the Air Line Pilots Association in connection with the restructuring of Air Canada. Paliare Roland also appeared as counsel to the committee of non-unionized Quebec employees in the restructuring of Fraser Papers, and, most recently, as counsel to a committee of former employees in the Cinram restructuring.

83. As of December 14, 2012, Class Counsel, together with Paliare Roland, in aggregate had more than \$5,701,546.50 in time and \$950,205.51 in disbursements for a total of \$6,651,752.01, exclusive of applicable taxes.

84. As a result of Class Counsel's involvement in other cases, we have gained considerable experience in the settlement mechanics and imperatives, damages methodologies, and risks associated with this type of litigation.

85. Class Counsel recommend the approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement. In our view, its terms, including the consideration available to the Class, are fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The Ernst & Young Settlement delivers a substantial, immediate benefit to Class Members on claims that faced significant risks.

86. I explain below our rationale for recommending to the Ontario Plaintiffs, and to this Court, the compromise of the claims advanced against Ernst & Young in this action.

Information supporting settlement

87. In assessing our clients' position and the proposed settlement, we had access to and considered the following sources of information:

- (a) all of Sino's public disclosure documents and other publicly available information with respect to Sino;
- (b) the available trading data for Sino's securities;
- (c) non-public documents uploaded by Sino into the data-room established in the Insolvency Proceeding for purposes of the global mediation, which included the documents listed at Schedule "A" to the July 30, 2012 Order of Justice Morawetz, which is marked and attached hereto as Exhibit "DD";
- (d) Ernst & Young LLP's responsive insurance policies;
- (e) the input and opinions of our accounting experts, insolvency law experts, and insurance coverage experts;

- (f) the input and opinion of Frank C. Torchio, the President of Forensic Economics, Inc., who has consulted or given independent damage opinions in securities fraud lawsuits for over 20 years.
- (g) the Statement of Allegations issued against Sino and certain officers and directors by the OSC, dated May 22, 2012, marked and attached hereto as Exhibit "EE";
- (h) the mediation briefs provided by the parties at the global mediation in September, 2012 and by Ernst & Young LLP at the mediation in November, 2012; and
- (i) input from experienced U.S. securities counsel, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, and discussions with US Plaintiffs' Counsel.

88. On December 3, 2012, after the Ontario Plaintiffs had entered into the Ernst & Young Settlement and on the day of the creditors vote on the Plan, the OSC issued a Statement of Allegations against Ernst & Young relating to the matter of Sino, which is marked and attached hereto as Exhibit "FF." Although Class Counsel's recommendation and the Ontario Plaintiffs' approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement were grounded on numerous factors, the OSC Statement of Allegations against Ernst & Young provided further insight about the risks associated with litigating the claims as against Ernst & Young going forward. As explained below, the OSC Statement of Allegation has since become a further factor, alongside the other documents listed above and the considerations explained below, for Class Counsel to now recommend the approval of the Ernst & Young Settlement.

89. In our view, Class Counsel had more than adequate information available from which to make an appropriate recommendation concerning the resolution of the claims as against Ernst & Young.

90. It has always been Class Counsel's view that the claims against Ernst & Young have merit. However, a number of factors in this case presented a significant risk to the ultimate

success and recovery from Ernst & Young. These risks weighed in favour of settlement with Ernst & Young. It is Class Counsel's view that this Ernst & Young Settlement (and the Ernst & Young Release) are fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the Class. Class Counsel's assessment of the Ernst & Young Settlement and our recommendation of it rest primarily on the following factors, in addition to the general risks of proceeding with complex litigation.

Recoverable damages could be far lower than actual damages

91. The Class asserts the following causes of action as against Ernst & Young:

- (a) statutory liability in respect of primary market share purchaser claims pursuant to s 130 of the *OSA*;
- (b) statutory liability in respect of secondary market share purchaser and note purchaser claims pursuant to Part XXIII.1 of the *OSA*; and
- (c) common law claims for negligent misrepresentation, negligence *simpliciter* and knowing or willfully blind misrepresentation for all purchasers of Sino securities.

92. These claims, if entirely successful, could result in an award for significant damages against all defendants. I have reviewed various expert reports by Mr. Torchio regarding damages in this action. Mr. Torchio is the President of Forensic Economics, Inc., and has consulted or given independent opinions in securities fraud lawsuits for over 20 years.

93. We were guided by the advice Mr. Torchio, but were also cognizant that it is common for defendants to produce opinions which make different assumptions and put forth lower damages figures. Indeed, in the course of settlement discussions in this case, Ernst & Young and other defendants insisted that far more conservative damages figures would be appropriate.

94. It is also important to recognize that Mr. Torchio opines on the total estimated damages. His opinions are based in large part on trading models and various assumptions, the results of which could vary from the actual trading patterns of the Class Members.

95. The damages alleged are for all losses suffered, including those attributable to Sino and the defendant directors and officers. Following the *CCAA* Proceedings, only the assets of certain of the defendants (Chan, Poon and Horsley) and the Director and Officer insurance proceeds following major draw-downs and hold-backs, are available to the Ontario Plaintiffs in respect of those claims.

96. Further, as part of the Plan, the Ontario Plaintiffs negotiated a cap of CAD\$150,000,000 for claims by noteholders in the various class actions indemnifiable by the Company, including claims by the Third Party Defendants, including Ernst & Young, for indemnification in respect of any noteholder claims against them (the "Noteholder Class Action Cap"). The Company admitted all claims for indemnification of the Third Party Defendants, including Ernst & Young, for the purposes of the Noteholder Class Action Cap. Ernst & Young waived all distribution to it under the Plan in return for the inclusion of Article 11.1 in the Plan. Therefore, the maximum that may be recovered by all noteholders with regard to indemnifiable claims in all of the class actions against all defendants in the aggregate is CAD\$150,000,000.

97. Moreover, the actual damages to be paid may only be for claims filed. For a variety of reasons, less than 100% of the Class Members generally file claims. Although claim rates vary from case to case, it is never the case in a matter of this nature that all Class Members file claims. Therefore actual payable damages could be some portion Mr. Torchio's figures if the matter proceeded to trial and the defendants succeeded in establishing that damages should be based only on claims filed.

98. Finally, and most significantly, irrespective of the scale of actual damages, the legal impediments to recovery for the claims against Ernst & Young weigh strongly in our recommendation of the Ernst & Young Settlement. In essence, while the damages alleged are in the billions of dollars, recovery against Ernst & Young may be less than the Settlement Amount if certain of Ernst & Young's defences and arguments are successful at trial.

Statutory claims on behalf of primary market share and note purchasers

99. The Ontario Action advances claims against Ernst & Young under s 130 of the *OSA*. Although no Statements of Defence have been delivered in the Ontario Action, the Ontario Plaintiffs understand that Ernst & Young denies that: (i) its auditors' reports contain the misrepresentation alleged; (ii) Sino's financial statements on which Ernst & Young opined were not GAAP-compliant; and (iii) Ernst & Young's audit work was not GAAS-compliant.

100. The Ontario Plaintiffs would be put to the proof that the auditors' reports contained the misrepresentations alleged. The Ontario Plaintiffs also understand that Ernst & Young asserts a due diligence defence under ss130(3) and (4) of the *OSA*. The Ontario Plaintiffs also understand that Ernst & Young takes issue with the damages calculations by Mr. Torchio. The damages for these claims are limited in the aggregate to approximately \$77.8 million.

101. However, recovery from Ernst & Young could be smaller. It is very likely that if Ernst & Young is found liable, responsibility would also be borne by Sino, its officers and directors, BDO Limited, and, notably, the Underwriters. Although liability under section 138 of the *OSA* is joint and several, Ernst & Young would be able to claim contribution from the other co-defendants found responsible for the misconduct. Ernst & Young waives this right to contribution as part of the Ernst & Young Settlement. The Settlement Fund provides certainty of the amount to be paid by Ernst & Young to the Class.

102. It should be noted that the Ontario Action advances claims pursuant to s 130.1 of the *OSA* against Sino for misrepresentations in the offering memoranda that Sino issued during the Class Period. However, the *OSA* does not provide for a statutory right of action relating to the offering memoranda in respect of any other defendant, including Ernst & Young, a fact that Class Counsel have taken into account in recommending the Ernst & Young Settlement.

Common law claims: auditors' duty and standard of care

103. The Ontario Action has asserted common law claims on behalf of secondary market share purchasers against Ernst & Young for negligent misrepresentation, negligence *simpliciter* and knowing or willfully blind misrepresentation.

104. As stated above, the Ontario Plaintiffs understand that Ernst & Young denies these claims.

105. A significant hurdle faced by the Class in asserting these claims is establishing that Ernst & Young, as auditor of Sino's financial statements, owed a duty of care to the Class. The Supreme Court of Canada held in *Hercules*² that the auditor in that case owed no duty of care to the shareholders of a corporation that it had audited. While Class Counsel believe that *Hercules* is distinguishable, a significant risk exists that a court would rely on the reasoning in *Hercules* and find that Ernst & Young did not owe a duty of care to the Class, thereby defeating the common law claims based on negligence against Ernst & Young.

106. Moreover, even if the Class is able to establish that Ernst & Young owed a duty of care to shareholders, there remains the possibility that we will be unable to prove that Ernst & Young breached the standard of care. Within the settlement context and on a privileged basis, Ernst &

² *Hercules Managements Ltd v Ernst & Young*, [1997] 2 SCR 165 ("*Hercules*").

Young has provided Class Counsel with the opinion of an auditing expert, who opines that Ernst & Young complied with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS") and was not negligent in the preparation of its 2010 audit report (Ernst & Young's counsel have advised us that, as of the date hereof, it expects to receive similar opinions with respect to audit reports for prior years, if necessary).

107. We anticipate that Ernst & Young will argue that it was itself the victim of a fraud by Sino's management, and appropriately relied on other experts during the conduct of its audits, including a major Chinese law firm, and the valuation reports of Pöyry (Beijing) and its affiliate entities. In its Statement of Allegations against Sino and certain of its former senior officers, staff of the OSC allege that Sino's auditors, including Ernst & Young, were not made aware of Sino's alleged falsified contracts.

108. Ernst & Young could also argue, and a court could find, that a negligence claim requires a showing of reliance by each individual class member. Depending on the process a court adopts, this may require active participation by Class Members in the litigation. The need to actively participate, and to prove reliance, is likely to reduce the total judgment ultimately rendered against Ernst & Young in this class proceeding and increase the length, complexity and cost of the proceedings.

109. Finally, to the extent proof of individual reliance is required as an element of these common law claims, it was by no means certain that a court would grant class certification in respect of these claims. Recent authority has been divided on this issue, and without doubt the certification order would be appealed by the losing party.

Part XXIII.1 liability limits

110. The Class asserts statutory secondary market misrepresentation claims against Ernst & Young under Part XXIII.1 of the *OSA*. The Ontario Plaintiffs understand that Ernst & Young denies these claims. The Ontario Plaintiffs understand that Ernst & Young asserts a reasonable investigation defence pursuant to s 138.4(6) of the *OSA*. The Ontario Plaintiffs also understand that Ernst & Young takes issue with the quantification of damages. Further, the Ontario Plaintiffs understand that it is Ernst & Young's position that s 138.7(1) of the *OSA* could limit recoverable damages to the fees that Ernst & Young earned while auditing Sino, being in the range of \$4-\$8.5 million. In other words, even though the damages of these secondary market purchasers is over \$3 billion, the *OSA* could restrict recovery for the Part XXIII.1 claims to a relatively tiny amount.

111. The only exception to this potentially paltry recovery would be for the Ontario Plaintiffs to prove that Ernst & Young knowingly made the alleged misrepresentations. This could be a challenging standard to meet, one which Ernst & Young denies and which Ernst & Young asserts requires proof of fraud.

112. Class Counsel's view that establishing knowledge will be challenging is bolstered by the recent Statement of Allegations against Ernst & Young released by the OSC, more than 15 months after the cease-trade order. The OSC's Statement of Allegations does not include any allegations that amount to knowledge of or recklessness with regards to a representation.

Claims on behalf of purchasers of notes

113. The Ontario Action also advances common law claims against Ernst & Young on behalf of note purchasers (debt securities purchased pursuant to an offering memorandum).³ Class Counsel are mindful that there are challenges to the prosecution of these claims in the circumstance of this case.

114. Recovery on behalf of noteholders in the class actions is limited, with respect to indemnifiable claims, by virtue of the Plan to a total of CAD\$150,000,000, for both primary and secondary market purchasers, and as against all defendants.

115. Certification of the common law claims relating to Sino notes remains subject to certain risks, including those described above in respect of common law claims on behalf of shareholders. These claims are also subject to a number of unique defenses. For example, the trust indentures governing Sino notes restrict the right of individual noteholders to assert claims in relation to their notes. As such, the Ontario Plaintiffs understand that Ernst & Young may assert that anyone who is not a current noteholder, even if they sold their notes only recently, has no right of action. The defendants assert that those former noteholders transferred all of their rights in the notes, including any right to sue for misrepresentations. Further, to allow the common law claims may violate the rule against double proof; the claimants cannot sue both for trading losses and under the note covenants.

116. Ernst & Young has also raised the argument that the current noteholders have chosen to recover from Sino's assets pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan of Arrangement, and that any other remedy would amount to double recovery.

³ As noted, the *OSA* does not provide for a statutory right of action against Ernst & Young in relation to the alleged misrepresentations in the offering memoranda by way of which the notes were distributed.

117. In assessing the noteholders' common law claims in the context of the settlement, Class Counsel have been cognizant of such risks and uncertainties.

Ernst & Young LLP's Insurance

118. Taking into account the available insurance and annual revenues of the firm, it is the view of plaintiffs' counsel that the amount of damages estimated by the plaintiffs' expert would not reasonably be recoverable against an organization such as Ernst & Young LLP.

Other Auditor Settlements in Securities Class Actions

119. Attached as Exhibit "GG" is a list titled "Top 50 Accounting Malpractice Settlements" prepared by Audit Analytics, an independent research provider focused on the accounting, insurance, regulatory, legal and investment communities.

120. Based on our assessment of the Audit Analytics document and other information available in the public domain, the Settlement Amount would represent the largest securities class action settlement paid by defendants involving a Canadian issuer, the shares of which were not listed on a U.S. stock exchange. Before this settlement, the largest such settlement was in the *YBM Magnex* case where the defendants collectively paid \$85 million to settle the action, which claimed \$875 million in damages, on a global basis.

121. Based on our assessment of the Audit Analytics document and other information available in the public domain, the Settlement Amount would also be the largest settlement paid by a Canadian auditing firm in a securities class action lawsuit. Previously, the largest recovery to shareholders by a Canadian auditing firm was a US\$50.5 million settlement paid by the Canadian branch of Deloitte & Touche in *In Re Philip Services Corp Securities Litigation*.

122. Based on our assessment of the Audit Analytics document and other information available in the public domain, the Settlement Amount ranks as the fifth largest settlement paid by an auditing firm worldwide in a securities class action.


123. The other class action settlements were: i) the \$335 million payment to Cendant shareholders in December 1999; ii) the \$225 million payment to Tyco shareholders in November 2007; iii) the \$210 million payment to Adelphia shareholders in August 2007; and iv) the \$125 million payment to Rite Aid shareholders in March 2003.

124. The remaining settlements on the Audit Analytics list that rank above the Ernst & Young settlement relate to payments made by auditing firms to government regulators or the auditors' clients, or relate to non-securities litigation.

CONCLUSION


125. In light of all of the above considerations, it is Class Counsel's opinion that the Ernst & Young Settlement and Settlement Amount are fair and reasonable to the Class. Class Counsel have no hesitation in recommending to the Court that it approve this settlement.

SWORN before me at the City of)
Toronto, in the Province of Ontario,)
this 10th day of January, 2013.)



A Commissioner, etc.)
LSUC # 62311 B)

S. Sajjad Nematollahi



Charles M. Wright

The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund
of Central and Eastern Canada, et al.
Plaintiffs

Sino-Forest Corporation, et al.
and
Defendants

Court File No: CV-11-431153-00CP

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**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

Proceedings Under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*

Proceeding commenced at **Toronto**

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